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ABSTRACT

When late 19th-century Romanticist thinking culminated in
modern individualism, there resulted a philosophic shift from univer
sal objectivity to individual subjectivity, from absolute morality to
relative morality.

Artists wishing to express the new philosophy had

to search out fresh methods of presenting their material.

Writers of

fiction realized that the traditional omniscient approach to the
problem of rendering unspoken thought was no longer acceptable, since
omniscience rested its argument on the concept of universality,
whereas Relativism demanded a concern with the problem of point of
view.

Moreover, the new science of psychoanalysis soon conceived of

man as governed chiefly by his most primitive, irrational impulses.
Consequently, the question of point of view became the problem of
rendering not only the individual's consciousness but also his metaconscious states as well.

Thus, the concern with point of view also

became a concern with the convention of stream of consciousness,
that is, with a convention capable of expressing a totally subjective
perspective.
After the novelist Henry James clearly articulated the problem,
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a number of impressive experiments with point of view in general, and
stream of consciousness in particular, came from such novelists as
Proust, Joyce, and Faulkner.

So striking were these experiments that

some students of the novel have assumed that the problem is indigenous
only to fiction.

Actually, the issue of point of view is basic and

vital to the whole concept of Relativism, and in appropriately altered
form it stands as the essential question of rnqst modern arts.
It is the purpose of this study to demonstrate that point of
view, or the subjective perspective, is the primary and distinctive
feature of modern dramaturgy.

To support this contention, the

development of modern drama is presented as paralleling that of the
modern novel.

Like Zola and Flaubert in fiction, Ibsen first

attempted to present his Relativism through third-person dramatization,
but when this approach failed to satisfy him, Ibsen tried to pierce
third-person objectivity with symbolism.

That he was not totally

successful in his attempt did not keep his younger contemporary
Strindberg from completely discarding third-person in favor of firstperson dramatization.

After Strindberg had stated the problem, many

important dramatists followed him in exploring and exploiting the
subjective perspective.
This study investigates eight significant point-of-view experi
ments in drama.

Strindberg's The Dream Play and Evreinov's The

Kaiser's From Morn to Midnight and Pirandello's Six Characters in
Search of an Author are offered as plays concerned with point of view
because their themes centered about the concept of the disappearing
ego.

O'Neill'8 Strange Interlude and Giraudoux's The Madwoman of

Chaillot are studied as solutions drawing upon older dramatic tech
niques.

Finally, Death of a Salesman by Miller and The Waltz of the

Toreadors by Anouilh are presented as representative of recent trends
toward compromise.
Viewed in terms of method, modern drama need not be considered
as a mass of conflicting and confusing "ism's," for it consists,
briefly, of two broad, interrelated directions, both of which share
a common romantic background.

The first direction, popularly called

Realism, is based on a third-person objective dramatization; the
second direction, a later stage and consummation of the first, is that
of first-person subjective dramatization.

For identification, the

two directions may be labeled Externalism and Pan-psychism.

Pan

psychism, the more subjective and irrational direction, had tended
toward deep pessimism.

This pessimism apparently touched bottom with

Pirandello, for recent point-of-view dramas have tended to compromise
with approaches involving saner and more lucid subject-object
relationships.
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PREFACE

This study is one in dramaturgic method.

In a very broad

sense, it is also a study in comparative literary forms, for the
particular dramatic problem which is investigated is that struc
tural issue long known to students of the modern novel as point of
view.

Regarded in another light, the study may also be considered

as a historical-philosophical presentation of certain trends in
modern dramatic literature, for although the main emphasis is on
close critical analysis of eight plays by eight representative
m o d e m playwrights, the'general historical background and the past
and present philosophic implications of the matter under study are
not ignored as if the plays and playwrights existed in a cultural
vacuum.

On the other hand, this work is not intended as an

exhaustive treatment of history, philosophy, or comparative
literature.

It is, first and last, chiefly concerned with the

place and function and evolution of the convention of point of
view in contemporary drama.
The question of point of view as an important structural
problem first began seriously to be considered by the authors of
the late 19th-century, who, acting under the pressure of a philo
sophic shift from universality to individuality, from absolutism
to relativism, began to be less interested in the total action of a
story and more interested in the post from which the action was
vii

observed.

Thus, many of the major novelists of the time began to

exchange their omniscient approach for that of a third-person
objectivity.

As the twin concepts of relativism and individualism

gained more and more acceptance, writers dropped third-person
objectivity for first-person subjectivity.

Subsequent experi

mentation with first-person presentation ultimately produced the
technique known as stream of consciousness, a device which
attempted to present the most basic and unintellectual areas of
human thought.
The critics of the novel have produced a number of long
studies of the nature and evolution of the concept of point of view
in the modern novel.

In terms of the drama no such studies exist.

Indeed, some students of the novel even feel that the problem of
point of view is peculiar to the novel, but a number of the more
respected dramatic critics— men like John Gassner, Allardyce
Nicoll, and Alan Downer— have, at one time or another, commented
on the presence of the problem of point of view in the modern play.
None of these comments, however, has been very extended.

There

seems, therefore, to be a need for a study of some length on the
problem of the subjective perspective, i.e., point of view, in
drama.
In general the investigation is divided into two major parts.
The first, and shorter part, presents the general background.
Chapter One offers a broad consideration of the total concept of

viii

point of view in literature.

In brief fashion, the chapter presents

the development of the modern problem of point of view out of the
ancient and continuing issue of unspoken thought.

The modern

convention is related to the philosophic shift from absolutism to
relativism, and the chapter concludes with a brief glance at some
of the solutions, from James to Faulkner, which have been attempted
in the contemporary novel.
Chapter Two concentrates only on drama.

Those men and forces

in drama which shaped and influenced the 20th-century playwright's
concern with first-person presentation are presented and briefly
discussed.

In general, the chapter traces the late 19th-century

dramatist's attempts to present his relativistic philosophy, first,
through third-person objectivity and, finally, through more sub
jective approaches.

The chapter presents these attempts as forces

which caused modern drama to take both a subjective and an objective
direction, two seemingly opposed but on a structural level, quite
closely related forms.
The second and longer portion of the study is an examination
of eight plays by eight different playwrights.
are selected for various reasons.

Ihe playwrights

First, because as a group, they

form a representative cross-section of trends in modern drama.
Second, because as an international company, they suggest the scope
and extent of the problem of point of view in modern dramaturgy.
Finally, the playwrights fall into a rough chronological pattern
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which provides a basis for a general consideration of the evolution
of the subjective perspective within the m o d e m dramatic framework.
The playwrights are studied in pairs.

Strindberg and Evreinov

are considered first because they serve as examples of early
experimenters with the new problem.

Kaiser and Pirandello are

next presented as two slightly later playwrights who took up the
problem of viewpoint because of their need for a device which would
adequately present their philosophy of the ego as a spiritually
isolated, constantly eroding and dissolving phenomenon.

The third

pair of playwrights considered are O'Neill and Giraudoux.

These

two writers are among that group which sought to solve the problem
of point of view by reintroducing older dramatic techniques, tech
niques which were held in disfavor by early m o d e m dramatists.
last two playwrights studied are Miller and Anouilh.
exemplify certain recent tendencies toward compromise.

The two men
Miller

attempts to reunite third-person with first-person subjective
dramatization; Anouilh returns to an even earlier tradition and
combines the modern subjective perspective with the omniscient
technique of Moliere.
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CHAPTER ONE

FROM EURIPIDES TO ULYSSES
THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEM OF UNSPOKEN THOUGHT

Sophocles begins the second choral ode of Antigone with the
triumphant:
Many are the wonders of the world
And none so wonderful as Man.
And after listing the many achievements of man, the poet cries out:
Language withal he learnt,
And thought that as the wind Is free,
And aptitudes of civic life:
Ill-lodged no more he lies,
His roof the sky, the earth his bed,
Screened now from piercing frost and pelting rain;
All-fertile in resource, resourceless never
Meets he the morrow...1
In these ringing words, Sophocles not only pays tribute to the
indomitable human spirit and Intelligence, but he also hints at one
of the most difficult problems which confront any artist when he
attempts

to capture within the limits of an art form the reality

which is man— the problem of basing his work on some manifestation
of human "thought that as the wind is free."

And Sophocles all but

acts as prophet to the many and varied forms which this artistic
difficulty will produce when he sings that man is "all-fertile in
resource, resourceless never."

^•Charles Alexander Robinson, Jr., Ed., An Anthology of Greek
Drama (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 112.

1

2

The Sophoclean metaphor which catches up thought and wind
Into a single complex brings to mind those medieval icons which
depict the winds as blustery and full-cheeked gentlemen strongly
suggestive of cloud formations.

The relationship, of course,

between the two devices is truly of the slimmest, but they jointly
suggest certain problems which face any artist who addresses a
particular art form, be it poetry, painting, sculpture, or— and
these especially— narration or drama.

Art is, despite the

currency of the term abstract, to some extent always concrete, limit
ing, tangible.

What Mark Schorer says of fiction can be extended

to all the arts.
selective."

9

"Fiction, we propose, is solid, is formal, is

On the other hand, much of natural and most of human,

activity is nonlimiting, nontangible, in short, nonobjective.

The

artist's basic task then is to reconcile irreconcilables, to fix, at
least for an instant, boundaries for the boundless; to give form
to the formless; to create concrete counterparts for the irretriev
ably abstract.

Some of the aspects of this labor are solved by the

very act of selecting an art form; others, however, are compounded
by that very selection.
The painter, for instance, who selects a canvas of a given
size has by that act set limits to limitless space, although he
may, as did the painters of the Renaissance, feel that the limits
are too binding and immediately set out to enlarge them through

^Mark Schorer, Ed,, The Story. A Critical Anthology (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 5.
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such devices as perspective.

Actually, viewed from one angle, the

entire history of painting since the Renaissance can be told as
the struggle of the artist to extend the spatial restrictions
imposed by the very selection of his medium.

Segfried Giedion

in his monumental and aptly titled work, Space. Time and Architecture,
attempts Just such a historical study in terms of architecture.

In

fact, when considering the problem of space in the plastic arts,
we may be forced to a strange conclusion:

the nature of the

spatial arts constrains those working in them to attack reality just
at that point where the art form is most restrictive— in the area
of space.

This paradox, in appropriately altered form, can be

extended to all arts.
Thus the poet, dealing most often with nonverbal matter,
directs a great portion of his energy to extending the frontiers
of the words and rhythms which define his peculiar art.

In like

manner the musician is often at odds with the very bars and measures
which he cherishes most.

The ways of this paradox are devious, and

its resolutions, usually only partially successful, are as numerous
as the possessors of the "all-fertile" human resource, but as
Sophocles's metaphor and the medieval geographer's rendering of the
winds suggest, the solutions have a certain common ground, a
certain affinity.

Each attempts to lay open the puzzle through

some fashion of alternate- or even anti-reality, to substitute, as
it were, some type of artistic pattern for the general disorder of
reality, and consequently to solve the difficulty by partially or
completely ignoring the real world.

At the risk of oversimplification,
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these patterns may, as a whole, be encompassed by the critical
term "artistic convention."
Conventions and their uses often become the key to a given
art form, for the manner in which an artist chooses to counter
attack, that is, to ignore or conventionalize, reality can usually
provide us with the basic clue to what the artist wishes to say
about man in the universe.

Moreover, while there are other avenues

of approach open to the critical mind, the way to art through
its conventions may often be the most fruitful way.

As H. D. F.

Kitto argues, and there are many to support his claim, there is
no dividing of form and meaning. 3
another.

The two are functions of one

The former may be found only through the latter; the

latter will usually suggest and dictate the former.
Now there is a certain truth in arguing that "a rose is a
rose," but such an argument is, after all, nought but an admission
that the work of art has left us with nothing to say.

It is only

by careful and close analysis that we are able to understand and
demonstrate that a play by Shakespeare is superior to one by Pinero,
and analysis implies a study of meanings, intentions, and, above
all, conventions of form and structure— conceived and conceivable.
Moreover, even as it is possible to study and understand conventional
uses within a given work of art, it is also possible to extract these
from several works within a particular period in order to compare them

3h .D.F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama, a Study of Six
Greek Plays and of Hamlet. (London: Methuen, 1951), p. v.
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to each other and to trends In the era as a whole.
Nothing will be gained by denying that some violence is
necessarily done to the single work by disturbing its inherent
unity, but such violence is justified if insight can be gained
into the total corpus of a given period.

Ultimately, what damage

is done to the single work will be more than compensated for by
our gaining a greatly enriched understanding of the individual
work when the so rudely separated and studied part is once more
returned to its rightful whole.

It is with this hope of an

improved understanding that our attention will presently be brought
to bear on a particular artistic convention in a given period of
creative activity.
The period which will be the ultimate focus of our
attention will be that era which extends from the last quarter
of the 19th-century to the present.day, the era which we have
roughly tenned "modern."

The convention which will be studied is

that of point of view, in particular the peculiarly m o d e m interest
in first-person subjective point of view, an interest which arose
out of a philosophical shift from absolutism to relativism, from
rational objectivity to irrational subjectivity.

Prior to the

m o d e m period, artists, like the rest of humanity, assumed that
all men took the same general view of reality.

Individual dif

ferences were, of course, recognized, but these were assumed to be
minor variations within an unchanging over-all pattern.

Thus,

paintings were executed to be observed by the universal viewer from
the universal viewpoint.

Stories, dramatic and narrative, were
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presented omnisciently.
this was changed.

With the coining of modern relativism, all

Each post of observation was understood to be

decidedly different; each was considered equally valid.
painter this meant an abandonment of perspective:

To the

to the writer,

a discovery of new narrative means to isolate and give emphasis
to individual subjectivity as opposed to universal objectivity.
In other words, there was a great effort made to perfect and
exploit the various possibilities of point of view.

It is this

effort, as it manifests itself in modern drama, which forms the
basic matter of this study.
Before an Investigation of point of view in the m o d e m drama
is undertaken, however, it will first be necessary to isolate the
convention historically and artistically in order to establish in a
general manner its nature and importance.

To do this, let us return

to Sophocles and the problem suggested by his figure, "thought that
as the wind is free."
That paradox which we have been discussing— "i.e., an art
form seems to focus the activity of the artist on the very area in
which he is most limited— centers itself especially in the related
arts of narrative and drama near to, or in the very center of, the
fugitive phenomenon of human thought.

In both narration and drama,

the principal tools of comment are human character and human action.
The writer, be he author of novel or epic, classical tragedy or
m o d e m melodrama, must make his major statements in terms of these
two elements.

Now the common source of both character and action—

indeed their fountainhead— is the hidden, motivating thought, which
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as Sophocles suggests, Is as elusive as the wind.

To

precise, we

may say that it is neither character nor action, but that it may
manifest itself as one or both of these.

Thus, one of the major

problems of the playwright and the narrative artist is not only
to depict character and action but also to reveal or suggest the
thought which lies both beneath and beyond these two literary
elements.

In short, the author must devise a convention which will

be an acceptable vehicle, _i.e., counterpart or substitute, for the
reality which is thought.
The attempts to meet the challenge of presenting thought in
a literary art are sometimes facile, sometimes subtle, sometimes
heavy-handed, but almost always interesting, for among all the
structural problems this is the one which as Ellis-Fermor says
"goes near the roots and is closely linked with many others."^
Stated in a different manner, all narrative and dramatic art is
ultimately centered on the inner thoughts of the characters, those
things which form character and prompt decisions and external
actions, and it is in the area of thought that the writer is
most restricted; to this restricted space he bends his inventive
efforts in an attempt to open it as perspective opened the interior
space of a Renaissance painting.
As early as the fifth-century B. C., the problem of hidden
thought was faced and partially solved by the Greek tragedians in

^Una Ellis-Fermor, The Frontiers of Drama (London:
& Co., Ltd., 1948), p. 121.

Methuen
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their reworking of an existing convention and in their particular
attitude toward the playhouse, an attitude which was to lose ground
during the succeeding centuries.

When the Greek playwright turned

his attention to matters psychicj he found one ready instrument for
his needs in the chorus, which had survived from an earlier, more
ritualistic period.

Thus, among its many burdens, the chorus was

also asked to function, from time to time, as a "reflector" of
the moods or thoughts of the characters.

Sometimes this was done

by having the chorus act as a confidant, one who obtains moods or
motivations by questioning actions or simply by acting as an avail
able listener to one who wishes to complain or explain.

Or again,

in a more ritualized variant of the convention, the chorus may
directly or indirectly take up the unspoken thoughts of the character.
This technique is most frequently employed by Euripides, though it
may be found in several isolated instances in the work of Sophocles,
and its use is especially apparent in the Orestia of Aeschylus.

An

excellent example of Euripides's method may be seen in the choral
ode which follows Medea's sending of her children, with their fatal
gift, to the new bride of Jason.

Though the chorus ostensibly

comments only on the situation, the direction taken is obviously
that of the silent thoughts of Medea herself.
A second device used by all three of the ancient tragedians
was the direct public address, a device which grew out of the very
nature of the Greek theatre.

A theatre, springing from religious

ritual and still lingering within the shadow of that ritual, may
allow its characters certain formalized activities.

Apparently,
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one of these permissible activities was direct public address to the
audience.

In fact, not only was this device permissible, it seems

to have been expected as one of the early speeches of the central
character; usually, it was the first speech he delivered.

The

early speeches of Oedipus, Creon, and Clytemnestra in the Oedipus,
the Antigone, and the Agamemnon stand as examples of this practice.
In these direct addresses to the audience— or through the chorus
to the audience— the speaker is allowed to cover some or all of
the expository matter and to disclose to the audience certain
essential traits of his character.

In line with the latter

privilege, he sometimes articulates what would normally be con
sidered unspoken or unspeakable thought.

This convention of

direct public address is heavily stylized, and it could well be
that a concentrated study of each of these speeches might lead
to a discovery of certain principles governing the use of this device.
For one thing, it is apparent, even to the casual observer, that
the practice is intimately related to the Athenian's passionate
interest in written and spoken rhetoric, and the speeches seem
to conform closely to the then prevailing rhetorical theories.
A variant of the public address technique is used by
Euripides in such plays as Medea.

In the latter play, perhaps in

an attempt to gain greater verisimilitude— Euripides has been
accused of this— the playwright allows us to examine the hidden
thoughts of Medea through a series of short, off-stage soliloquies
which the audience overhears.

This technique of the overheard
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soliloquy seems to mark the extent of the Greek experimentation
with the then existing conventions, though it is possible that in
such a play as Medea. Euripides may well be striking out in a
new direction, a direction which would have to wait some twentyfour centuries before it was again to be single-mlndedly followed.
When, after the demise of ancient drama, the Western theatre
was reborn on the altars of medieval churches, it was inevitable
that its forms and conventions would be influenced, as was the
classic drama, by the philosophic and aesthetic climate of its
age, and thus it is not surprising to discover medieval playwrights
surrendering to that overwhelming need of the Middle Ages to thicken
all symbolism to the point of personification.

Developing con

currently with the tendency toward personification was a whole
body of dramatic literature which completely rejected the external
world and concentrated on the struggles within the soul of man.
The medieval playwright, at least in the moralities, not only
was interested in revealing internal psychic processes, he was,
above all, concerned with dramatizing them through conventions
heavily dependent upon the uses of personification.

Accordingly,

in such plays as Everyman the human soul became a battle ground on
which the various aspects of human personality waged a constant
war.

Each of these aspects were abstracted and universalized into

a living entity.
Knowledge,

Thus, Man talked to and argued with his own

in essence, what the medieval playwright did was to

attempt to reveal inner conflict by compartmentalizing the human
personality, and, for the most part, broadly dividing it into those
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parts which recognized the beauty of doing good and those parts which
hungered after evil*

Just how extensive this division and sub

division became can be seen in The Castle of Perseverance where
man's intelligence becomes the good and the bad angels, and where
man's basic drives are first dichotomized into virtues and sins,
and then subdivided into seven of each type.

All sixteen of these

personifications walk the stage along with man, and in addition to
such abstractions as World, Confession, Penance, Death, and Truth.
Together with heavy use of personification as a means of
rendering thought, there was also in the medieval drama, as in
the classical drama, some use of the soliloquy, but it was not
until the advent of the English Renaissance that the full potential
of the soliloquy and its sister device, the aside, was realized.
In addition to these two conventions, the Elizabethan dramatists
also brought to full bloom a device found wherever dramatic
poetry is practiced— imagery.

Of these three means of presenting

unspoken thought— the aside, the soliloquy, and imagery— the latter
is probably the least dramatic and is most appealing when it is most
subtle.

Unfortunately, it is just at this point that it loses

its effectiveness in the theatre.

Consequently, despite the preva

lence of a latter-day intellectual game, that of picking to pieces
the uses of imagery by Shakespeare and other Elizabethans, we must
be extremely careful not to attribute to imagery more weight than
it can carry.

In poetry and closet drama it may reign supreme,

but in any work intended for the theatre, imagery must be counted
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as less important and less effective than the aside, the soliloquy,
or even the stage setting as a means of conveying ideas, especially
when those ideas remain as unexpressed motives.

With this reser

vation, it is still possible to say that imagery often functioned
as an invaluable vehicle for rendering unspoken thoughts in Eliza
bethan drama.

For instance, in Henry V, where the imagery through

out is fairly obvious, the various changes in Henry's underlying
mood can be noted by the changes in the figures of his speech.
Thus, as he begins his conversation with Princess Katharine, his
images, since he still views her as something akin to a prize
of war, are for the most part warlike.
If I could win a lady at leap-frog, or vaulting into
my saddle with m y armour on my back, under the correction
of bragging be it spoken, I should quickly leap into a
wife.
When, however, the princess has not responded to his warlike
advances, when she has refused to be impressed by his soldierly
attributes, and when, in fine, Harry has come to realize that he
must meet her on more courtly terms, the King's imagery becomes what
for Henry can only be described as most unmanly.
No, Kate? I will tell thee in French, which I am sure
will hang upon my tongue like a newly married wife about
her husband's neck, hardly to be shook off.
But even such obvious imagistic changes as are found above
are likely to go unnoticed in the theatre, so that modern interest
in Shakespearian imagery notwithstanding, it was truly in the aside
and especially in the soliloquy that Elizabethan dramatists achieved
consummate conventional forms.

As Ellis-Fermor says:
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But at Its finest, as at the height of the
Elizabethan period, the soliloquy, by Its rapid and
profound revelation of thought and passion, serves
the very ends of drama. It reveals what we could not
otherwise divine of the depths of the speaker's mind,
compressing Into some twenty lines of vivid illumi
nation what might else have taken the better part of an
act to convey.^
The aside served, to a lesser degree, much the same function
as the soliloquy, with the added advantage of allowing the character
to discover to the audience his secret thoughts while he was
surrounded by other characters who, during the aside, became
conveniently deaf.

Hie richness of psychological texture and

humor to be obtained by an effective use of the aside may be seen
in the famous dialogue between the Jew of Malta and Lodowlck, a
suitor of his daughter.
An interesting feature of the Elizabethan aside and soliloquy
is that while they were obviously directed at the audience, they
still were not formal public speeches.

That is, they remained, for

the most part, within the framework of the action taking place on
the stage.
practice.

There were, however, numerous exceptions to this
Richard III, for instance, can hardly be telling himself

he is a villain.

He is obviously, in his opening speech, addressing

the audience in direct public speech; as in the opening speech of
Oedipus, Richard is functioning much more as an orator than as a
character in the play.

This aspect of the aside and the soliloquy

became more and more popular as the Renaissance exchanged its

5Ibidi, p. 105.
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romantic tendencies for more neo-classic ones.

By the time of the

triumph of Restoration comedy in England, the twin conventions of
the aside and the soliloquy were fast assuming the shape of direct
public address to the audience, the shape which they had originally
taken in the Greek drama.
With the change in the formal direction of the two devices
came also a change in their uses.

Throughout the late 18th- and

19ch-centuries, the aside and the soliloquy tended increasingly to
function as a means of conveying exposition and as a way of preparing
for plot complications, rather than as vehicles for presenting hidden
moods and motives.

This transformation in function held true through

out the 19th-century and by the third quarter of that era, the two
devices remained in English and continental drama only as methods
which allowed lazy or inept playwrights to handle situations which
would have taken some skill to dramatize effectively.

In short,

during the 19th-century, the aside and the soliloquy served only to
provide the playwright with a line of retreat into the narrative.
Historically, from 5th-century Athens to 19th-century Europe,
the basic approach to unspoken thought, regardless of the conventions
used, was much the same.

No matter who the character, be he Claudius,

Oedipus, Everyman, or Hamlet, the audience understood that the play
wright expected his viewers to see beyond the thoughts of the
individual characters to the play as a whole action.

The audience

realized that back of the insight of a given character lay matters
which may be unperceived by the individual, but which are perfectly
apparent to the audience, and these were meant to be so.

Over the
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whole of the dramatic action lay the shadow of great and absolute
verities of which only the audience and the playwright were aware.
In accordance with this approach, the playwright was granted the
ability to select at will the hidden thoughts of as many characters
as he wished.

This license was granted with special generosity to

the Elizabethan playwright.

Thus that artist was able to create

an intensely dramatic scene in which each character revealed, and
acted on, his own Insight, while the audience saw and understood
both individual viewpoints and the greater universe which lay beyond.
An example of such a scene is the chapel scene of Hamlet.
As this scene opens, we learn from Claudius's soliloquy that
he cannot bring himself to pray, though outwardly he appears to be
doing so.
hell.

Thus, Claudius, if killed now, is a prime candidate for

However, we immediately learn from Hamlet's soliloquy that

the Prince's insight has failed him, for Hamlet believes the King
to be praying.

And so Claudius is saved.

The drama in the scene

lies in the irony revealed by juxtaposing the silent thoughts of
each character.

As far as external action goes, the scene is static

enough to satisfy the most fervent wishes of Maeterlinck.

The most

important point to be made about the scene, however, is not that the
audience is allowed to perceive the thoughts of both characters but
that the audience is aware throughout that it is to comprehend the
revealed thought only in terms of the greater action of the scene and
the total action of the play.

From the drama of the Greeks to the

last quarter of the 19th-century, the dominant attitude toward the
rendering of thought and concealed motives was the attitude exemplified
in the above scene, the attitude which may best be described as
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absolute.

That is, the individual's motives were always placed

against the background of great moral and ethical values.

But as

far back as the Greek playwright Euripides, there were Indications
that another, subtly but significantly different approach was
possible.
H. D. F. Kitto in his Greek Tragedy has suggested that, in
such works as Medea, Euripides was not writing classical tragedy at
all, but was composing what in m o d e m idiom would be called a
psychological drama.®

Medea, for instance, is not to be viewed

as a character, but as a particular state of mind and soul.

She

might even be considered a personification, much as the sin of envy
was personified in the medieval morality play.

It is difficult

to argue with Kitto on this point, for when his premise is granted,
many of the puzzles of the play resolve themselves.

The daus ex

machina at the end, for example, becomes not mere trickery, but a
meaningful necessity, for if Medea is the passion of jealousy, she
truly belongs to the total universe and to the gods, and cannot
suffer herself to be destroyed by man.

More important than this,

however, is the solution which Kitto's theory provides for the problem
of Jason.

It is a common complaint, even among students in a fresh

man play reading course, that it hardly seems possible that such a
sanguine woman as Medea could have committed so many horrible deeds

^H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1954), p. 197 f.
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In the past and contemplated such unnatural murder In the present
solely for the love of such a spineless, colorless man as Jason.
And, Indeed, It does seem improbable if we approach Medea In the
traditional manner, but if we accept Kitto*s suggestion and follow
it to its conclusion, we find that the Jason puzzle no longer exists.
For Jason exists only in Medea's mind, and Medea is naught but
ruthless jealousy, made shocking by human suffering but not limited
by human logic.
To explain, Euripides was actually writing, perhaps for the
first time in literary history, a truly modern psychological work,
and he was using as his basic technical device a convention which
we have earlier referred to as first-person subjective point of view.
In Medea we have a play which does not immediately allow the audience
to see the characters interacting against the backdrop of a larger
action; we have in Medea a play which permits the audience only to
see the characters against the background of Medea's passion.
is, we see Jason only from Medea's point of view.

That

Considering the

state of her mind, it is little wonder that the hated man appears
as stupid and insipid.
This method of rendering soul states, this filling of the
stage with a single viewpoint, which, as it were, lays a psychic smoke
screen between the objective action and the audience, was from time
to time to be tinkered with in the centuries of literary effort which
followed the wGrk of Euripides, but it was not again to be whole
heartedly pursued until late in the 19th-century.

There may be some

validity in arguing that the medieval moralities were, after a
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fashion, examples of the use of this method, and, of course, there is
some affinity between the two.

There may even have been, though it

would be difficult to prove, some attempt on the part of the medieval
playwright to employ variations of point of view, but it could
hardly have been serious or extended effort, for the important
point in the moralities is that the audience be able to comprehend
the actions of man in relation to the actions of the absolute laws
of Q o d and church.

In other words, the audience was expected to

understand the actions of the individual from the viewpoint of the
great moral laws, not to understand the laws from the viewpoint of
the individual.
A basic change in artistic philosophy was ultimately to
reverse this situation, but the approach of the medieval playwright,
as has been noted earlier, was to continue as the prevailing
attitude toward the individual ego throughout the 16th, 17th, 18th,
and most of the 19th-centuries.

There are, of course, numerous

isolated examples of a more m o d e m approach to point of view.
There is, for instance, the exciting banquet scene in Macbeth,
which is only to be understood as a direct rendering, for that
scene at least, of the point of view of a single individual—
Macbeth— to the exclusion of all others.

But the scene once over,

the action returns to a more universal objectivity, and the scene
becomes, in the totality of the drama, a sort of dramatized soliloquy,
an involved variation of the same technique earlier applied in the
"Is this a dagger" speech.
Samuel Richardson, the first English novelist, is another

19

example of those men who serve as forerunners to the m o d e m Interest
In subjective points of view.

Casting about for a means to tell

his stories, Richardson hit upon the epistolary method, an approach
which forced him to present his narrative from a point of reference
quite close to the viewpoints of the characters themselves.

Richard

son's technique so appealed to Coleridge that according to Leon Edel
the great romantic poet was moved to comment that Richardson demon
strated "the morbid consciousness of every thought and feeling in
the whole flux and reflux of the mind, in short its self-involution
and dream-like continuity."^

From our present vantage point, it

hardly seems that Richardson's technique quite accomplished what
Coleridge thinks it did, but we must make allowances for the extrava
gance of Romantic criticism.
What Coleridge did recognize was that Richardson's method was
a new direction, and a very important one.

But its importance aside,

it was in advance of the time when a shift in philosophy would prompt
widespread exploitation of his new method.

The age of Richardson

was the Age of Reason, and Reason was more interested in the final
forms and results of thought than in the processes by which the final
forms were reached.

Because of this, the age was interested, as no

other has been, in the general not the particular.

Racine's uni

versalized men and women were more esteemed than Shakespeare's some
what more individualized people.

The ideal of all, in science as in

^Leon Edel, The Psychological Novel:
J. B. Lipplncott, 1955), p. 39.

1900-1950 (New York:
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literature, was not analysis but synthesis, and, thus, the novelists
and playwrights, in the main, tended away from investigations of
idiosyncrasies.

Like Moliere, they were interested in extracting

the essence of a character, his dominant trait, that universal
quality which he shared with all men, or at the very least with
all men of his type.
As the Age of Reason gave way to the onslaughts of the
Romantic Revolution, the playwright, while he continued to use the
soliloquy frequently and the aside excessively, veered more and more
in the direction of melodrama, and consequently shunned— -indeed,
abhorred— -any extensive treatment of psychic depths.

The fervor

of the steadily growing romantic philosophy and the popularization
and vulgarization of the theatre gave additional impetus to the
melodrama as the chief dramatic mode.

The triumph of romantic

realism and the piece bien faite was approaching, and what need
had a dramatist of intrigue with thought or motivation?

In the

melodrama then, the aside and soliloquy became monologues in the
true sense, direct public addresses to the audience which provided
rapid exposition or preparation for plot complications.
As the drama after the Age of Reason drifted more and more
into melodrama, the novel steadily gained respect as a literary
form, but though the novel soon became one of the chief literary
media of the Age of Romanticism, its practitioners stubbornly
refused to relinquish the tradition of the omniscient author, the
author who through the grace of neoclassic dispensation was able to
see all and tell all.

Moreover, the novelists had good reason for
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their stand.

Theirs was a new genre, freed from the temporal and

spatial restrictions of the stage, flexible enough to allow the
omniscient author an almost unlimited choice of approaches and
subjects.

Even after the Romantic Movement had completely elimi

nated the philosophic demand for omniscience on the part of the
narrator, the 19th-century novelists continued to feel no need
to consider a new convention.

Why should they?

The had not yet

completely realized the full potential of the old.
It is true that there were some steps taken in the direction
suggested by Richardson.

There was even some dalliance with the

presentation of entire stories through the first-person, such a
presentation as is found in David Copperfield.

But the first-

person as Dickens and others presented it was more objective than
subjective.

As Percy Lubbock observes:

"David offers a pair of

eyes and a memory, nothing further is demanded of him."**
words, David's vision is a univeral vision.
anyone.

In other

It might belong to

Moreover, behind that vision, and never very far away, was

the more omniscient perception of Dickens himself.

In short, the

essential address was still that of the omniscient author, but
little circumscribed by the first-person technique,

But such flirt

ing with first-person objective as we find in David Copperfield and
kindred works must be considered more as an attempt to add variety
to a slightly stale approach than as an indication that a new

®Percy Lubbock, The Craft of Fiction (New York:
Press, 1957), p. 130.

The Viking
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development was at hand.

Any really significantly different method

of narration, either in the novel or in the drama, had to wait
until a drastic philosophic change had occurred, and that change
was long in coming.
Universally held beliefs yield slowly, if ever, to changes.
The Romantic Movement had succeeded in overthrowing reason and in
establishing passion as a key to human activity.

This revolution

had seriously weakened the foundations of a Western philosophy
which had remained relatively intact since the late Middle Ages, a
philosophy based on Aristotelian ideals of synthesis, a philosophy
which had reached its latest apogee in Augustan England and Baroque
France.

But however weakened its foundations, its superstructure

stood for more than a century.

If great passion must be more

highly esteemed than clear reasoning, so be it.

But even great

passion must be synthesized into its ideal counterpart, its "ideal
grace."

Thus, Thackeray may be free to scratch about in the hidden

c o m e r s of Becky's soul, but he is also equally free, as the author,
to comment on her relation to more ideal standards. Not only is
Thackeray free to do this, but as Lubbock says, he takes a "positively
willful pleasure" in doing so.

There are even times when Thackeray

will "boast of his own independence, insisting in so many words on
his freedom to say what he pleases about his men and women and to make
them behave as he will."^

9lbid., pp. 87-88.
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But even as Thackeray wrote there were forces forming which
were ultimately to make a complete shambles of the philosophy of
absolutism upon which Thackeray rested his argument for the free
manipulation of his men and women.

These forces, many of which had

been created and all of which had been incubated by the Romantic
Revolution, were, in the last quarter of the 19th-century, to cause
a complete transformation in the thinking of Western Culture.

They

were forces which would find their culmination and finest expression
in a new generation of artists and philosophers, in such men as
Ibsen, Zola, Flaubert, Strindberg, Freud, Nietzsche, and Henry and
William James.

These were the men who saw a new vision of the world,

and it was they who gave a new direction and impetus to the dying
romanticism of the 19th-century.
Different as these men were from one another, they all had
a consnon romantic heritage and from it they fashioned a new and
distinctly modern philosophy.

To ferret out and discover the origins

of those concepts which formed the bases for their new philosophy
would be an intriguing study, but one which is certainly too vast to
be attempted herein.

It is more to the p o i n t at hand to recognize

that by the final quarter of the 19th-century a significant mutation
in romantic thought was observable.

Out of such things as the

increasing scientific interest in energy systems; out of the
evolutionary theories of the natural sciences; out of the general
scientific concern with the "how?" instead of the "why?"; out of
the Positivism of Comte and the Individualism of John Stuart Mill,
out of these concepts and the trends which produced them, the
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artists and philosophers of the late 19th-century built a new,
modern world view.*®
As the 19th-century drew toward its final quarter, the
romantic mind felt it had earned a right to be a bit smug.

In

no small measure it had aided the creation and growth of modern
democracy.

It had succeeded in freeing the arts from the oft-

times pointless restraints of neoclassicism.

It had even, albiet

not always with good grace, seen the Industrial revolution through
to its accomplishment, and it now had the pleasure of watching
the new sciences show man the way to "progress" and to God's
kingdom on earth.
be sentimental.

It was a time to be pleased.

It was even a time to

Despite certain signs to the contrary, it was even

a time to cry out that God was in his heaven and all was right with
the world.

But such a declaration might indicate a trifle too much
I

protestation.

The sentimentality of the time might well be an attempt

to gloss over a deeper unrest.
true.

Both suppositions appear to be

For the preachment about the well-being of the world and the

sentimental approach to the individual seem to have been futile
efforts to avoid the truth of the matter:

romanticism had passed

its first rush; it had worn itself out, become decadent.

The indi

vidual man, having gained steadily in importance as a social entity
through the breakdown of absolute standards, demanded the increased

*^For a discussion of the late 19th-century shift towards
relativistic values see Wilhelm Windelhand, A History of Philosophy;
Renaissance. Enlightenment, M o d e m II (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
Harper & Brothers, 1958).
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respect possible to one who could be regarded both as a social and
a scientific phenomenon*

He wished to be analyzed along with the

other natural forces and energies.

In its decadence the age had

grown morose and turned in upon Itself..
This was the atmosphere in which such men as Neitzsche and
Zola wrote and thought.

It was in this climate of strong intro

spection that they were prompted to develop their sacred reverence
for the individual into what has been called the "cult of the ego."**
Essentially this meant that truth as they saw it was an irrational,
subjective phenomenon.
not Apollonian.

Truth was in Nietzschean terms, Dionysian

In other words, the Individual ego did not exist

in the world; the world existed in and for the ego.

Stated in terms

of the arts, the cult of the ego invites the following comparison with
more classical standards:

Classicism's genius lay in the artist's

ability to make the subject serve the object; modern romanticism's
genius lies in the artist's subordination of the object to the
subject.
This passionate interest in the worth and value of the indi
vidual soul went hand in hand with yet another important tenet of
late 19th-century thought— the belief in a relative moral standard.
The absolute morality of an earlier day, which throughout the century
had been steadily losing in importance, was now entirely discarded by
many intellectuals, and in its place was set a sliding yardstick

^Laurence LeSage, "Jean Glraudoux, Surrealism and the
German Romantic Ideal," Illinois Studies in Language and Literature.
XXXVI, No. 3 (1952),
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of values which changed with each new individual and each new set of
circumstances.
With the triumph of individualism and relativism, with the
exchange of universal values for pragmatic and utilitarian ones,
with the total retreat from absolutism to empiricism causing, among
other things, the change to a more scientifically and individually
centered psychology, it is not strange to note that the writers of the
late 19th-century, particularly the novelists, became more and more
interested in the "how?" and less and less interested in the "why?"
This new quasi-scientiflc Interest in individuals as energy systems
called forth in the first instance the laboratory objectivity of
Zola's third-person objective approach.

But it was not long before

the restrictions of this objectivity became oppressive to those who
felt that it afforded them little opportunity to handle what had
become for them the chief problem of the novelist— that of describ
ing as completely as possible the flux and reflux, the "Newtonian
psyche," as it were, of the individual ego in a relative world.
To solve this problem, the novelist must discover some
means of presenting the pure and untouched center of the ego.

This

approach is especially necessary if the underlying philosophy is
relativism.

If an absolute morality is no longer to be held in

high regard, then we must, in order to comprehend individual moral
decisions, understand them as the individual understands them.

To

do this, we must see the world from the same posture as he sees the
world.

In fine, we must locate ourselves within the individual, and,

by placing ourselves there, we automatically force ourselves into
seeing and feeling only from his point of view, not from our own or
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from that of an omniscient author.

We may, of course, catch some

knowledge of the greater action in which the Individual operates,
but we can see only that aspect of the greater action that the
private viewpoint allows*

As Frederick J. Hoffman observes, "the

control which a point of view exercises upon the probabilities of
action immensely and splendidly qualifies our awareness of them*"

12

It is true, of course, that once away from close Identification
with the viewpoint of the central consciousness of the story, our
own conclusions about the action may be different, more intelligent
even, but on the surface, at least, we can have no more knowledge of
the whole action than that possessed by the character whose insight
we are sharing.
This then is the new method, the new structural approach
through first-person subjective point of view*

Ihe reader or

listener is no longer permitted to catch up the total action in
the same fashion that he could in the Hamlet-Claudius scene*

How much

he is able to see beyond the Individual point of view of a given
character, how much he is able to judge for himself will depend
upon the sensitivity of his Intelligence and the extent to which
the author has lent himself to the ideals of relativism*

In the

main, the reader's Interest is usually deliberately turned from
universal moral issues and becomes fixed instead on the motions of
the individual soul.

More often than not, there is little effort

^Frederick J. Hoffman, The Modern Novel in America (Chicago:
Gateway Editions, Inc., 1956), p. 5.
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made to relate the individual to any fixed points of reference, for
the author seeks a response rising more from the reader's empathy
than from his intellectual sympathy.
The new method, found in tentative experiments throughout the
history of Western literature from the plays of Euripides to the
novels of Flaubert, was firmly established as the most important
structural concern of the m o d e m novel by the American author Henry
James.

As Hoffman remarks, "The greatest contribution of James to

m o d e m fiction is his discussion and use of what he has variously
called the 'large lucid reflector* and the 'central consciousness.'
Thus the range of the novel's donnee is seen in terms of the

13

character who provides its point of view." ^

James himself

described his method in terms of his novel Roderick Hudson as the
location of the "centre of Interest throughout Roderick...in
Roland Mallet's consciousness, and the drama is the very drama of
that consciousness."*^

Percy Lubbock describes the Jamesian

technique in terms more reminiscent of the science of m o d e m
physics when he says:

"we watch the thought itself, the hidden

thing, as it twists to and fro in his brain— >watch it without any
other aid to understanding but such as its own manner of bearing
may supply."*3

*3Ibid., p. 4-5.
*^Henry James, The Art of the Novel. Critical Prefaces by
Henry James (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 16.
*3Lubbock, op. cit.. p. 157.
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As Lubbock suggests, James was attempting to tell the "how?"
not the "why?" of his characters, and yet ingrained beliefs die so
hard that his famous brother William, a most militant relativist,
despaired of understanding Henry's later work and complained that
in Wings of the Dove Henry had violated the first precept of story
telling, that is to tell it.
story?

But how could Henry himself tell the

According to both his and William's philosophy, the story

was relative to the viewpoints of the characters caught within the
action of the tale.

It was not one story, but many.

Select one

character, the story was a melodrama; select another, the tale was
a bitter tragedy.
As James began to experiment with his new convention, he
found more and more variety inherent in it.

At first, as in

Portrait of a Lady, he limited himself merely to placing emphasis
on Isabel through empathic narration.

He described his technique

in Portrait as the placing of the "centre of the subject in the
young woman's own consciousness."
Stick to that— for the centre; put the heaviest weight
into that scale, which will so largely be the scale of
her relation to herself, and this relation needn't
fear to be too limited. Place meanwhile in the other
scale the lighter weight...press least hard, in short,
on the consciousness of your heroine's satellites,
especially the male; make it an interest contributive
only to the greater one.'’®

James, oj>. cit., p. 51.

As can be seen, what James was deliberately striving for was that
flux, reflux, and self-involution of his heroine's mind which
Coleridge claimed Richardson had achieved.
about his task with infinite caution.

But James was going

While placing the heaviest

weight into Isabel's scale, he was reserving for himself the right
to warn his reader each time he came to load that scale.

He still

narrated to some extent, omnisciently; we are notified about what
Isabel thought; we rarely see the thought itself without authorial
comment.
Presently James was to become bolder.

In Portrait we know

what Warburton and Ralph are like, not because Isabel tells us, but
because James does.
in point of view.

In The Turn of the Screw we have a total study
We know nothing about the characters except that

which we are able to glean from the limited perception of the
Governess.

In fact, so rigorously does James hold himself to the

viewpoint of the Governess, that a violent critical controversy is
still being waged about what actually took place in the action of the
novel.^
Always an experimenter, James was not content to remain within
the bounds of such works as The Turn of the Screw and What Masie Knew.
He began to flirt with a number of complications and complexities
indigenous to his method.

In Wings of the Dove, for instance, he

presented not one but multiple points of view, chief among which were

^ F o r an interesting comparison of critical opinion on Turn of
the Screw see Schorer, o£. cit., pp. 563-606.
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those of Milly Theale and Merton Densher.

Each point of view served

as a reflector of the others, and all served as reflectors of the
Joint action shared by every character.

As to the author, Janies

stood aloof and above, never Intruding.

This technique certainly

has Its points of similarity to the multiple soliloquizing of the
Elizabethans, the difference again being one of a shift in emphasis
caused by a change In underlying philosophy.
were seen in relation to the whole action.
only in relation to the characters.

Elizabethan characters
Jamesian action was seen

James's combination of inter

acting points of view allowed him to gain the same irony in Wings as
Shakespeare had obtained in Othello by playing the point of view of
Iago against that of Othello, but James's method also allowed him
to gain the further end of' using action as a means of access to
character, as a means of making a relativistic statement.
As has been pointed out earlier, James's experiments with
first-person point of view came at the end of a long Romantic Move
ment.

As the 19th-century drew to a close, the romantic mind, as

might be expected after almost a century of focus on human indi
viduality and passion, became more and more morbid and began to
involute excessively.
of inward turning,
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The time was, as Leon Edel terms it, a time
and James's work was but one milestone in that

process of self-involution.

The modern literary convention of point

of view may, perhaps, have remained where James found it, had it not

18Edel, op. cit., p. 41 f.
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been for the growth of two other literary phenomena— Freudian
psychology and the Symbolist movement.

James, of course, was not

directly related to either, but his work is a significant example of
the trends which produced the two movements— specifically, a relativistic philosophy and an interest in the workings of the mind operating
in no larger sphere of action than the mind itself.
James, as he used point of view, was to give almost equal
weight to external and internal action.

Perhaps the major reason

for this split in emphasis was James's own philosophy, best embodied
in his favorite work— consciousness.

In short, James was still

enough of a traditional moralist to remain throughout his life a
champion of human awareness.

He was most interested in the human

mind from the time the thought took phrasable shape until the time
it reacted to external pressures, and, of course, the reverse of
that process.

He lacked both the philosophic need and desire to

pursue the mind's involutions any deeper than the level of intelli
gent awareness.

As Hoffman tells us, "James's concern with fiction

was preeminently a moral concern; he Insisted upon the highest
degree of cultivation and sophistication in the characters who were
the central consciousnesses of his novels.

A crisis had therefore

to be a moral crisis; and the decision taken by his character was
therefore not forced upon him but arrived at after a careful and
often attenuated moral concern over it."19

l^Hoffman. op. cit., p. 9.
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Moreover, bad James's philosophic posture been slightly differ
ent, it is doubtful that he would have proceeded much farther in the
development of his method.
the tools.

He lacked the knowledge and he lacked

The one was to come with Freudian psychology; the

other, the tools, were to be provided principally by the Symbolists,
who ultimately came to seek a new and only partially conscious
means of presenting human thought.

Essentially, human thinking,

as seem by the Symbolists, was a nonorderly process. So inextricably
united was it, in each of its phases, with external and remembered
experiences, that it could only roughly be approximated in language
and then only by a series of loosely related concrete instances.

An

artist was henceforth to walk as Ezra Pound later said "in fear of
abstraction"; and he was to use what T. S. Eliot was later to call
"the objective correlative," some sort of concretion which "captured
an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time."

In

short, the artist was to recognize the essential Irrationality (or
more precisely nonlogicality) of the human mind and he was to
capture and represent this’ by telling his tales, writing his poems,
making his statements in symbols.

The symbolists were, in fact,

taking the first of modernism's steps towards the type of artistic
and poetic freedom which Jacques Maritain describes as a three
fold process of freedom from "nature and the forms of nature,"
freedom from and "transformation of rational language," and,
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finally, freedom to enter the "regions of obscurity.
This is not to say that Henry James did not use symbols, for
he used them lavishly, but withal he employed them as writers of
all ages have used them.

They were important, but they were not

the core of his work, and when he did use them, they were not the
final end of his work.

There is no denying that the dove symbol

is made to labor long and hard in Wings of the Dove, but behind it
lay the conscious thinking of Milly, Kate and Densher; behind it
lay some manner of orderly thought process, some manner of abstraction
in the minds of each of the characters who were in any way caught up
in the symbol.

That the dove symbol became a way of making state

ments in the novel is true, but it is not the only nor
important way.

the most

Always there was the consciousness; there was, for

instance, Densher consciously working out the meaning, for him, of
Milly's death and sacrifice, proceeding in his mind through many
of the abstractions of which the Symbolists were to walk in dread.
James may not have been a profound philosopher, but it is unfair
to say of him as does T. S. Eliot that he had a mind so fine no
idea ever violated it.

Eliot's evaluation notwithstanding, we may

^Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry
(New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), p. 53 f. For a thorough
discussion of the Symbolist Movement see Arthur Symons, The Sym
bolist Movement in Literature (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company,
1919). A later treatment of this same matter is found in Andrew
Lehmann's The Symbolist Aesthetic in France (Oxford: George
Blackwell, 1950).
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say that with James, as with any other presymbolist writer, the
symbols used issued from the idea, the abstraction, were a partial
manifestation of it, and were ultimately encompassed by it.

In

symbolist literature, the symbol is the abstraction; it exists
as greater than the abstraction, and it is the end towards which
the abstraction irresistibly moves.
Despite their oversimplification and the narrowness of their
approach, the Symbolists had hold of not a little truth, and they
had not long to wait in order to find their beliefs "scientifically"
justified by the students of the new psychology.

As early as 1890,

William James recognized that beneath any orderly thought process
lay a strata of less orderly thought— ‘awarenesses which bubbled
up from some deep well of human perception or memory and which, in
their original form, had no resemblance to what is called reason.
They came up, unbidden, from the sub-and' unconscious, and if they
were not acted upon in some way by the organizing Intelligence,
returned to whence they had come.

This phenomenon William James

named the "stream of consciousness," Implying by the very metaphor
he selected that the thought was in constant flux, uncontrollable,
and organizable only by labored effort.

In other words, the

phenomenon which William James identified as the stream of conscious
ness is an "apparently unorganized succession of items connected on
the grounds of association."

In short it is "the sequence of idea
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and image in the mind. "21

This aspect of the mind was, of course,

recognized by the Elizabethans in such renderings of the flow
of thought as those found in the mad scenes of Ophelia or Lady
Macbeth.

But the phenomenon was conventionally used chiefly to

portraymadness, or states of mind bordering on insanity.

When

a sane character thought, he thought in coordinated phrases as does
Macbeth or Brutus.

It was not until the late 19th-century that

the divine state of madness and its corresponding stream of thought
became the possession of every little humdrum merchant who wandered
the streets.
Before the century had turned, Freud was to study the
attitudes of some hysterical individuals, and, consciously or not,
compound his theories with that of the stream of consciousness and
those of the Symbolists, and come up with a new proposition concern
ing human behavior, a proposition based upon the symbolic mani
festations of human desires as discovered in the symbolism occurring
in the waking, and particularly in the sleeping, dreams of men and
99

women. ‘

Within a short time, Jung was to expand this theory into

a broad, transcendental philosophy.

With Jung, symbols acquired a

^Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren, Understanding Poetry
(New York: Henry Holt, 1950), p. 487.
^ T h o u g h Freud has several times stated and restated his theory

of dream interpretation, perhaps his most lucid explanation, at least
for the uninitiated layman as the present writer is, is Part II of
Freud's A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1960), pp. 87-252.
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metaphysical nature.
Individual.
scious.

They were not the sole possession of the

They were shared by all through the universal uncon-

23
The result of all this was by 1913, a year before Henry

James's death, point of view as a structural convention was once
more applied by Proust to the autobiographical novel, one of the
forms which had earlier served as a forerunner to the Jamesian
method.

This time, however, there was a marked difference.

As has

been observed earlier, the first-person as used, for example, by
Dickens in David Copperfield was simply a variation on the omni
scient author, or more precisely, on the third-person objective.
Copperfield could tell the story because the interest was fastened
on the external action.

We are more interested in the story David

tells than in his point of view of it.
dog is loose.

In Proust's work a different

We are there watching the very motion of a mind,

the external action is only incidental; indeed it is entirely
dependent upon the quirks of direction taken by the mind of the
central character, the author himself.

As Irene Cornwell says of

A La Recherche Du Temps Perdu:
Whether or not Temps perdu is a memoir or a novel
Proust himself was not able to decide. Certain it is
that if a novel requires composing, with an introduction,
a climax, and an unravelling of plot, the work does not
meet the specifications. There is no definite con-

23For an introduction to the concept of the universal
unconscious see C. 6. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology
(New York: Meridian Books, 1956),
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struction in the Temps perdu, which has no plot, no
action, but which emphasizes absolutely every trait,
quality idea, and motive.2^
The essentional formlessness of Temps perdu is probably the result
of Proust's philosophy which regarded thought as an "aesthetic,
rather than a logical process."
For Proust, as for Bergson, the external world bad
no existence of its own, is but a projection of our
feelings and states of consciousness, and in final
analysis Proust's consciousness is not essentially more
real than the universe. Developing the theory of multiple
personality to the extreme limit of plausibility, he
conceives of consciousness as never two minutes alike,
to such an extent that we cannot think of a self, but
only of an infinite number of selves, each in succes
sion increasingly different from the first of the
series. The only link between these is m e m o r y . 25
In other words, what we have in Remembrance of Things Past
is an artistic rendering of the newly discovered logic, crytallized
through the wedding of psychology and symbolism, the logic of free
memory-prompted and essentially uncontrolled association.

Relativism

as practiced by Henry James had reduced traditional action to a
secondary position.

Free association, as practiced by Proust,

went a step farther and subordinated traditional space and time,
for what intrigues Proust is neither events nor their normal
sequence.

He and his reader dispense with traditional action and

set out to study the author's mind in the very act of dredging the
stream of consciousness for impressions which can be considered by

2^Irene Cornwell, Ed., Contemporary French Fiction (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1940), p. 379.
25Ibld.. p. 375.
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the organizing intelligence.

That isy Proust is presenting a unique

aspect of his point of view, an aspect which shows him in the act
of raising the constituents of his stream of consciousness up to
the level of the Jamesian consciousness, that is, to the level at
which those constituents coordinate in some way with external
stimuli, which in turn act upon the subconscious to call up other
impressions long hidden.

Proust's work, then, is a classic study

in modern psychic flux.
If this technique could work autobiographlcally, it could
also work when applied to other people.

Thus, it is not surprising

that within a decade after the appearance of Proust's first efforts,
James Joyce had published Ulysses, a novel which experimented with
the presentation of the points of view of several characters as seen
through their respective streams of consciousness.
external action— walking, for the most part—

Only enough

is provided in Ulysses

to stimulate the memory of the characters or to give their thought
streams sufficient opportunity to react on various levels of
awareness.

The Night Town section even makes an attempt to

penetrate into that shadowy psychic area where only pure images
exist.

In brief, in Ulysses Joyce not only tries to extend the

Proustian method to psyches alien to his own, but also pretends as
well to the study of the very actions of the metaconscious personality
as it leads its own life submerged below the stream of consciousness.
By 1925, the new technique was sufficiently established to be
exploited in a number of ways by a diversity of novelists.

Not all

of them were willing, or able, or philosophically desirous of

AO

following Joyce as he quested through the thorny ways of Ulysses Into
the labyrinth of Finnegin's Wake.

Most of them were able journeymen

In their craft who accepted the convention of point of view as an
accomplished fact of the novel form.

Some like Faulkner and Gide

were true innovators, using with genius the various possibilities
of point-of-view techniques.

Almost all, however, journeyman or

genius, were to grasp the fact that the future forte of the serious
modern novelist would, in the main, be introspection not intrigue.
In like manner, almost all were to become, if not profound, at least
facile users of symbolic logic and of the symbol as an independent
device or, more often, as a contributory technique in a point-ofview study.
Gide and Faulkner have been mentioned above as a pair of
contemporary masters in the uses of point of view because they
serve as examples of the inherent diversity of the approach as
applied to the novel.

Faulkner, for instance, in his masterpiece,

The Sound and the Fury, utilizes the streams of consciousness of three
different individuals— an idiot; a tormented, neurotic boy; and a
petty and miserly small town merchant— to throw light first upon
one another, then upon a fourth person— the sister of all three—
and finally upon a family and a whole civilization.

Faulkner,

however, pushes beyond simple presentation of various streams of
consciousness.

In order to make his final statement, the author

gathers all special insights once more to himself and concludes
the novel with a final section narrated omnisciently.

Faulkner's

method of combining point of view with omniscience is, of course,
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a perfect reflection of his concern with both the value of the
individual and the ultimate triumph of the great and universal
moral issues.
has said:

Concerning Faulkner's use of point of view, Hoffman

"Though there is every possible difference between his

work and that of Henry James, no novelist since James has developed
so skillfully a genuinely effective management of point of view....
In many ways, this novel (Hie Sound and the Fury) is a more honest
and more efficient use of the so-called 'stream of consciousness'
technique than Joyce's notorious Ulysses." °
Unlike Faulkner, Gide, in a novel like The Counterfeiters,
prefers to remain within the older, more Jamesian tradition, and to
approach his situation not through a series of conflicting or con
trasting streams of consciousness, but through several different
layers of intellectual awarenes?, all of them remaining on or close
to the James level of consciousness.

Simplifying Gide*8 novel

greatly, we may, for our purposes, present a scheme of it in terms
of concentric^ circles.

First, at the center, there is the point

of view of a youth taking cognizance of the action.

This viewpoint

is encircled, and thus slightly altered and heightened, by the point
of view of the central character, Edouard, a character whose sensi
tivity and intelligence amply qualifies him as a "large lucid
reflector" in the full Jamesian sense.

Edouard's awareness is,

in turn, encompassed by that of the author acting as third-person
narrator, and, finally, the whole of the novel is embraced by the

^Hoffman, o£. cit.. p. 176.
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author acting as omniscient commentator not only on the novel and the
characters in it, but also on his cvn relation to them as well.

In

fact, almost the whole history of the techniques of the m o d e m
novelist is interwoven into this one short work.

There is even

one section— *that of the visit from the angel— in which Gide attempts
some sort of symbolic approximation of the stream and substream of
consciousness.
James, Proust, Joyce, Faulkner, and Gide are but five examples,
albeit outstanding, of the diverse approaches to the issue of point
of view in the m o d e m novel.

It would be possible, of course, to

go on adding examples of the different m o d e m solutions to the problem
of point of view.

Instead of Faulkner or Gide, it would, for

instance, be possible to cite works by Virginia Woolf, or Conrad
Aiken, or F. Scott Fitzgerald, or even Thomas Mann.

But to do

this would be attempting more than is intended in this chapter, for
the intention herein is to do no more than to glance at the postures
of one or two representative m o d e m novelists as they addressed the
question of point of view.
Actually, the aim of this chapter has been twofold:

first,

there has been an attempt to establish in general terms the conti
nuity and importance of the problem of revealing unspoken thought in
a literary form; and, second, there has been an attempt to study in
more detail the question of hidden thought in relation to the m o d e m
shift from an absolute to a relativistic world view.

That is, the

ultimate purpose of this chapter has been especially to seek out
the problem of point of view at that time when it ceased to be one
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of rendering any unexpressed thought and became one of establishing
a particular point of view solely for its own innate values.
A brief review of the material covered by this chapter will
indicate that although the discussion of unspoken thought began
with Greek tragedy, that is with drama, the focus was gradually
shifted to the novel as we came to discuss the m o d e m period and
its concept of point of view.

Such a shift in interest would

indicate that the m o d e m problem of point of view was a structural
manifestation of the novel alone, and there are those who would
argue that such is actually the case.

G. M. Forster, for instance,

in his very influential work, Aspects of the Novel, states that

27

"the problem of point of view certainly is peculiar to the novel." '
Whether Forster is correct or not there is no denying that while
critics of the novel have been very much alive to the uses of point
of view in the novel, and while they have contributed a number of
fine studies of the problem, studies ranging from Lubbock's The
Craft of Fiction to Edel's The Psychological Novel.^8 the critics of
the drama have all but ignored the question of point of view in the
drama.

Some men have taken note of the place of first-person

^ E . M. Forster, Aspects of the Novel (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, Harvest Books Edition, 1954), p. 79 f.
^®Lubbock and Edel have been previously cited. It would be
difficult to present a total list of the various critical studies which
have been concerned in some manner with point of view, but to cite
some of the more important ones: Joseph Warren Beach's The TwentiethCentury Novel (New York: Century Co., 1932); M. J. Friedman's Stream
Of Consciousness. a Study in Literary Technique (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1955); Robert Humphrey's Stream of Consciousness
in the M o d e m Novel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).
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subjective in dramatic method, men like Gassner, Nicoll, and Alan
Downer, but none of them, with the exception of Downer,^ have been
willing to consider it as central an issue to modern drama as it
is to m o d e m fiction.

Just why there has been a lack of recognition

of the place of the central consciousness in drama is difficult to
say.

It may well be that the critics of the drama have simply

accepted such pronouncements as Forster's, and instead of seeking
a broad structural base which might embrace the whole question of
method in m o d e m drama, they have busied themselves with classifying
m o d e m plays into realistic or expresslonlstlc, symbolic or grotesque.
Perhaps this approach has been taken because the critics of drama
have meekly followed the lead of the leading literary critics of the
day, and, as Joseph Wood Krutch has observed, drama in general is held
in very low esteem, so low that such men as Edel seem to feel that in
such point-of-view studies as Strange Interlude the playwright is not
making an original statement but merely imitating the novelist James
Joyce.30

Moreover, Edel is prone to believe that even in this

imitation O'Neill succeeds only in "employing merely the timehonored 'asides' of the old plays or a series of soliloquies."^

What

ever the reason, whether it is the result of the attitude of the

^^Alan S. Downer, The Art of the Play; an Anthology of Nine
Plays (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955)
30

Joseph Wood Krutch, Modernism in M o d e m Drama; a Definition
and an Estimate (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), p.l.
3*Edel, o£. cit., p. 85.
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critics of the novel or whether it is the result of their lack of
perception, the students of modern drama have failed to seek out
and study in detail the presence of point of view in modern drama.
Such failure on the part of the dramatic critics might consti
tute a serious oversight, for even on a priori grounds there is every
reason to suspect that point of view as an important structural
element plays as significant a role in the drama as in the novel.

To

begin with, it is hard to discover an adequate foundation for the
contentions of such critics as Edel and Forster.

It hardly seems

logical to view the novel as so totally unique an art form that
it alone is able to encompass the significance of the device of
point of view.

Reason lies with the contention that it is more

usual for the arts of a given period to be viewed as parallel
expressions of a common philosophy of the times, a condition which
would normally force the arts into similar, if not nearly identical,
structural patterns.

This certainly seems to be the case in the

modern period, where artists have been particularly concerned with
expressing a highly romanticized, essentially subjective and
irrational relativlstic philosophy.

In order to present their

world view, more than one of the m o d e m arts have been concerned in
some measure with the issue of point of view.

In m o d e m painting,

for instance, there are the abstract landscapes of Kandinsky and
the symbolic fantasies of Paul Klee.

The former can only be under

stood as the chromatic translation of the artist's stream of con
sciousness and the latter can be equated to that same world of
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Junglan Imagery that Joyce unearthed in the Night Town section of
Ulysses.

Or we may take as additional proof Helen Gardner's

definition of Cubism as "a succession of points of view such as
front, profile, and hack, known to the mind but not seen by the eye
simultaneously."32
With such an interest in point of view evidenced by the
visual arts, it would be surprising to discover that drama, a form
which draws its strength from both the visual and literary arts,
would have ignored the question entirely.
not the case.

And, indeed, such is

In fact, the contrary is closer to the truth.

Edel's

accusation of O'Neill notwithstanding, there is every indication
that the playwright's interest in point of view was awakened just
as early as that of the novelist, and there is some reason to
contend that dramatic experiments with the presentation of intensely
subjective and highly individualized viewpoints may have predated
some of the more important innovations in the novel.
The above listed concepts form part of the matter of this
study, for it is the concern of this investigation to establish to
some extent the scope and nature of the convention of point of view
in m o d e m dramaturgy.

In order to do this, eight plays by eight

representative playwrights have been selected to stand as evidence
that point of view is as important to the m o d e m dramatist as it is
to the novelist, and that the dramatist's solutions are not merely

•^Helen Gardner, Art Through the Ages (New York:
Brace, and Company, 1948), p. 743.

Harcourt,
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unsuccessful imitations but are just as successful, varied, and
interesting as are those of the writers of fiction.

To support the

above contentions, it is the plan of the thesis to establish briefly
the trends in modern drama which led up to the contemporary experi
ments with point of view.

These trends once established, attention

will be turned to the individual plays.

In the case of each play

wright studied, the attempt will be first to demonstrate that as a
modern subjective relativist he was forced into selecting subjective
point of view as his approach.

Once this has been accomplished,

attention will be turned to his play and the work will be carefully
analyzed in terms of the uses and meanings of point of view in the
dramatic illusion.
As can be seen from the above outline, it is not the intention
of this study to survey the whole field of m o d e m drama, but rather
to sample judiciously a few plays by playwrights generally recognized
as representative, in one way or another, of the trends of m o d e m
drama.

By taking such an approach, it is hoped that this investi

gation will not only reveal the nature and offer a detail examination
of some of the solutions to the problem of point of view in drama,
but also that as the study progresses it will suggest the presence of
certain trends that will clearly support the proposition that the
attack and resolution of the structural issue of viewpoint became
one of the major activities of an important group of dramatists and
that it touched, to some extent, the efforts of all but the most
confirmed dramatic reactionaries.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TWO DIRECTIONS OF MODERN DRAMA
THE EXTERNAL AND THE PAN-PSYCHIC DRAMA

It is difficult to say whether the honor of developing modern
realism should go to Norway or to France.

Traditionally, the study of

realism begins with Ibsen, but this precedent cannot obscure the fact
that the well-made play, as developed by Scribe, was pointed from the
first in the direction of modern realism.

Moreover, the best of

Scribe's successors, Augier and Dumas, fils, continued the realistic
evolution by adding, within their own narrow sphere, a certain honesty
to the treatment of social themes.

In this same tradition, Zola ap

peared, urging a naturalistic treatment of life on stage.

Then too

French practices were not limited to France; their influences were
wide-spread.

As Carpenter points out, the two great English realists

before the advent of Shaw--Jones and Pinero--owed more to France than
to Ibsen.*

But despite its importance, early French realism was a

1-Bruce Carpenter, The Way of the Drama; A Study of Dramatic
Forms and Moods (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1929), p. 151.
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thin brew, and there is no denying that the dramatic philosophy of 19century France forced her playwrights into a literary cul-de-sac.

The

leading critic, the reigning dictator of the French stage, Francois
Sarcey, articulated the ideal of all when he argued that a play was
but a machine for holding the attention of the audience for two hours
and then sending it home in good humor.^
It is not difficult to realize that a drama with such a philos
ophy dooms itself to superficiality and sterility.

Thus, although

realism may have developed first in France, the contributions of the •
Gallic genius were restricted to the well-made play form and to a few
broad hints at the possibilities of the social theme.

Briefly, in

terms of modern realism, French efforts were early and secondary.
Norway's contribution, on the other hand, was late and primary,
for between 1869 and 1872, Ibsen seriously turned his genius to the
well-made play and the social thesis.

He lifted the twin concepts of

realism and the social theme from the squirrel cage of French drama,
stripped them of the unhappy accumlations of almost a century of
existence, and presented his refined versions to an awe-struck world.
The difference in degree between the work of Ibsen and that of the

^Francis Fergusson, "James's Idea of Dramatic Form," Kenyon
Review. V (Autumn, 1943), 495 f.
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French school was so great that his stunned contemporaries soon her
alded him as the creator of a new dramatic mode.

For many years he was

considered the St. George of the modern theatre.

But viewing him from

the advantage of three quarters of a century, Ibsen appears much more
clearly as the savior rather than the destroyer of the well-made
dragon.

It is no secret that Ibsen was strongly influenced by the

French playwrights, and most modern critics will agree with HacGowan
and Melnitz that Ibsen was the "master architect of the truly well-made
play.What

the master architect did was to take a rather shop-worn

and mechanical form and freshen it and give it life by emphasizing its
better features while playing down it more obvious faults.

Thus it was

that Ibsen added vigor to the French play by reconciling its charac
ters with a more recognizable middle-class scale and by treating
social problems that were more directly related to the mercantile soci
ety of the day rather than following the practice of casting about for
his theses in the shadowy demi-monde so dear to the heart of the Gallic
romantic.

In keeping with his tendency to establish a more truly func

tional relationship between drama and society, Ibsen also attempted to
eliminate the often very shabbily forced happy ending and the unneces-

York:

3jCenneth MacGowan and William Melnitz, The Living Stage (New
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), p.355.
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sarily rigid assignment of precise tasks to each of the five formal
acts.

Each of these changes was probably necessary, but they were

modifications of, not departures from, the piece bien faite.

They may

have been striking reforms, but they were more obvious than profound.
It was in his sweeping introduction of an entirely new approach to the
total dramatic illusion that Ibsen made his truly significant change
in the well-made play.
To Ibsen, the French dramatist's excessive use of the aside and
the soliloquy, not as devices for investigating hidden thought, but
simply as supports for faltering dramatic imagination, were particular
ly

offensive structural crudities.

And when considering the following

three examples, we cannot but agree with him:
GEORGE.
DORA.

In a word, I have seen and admired you.
(Aside) He has a strange was of showing it.
European, I suppose.

LADY TRAVERS. Is my son here?
BARNEY.
No, my lady.
LADY TRAVERS. (Aside) So much the better. (Aloud) Is
the lady of the house in?
WINTERBOURNE. So you are at this moment. We can dream
that we are in that happy place.
DAISY.
(Aside) He can do with me what he will.
(Aloud) I'll tell them to keep you a seat. ^

^The first example is taken from Dion Bouciault's The Octoroon.
1859; the second from Steele MacKaye's Hazel Kirke. 1880; the third
from Henry James's adaptation of his own Daisy Miller.

So much did Ibsen dislike such practices as the above, that he reformed
them not by returning them to an earlier and better tradition, but by
ultimately eliminating the two devices entirely.

In fact, as early as

the writing of The League of Youth, Ibsen boasts that he has accom
plished " the feat of doing without a single monologue, without a
single aside."5

This is indeed a feat, and it is this accomplishment,

more than any other, which created modern stage realism!

For in elim

inating asides and soliloquies, Ibsen limited himself to the study of
character only through the external word or action.

In other words,

without recourse to the aside and the soliloquy, Ibsen had no other
choice but to make his statements solely through the agency of the sur
face elements of human experience, that is, through the elements of
objective reality.

To write plays without employing the two most pro

minent conventions of Western drama is undoubtably difficult, but it
is not necessarily praiseworthy.

In doing what he did, Ibsen gained a

certain kind of verisimilitude, but he did not come any closer to
reality, per se.

What he did do was to create Ibsenism, a highly con

ventionalized mode of drama which replaced the omniscient author with
that of the third-person objective narrator, which in turn had the
effect of an illusion of complete surface reality.

•’William Archer, trans., Eleven Plays of Henrik Ibsen (New York:
M o d e m Library, Random House), p. xi.
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Despite Ibsen's feat, there is nothing inherently weak in the
aside and the soliloquy.

In the hands of a Moliere or a Shakespeare

they become the most dramatic of conventions.

There did, however,

exist in Ibsen*8 time a considerable abuse of these conventions, but
this could have been corrected.

Reformation, however, was not Ibsen's

intention, for as long as the aside and the soliloquy remained in the
drama, their presence belied the relativistic statement which Ibsen was
attempting to make.

Consequently, Ibsen elected to reject rather than

rescue the two techniques.

In short, Ibsen relinquished entirely the

previously omniscient approach of the dramatist and substituted in its
stead a new, totally objective one.

Before Ibsen, the dramatist could

never, perhaps, lay claim to the narrative flexibility of the novelist,
but in his own much more direct and immediate medium he had his share
of freedom.

Ibsen altered this, and, after the acceptence of his prob

lem play, playwrights in the classic Ibsenian tradition CQuld report
only; never, unless very obliquely, comment.

Nor could they directly

reveal the inner reality, the hidden thoughts of their characters.
Out of Ibsen's new third-person objectivity grew his so highly
admired presentation of exposition, which was in reality the exchanging
of one convention for another.

Ibsen's new method of exposition, by

seemingly natural conversation between major characters, was, in great
measure, a reworking of the approach found in many Elizabethan plays.

After all, the major expository load In Hamlet, for Instance, is
shouldered by Hamlet and Horatio.

What made Ibsen's exposition suf

ficiently different, however, was his need to bring it into line with
his new objective point of view, that is, to reveal all information
only through dialogue or action.

Today, his so-called realism in ex

position— as, for example, in the long conversations between Nora and
Mrs Linde--often seems as stiff and as stylized to us as do the inane
dialogues between the older drama's ever-present butler and maid.

Much

like the older drama, Iben's exposition-conversatlons are often tedious
and dpll, and, more frequently than not, they contain things which
people just don't say to one another, or facts whibh they must surely
have revealed long ago.

Too often these conversations begin rather

clumsily, as, for instance, when Tesman says to Aunt Julia in Hedda
Gabler;
And now look here— suppose we sit comfortably on the sofa
and have a little chat till Hedda comes.
The little chat continues: into a long one, long enough to cover
most of the background of the play, and much is stated that would
either have been said long ago— the condition of Aunt Rina's illness—
or never have been said at all— Teaman's luck in capturing Hedda and
in having eliminated his rivals.

All this is not to say that the play

wright cannot be granted some license, or that Ibsen's handling of ex-

55

position is extremely poor, but only to establish that it is every bit
as unrealistic and stylized as any other method previously employed by
playwrights.

As pure verisimilitude it has its gauche elements, and

as an attempt at rendering life, it comes no closer to the total phe
nomenon than do the aside and the soliloquy.

All are artistic conven

tions .
When Ibsen early in his career stated that the illusion he
wished to create was that of reality and that he desired to depict
human beings and therefore would not have them speak the language of
the gods,^ he did not go on to qualify his definition of reality.

If

he had, he most certainly would have been forced to concede that under
given circumstances some human beings could very well speak the lan
guage of the gods.

What Ibsen most likely meant was that he was seek

ing to produce an illusion of a particular kind of reality and a par
ticular kind of human being.

He wished to depict the surface, the

readily perceptible, reality of middle-class Europeans of the late 19th
century.

At least this is what he accomplished in such plays as Ghosts

and Pillars of Society, and it is no mean accomplishment.

Nor can it

be said that there is anything inherently wrong with the goal Ibsen set

£

°Raymond Williams, Drama From Ibsen to Ellot(London:
Windus, 1952), p. 157.

Chatto &
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for himself.

It does however have Its limitations, not the least

among which is the loss of the principal dramatic means of rendering
hidden thoughts and moods; and it does have its dangers.

Among the

latter, the most difficult to avoid is that of Inadvertently creating
a social history rather than a play, with the resultant loss of dra
matic appeal to all but a very few in a very limited time and culture
range.
Ibsen managed to some extent to overcome these limitations and
dangers because he was a great playwright.
ism did not always fare so well.

Those who followed Ibsen-

The names of men like Brieux and

Galsworthy, good journeymen playwrights, are rapidly fading as their
so carefully recorded realism becomes, with time, less and less immed
iate.

Presently they will be understood and appreciated only by the

historian.

Scores of less talented playwrights have even disappeared

from the historian's view.
But the form which Ibsen utilized, despite its obvious pitfalls,
has continued to be the most popular approach of the modern theatre.
It repeats itself endlessly through dozens of Broadway, Paris, and West
End seasons.

It is the basic form for the great bulk of modern plays

and into its mould are cast such commercial successes as Stalag 17 and
The Seven Year Itch.

That basic form is the well-made play.

The

asides have been eliminated and so has much of the wit, but the essen
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tial ingredients are as present today as they were in Le Mariage
d'Olympe or A 0011*8 House.

Shake the bloom from the average Broadway

hit, Tea and Sympathy, for instance, make some allowances for changes
in social custom--in the 19th-century a woman who offered herself in
sexual sacrifice to save a teen-age boy from homosexuality simply
could not command sympathy— and there you have the old French thesis
play with its "big curtains," its love triangle, its contrived misun
derstandings, its staunch friends, its good women., and its pretentions,
all decked out in the straight-jacket of Ibsenidn third-person objec
tivity.
It is an old story, and one that does not need retelling here,
of how Ibsenltes everywhere created new methods of staging and acting
which provided productions reflecting and paralleling the objectivity
of Ibsen's scripts.

Antoine, Brahm and Grien brought "free theatres"

to France, Germany and England respectively, and in Russia Danchenko
and Stanislavsky established the famed Moscow Art Theatre.

It was the

latter group, more than any other, which popularized the primary con
vention of the objective production--the convention of the "fourth
wall." Ibsen had suggested the exclusion of the audience as a partici
pant when he eliminated the aside and the soliloquy; Stanislavsky made
this exclusion more definite when he placed chairs, facing upstage,
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along the plane of the proscenium arch.
With the establishment of the "fourth wall," the audience real
ized that it was no longer part of the total theatrical experience,
except in its role of mute and carefully concealed observer, crouching
silent and hidden in the dark auditorium like a natural scientist
studying the habits of beasts in their native surroundings.

It was

this concept of the audience as a silent, and, indeed, unnecessary ob
server, that became one of the major tenets of Stanislavsky's early
artistic philosophy.

As Bakshy has said:

There will be no difficulty in recognizing the basic prin
ciple which lay at the foundation of all the experiments
of the Art Theatre, tacitly admitted as the natural and
only artistic form of theatre. This principle was repre
sentation. The object of the theatre was understood not
to present a play through the medium of the stage, but to
represent it as a separate entity existing side by side
with the observing audience....Of the two elements of the
theatre, the stage and the audience, the second operated
merely as some superfluous attachment making itself felt
only through the necessity of providing for it the huge
window of the stage through which it could get a glimpse
of the world enacted.?
Such a philosophy was only possible after the appearance of the
objective play, and after the disappearance of the most direct means
of communication with the audience— the aside and the sbliloquy. Once

^Alexander Bakshy, The Path of the Modern Russian Stage (London:
Cecil Palmer and Hayward, 1916), p. 47 f.
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Ibsen

had objectified the play, however, it was only a matter of time

before someone would perform a similar service for the production.
The third-person script and the third-person production were absolute
ly necessary to one another, and the existence of the one predicated
the existence of the other.

In prodf of this, the "fourth wall" has

continued, like the Ibsenian version of the well-made play,
the most popular mode of stage presentation.

to be

It influences contempor

ary practices in directing, scenery, and lighting, and it forms the
basic precept of the "method school" of acting.
The tendency towards the exclusion of the audience was intensi
fied by the practices and polemics of Naturalism, an artistic movement
which began with Zola in France and soon spread throughout Europe.
Its quasi-scientific ideal was not to present an "illusion of reality,"
but to present reality itself, the so-called "slice of life."

The

dramatist was to become so completely an objective recorder that he
was to become, as it were, a case historian, forfieting any right to
interpret or exercise selectivity.

He was to study "feelings, ideas,

virtues, and vices...objectively, physiologically* and functionally in
the theatre, just as sugar and vitriol are analyzed in the laboratory."®

Drama

^Barrett H. Clark and George Freedley, A History of Modern
(New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1947), p. 242-
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While Naturalism in its extreme form never quite carried the
stage, it had a significant influence on the works of many modern
realists.

Its effects are especially apparent in the plays of the

Russians, particularly those of Checkov.

In addition, Naturalism,

with its total emphasis on understatement, caused a number of play
wrights to abandon, for a time, some of the more striking features of
Ibsenism.

Playwrights like Galsworthy and Hauptmann, for instance,

suppressed the plot and did away with the "big curtain."

But while

Naturalism helped further to loosen the formal act structure and, in
some instances, to increase the poverty of modern dramatic prose, its
general effects were, for the most part, short lived, and the wellmade play as Ibsen made it survives today as relatively intact.

The

chief and lasting effect of Naturalism was the great stress it laid
upon objective surface realism, especially upon the treatment of sordid
details.

In this respect it out-Ibsened Ibsen and encouraged and

strengthened

the use of the objective viewpoint.

In short, we may say that modern realism is one important di
rection of contemporary drama.

It was fashioned from French matter by

a Norwegian playwright, and its most distinctive feature is an objec
tivity of viewpoint, which was achieved by the elimination of the
aside and the soliloquy.

However, it is not, as many believe, anything

resembling a total break with the piece bien faite.

As Martin Lamm
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has commented:
so far as Ibsen surpassed the Frenchmen, he also nat
urally learned, as he says In a letter to Brandes In 1896,
to avoid their grossest errors and misconceptions. But
this should not be taken to mean that he disregarded
their technique. In stating a problem, working out a plot,
drawing a character, or writing dialogue Ibsen was devel
oping the techniques of the French drama.®
This is not to say that modern realism did not conceive of
itself as making a completely new direction, for its whole focus was,
in fact, on the rejection of the past.

As Raymond Williams points out

in his discussion of the "newness" of A Doll's H o use:

The play does not go any deeper than the usual mechanisms
of intrigue; it does not undercut the assumptions of ro
mantic drama, with its mechanical versions of experience;
it merely provides a reversal within the romantic frame
work. It is not a new positive dramatic standard; it is
simply anti-romantic, a negative within the same frame
work of experience.10
This negative attitude towards the past, this attempt to reject it, is
labeled by Joseph Wood Krutch as "modernism."

As already mentioned ih

Chapter One, modernism is that change in late 19th-century philosophic

^Martin Lamm, Modern Drama (New York:
1953), p. 113.
10Raymond Williams, o£. cit., p. 66.

Philosophical Library,
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posture which attempted to establish a difference between the past and
the present principally by rejecting all vestiges of the older abso
lute values and by placing in their stead a new subjectively based
relativism.

In discussing An Enemy of the People, Krutch noted this

phenomenon, and he said, "at last we have reached something that, for
the first time, might actually justify talk about a chasm separating
the past from the future."
A new world which had come to accept an all-inclusive rela
tivity actually would not be merely different from, it
would be genuinely discontinuous with an old one in which,
on the whole, it was assumed that some unchanging princi
ples were eternally established.^
What is so intriguing about this whole business is that while
modernism and modern realism proclaims aloud its break with the abso
lutism of the past, it is, essentially, an extension of the romanti
cist thinking of the 19th-century, and in so many ways it continues to
perpetuate the dramatic mode which rested its argument on an older
absolutism.

In searching for a new, anti-absolute and anti- universal

form, the realists introduced a new structural approach, a thirdperson objectivity which gained for their plays a quality of surfacereality.

In doing what they did, they eliminated a gross misuse of

omniscience by the premodern playwrights, but they also limited them-

H-Krutch, oj>. cit., p. 12.
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selves tremendously in that they excluded

from possible direct con

sideration any of those subjective areas of human activity on which a
relatlvlstlc creed must ultimately be based.

By accepting objectivity,

realism had henceforth no recourse but to depict surface elements of
human experience.
The achievement of third-person objectivity was, however, a sig
nificant and critical step, both for the realists and for another im
portant group of m o d e m dramatists.

For the realists, surface objec

tivity was the method by which they retained the virtues of the piece
bien faite while they corrected many of its vices.

For a second group

of playwrights, ttje objective perspective served as an irritant which
prompted them to invent various means of circumventing the obstacles
it posed.

The activity of the latter group of dramatists forms the

second direction of modern drama, the direction which will be the
ultimate concern of this study, the move toward nonobjectivity.
It is difficult to state unequivocally that modern drama would
not have developed a corpus of nonobjective writing if it were not for
the existence of the objective playwright, but we may say that it is
likely that m o d e m subjective forms would have been considerably
different.

Undoubtedly, the move toward objectivity was a crucial one

and served, at least negatively, if not positively, to hasten the
development of contemporary subjective forms.
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Alan Downer, at least, seems to feel that this .Is true.

As he

points out, realism " involves the concept of point of view for the
first time in drama."

We may take issue with this sweeping pronounce

ment, but we must admit the truth of his observation that:
Once the idea of point of view becomes established, once it
becomes a tool, the playwright will experiment with its
possibilities. The objectivity of the scientist, however
highly touted as an ideal by Ibsen, Zola, and Chekhov,
places unnatural restrictions on the creative a r t i s t . ^
What the development of an objective as opposed to an omniscient
point of view did was to make cleaf to those playwrights operating in
a more subjective tradition the major outlines of their own structural
problem and to emphasize for them the inadequacy of the old well-made
play omniscience as a probable method of solution.

They were thus

forced to begin not with a return to the older approach, whose weakness
as a relativistic tool Ibsen had amply demonstrated, but with the newer
realistic form as a basis for experimentation.

Therefore, instead of

rejecting the objective point of view, they were to develop it,
carrying it into the realms of total subjectivity and relativity.

In

short, Ibsen created modern realism by a concerted effort to do away
with the principle omniscient devices of the older drama.

Actually, he

begged the question of their inherent weakness, and ignored rather than

^■^Alan Downer, oj>. cit., p. 315.
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reformed che aside and the soliloquy.

A second, more or less anti-

realistic, school of modern drama fashioned its forms by taking realism
as a base and actually developing and extending that very aspect of it
which seemed least flexible, the concept of point of view.
This second direction of modern drama has been described above
as "subjective" and more or less antirealistic.

Now while these terms

serve well in general discussion, they are somewhat misleading when an
attempt is made to study the movement in more detail.

They have three

major shortcomings: first, they are too vague to suggest the diverse
and often contradictory practices which they embrace.

Second, they

bring to mind an antithesis with realism, rather than a development out
of realism and out of a common background shared with realism; and,
third, they encourage those who accept the realism-antirealism dichot
omy to follow this division'cto its logical conclusion and elaborate a
realism-romanticlsm dichotomy.

Wholehearted acceptance of the latter

two connotations can be confusing and may lead to unfortunate critical
errors.

Thus, it seems imperative, before going any further, to settle

upon a pair of terms which will suggest that the two directions of
modern drama without rigidly establishing any categories or fixing any
sharp lines of division.

None of the terms in current critical use

seem fitted for these requirements.
The first popular term which comes to mind is neo-Romanticism,
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but this raises more problems than It solves.

It Is true that the

subjective writers were principally romantics, but neo-Roraanticism
seems to indicate that realism was not romantic.
farther from the truth.

Nothing could be

As has been demonstrated earlier, Ibsen was

following closely the lead of the popular Franch romantics, and even
when his work was compounded with that of the more radical Naturalism,
the result still remained within the romantic tradition.

Zola might

have been crying out for a break with the "patent-leather" palaver of
his day, but in doing so he was, in a sense, calling for a return to
an earlier tradition, such a tradition as was reflected in the poems
of Robert Burns or outlined by Wordsworth in the Preface to the
Lyrical Ballads as the choosing of "incidents and situations from
common life" and the describing of these incidents "throughout, as far
as possible, in a selection of language really used by men."

Zola

might have scorned Wordsworth's additional purpose of throwing over
men and language a certain "coloring of the imagination," but he did
retain a most essential element of Romanticism— the emphasis on the
Individual common man and on his basic emotions.

In fact, in many

ways, Zola18 Naturalism is merely Romanticism transplanted from the
avenues to the back alleys.
Perhaps it would be stretching a point to attempt to place
either modern realism or Naturalism within the escapist school of 19thcentury stage romanticism, but this is unnecessary, for the former's
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emphasis on the bourgeois and the letter's interest in the lower
classes clearly demonstrate their essential romantic tendencies.

Con

sequently, since both directions of modern drama share a common roman
tic background, the term neo-Romanticism suggests a dichotomy which
simply does not exist.
The phrase "drama of the individual" comes closer to being apt,
but the difficulty with the expression as used by Nicoll is that it
can apply equally well to both directions of modern play writing.
Hedda Gabler. for instance, granting that it is a transitional play
between the two directions, still serves to demonstrate that the
realists could and did concentrate solely on the individual.
The Nietzschean terms Apollonian and Dionysian also have their
limitations in this regard.

They are useful to a degree when con

trasting Romanticism with Classicism, but when applied to two equally
romantic phenomena, they are rather confusing.

There might be a

certain divine madness in the works of many of the nonrealists, but
structurally speaking The Weavers is even more formless, and hence
even more Dionysian, than The Spook Sonata.

Another aspect of this

same difficulty arises when the terms Realistic and Non-Realistic are
utilized.

While it is true that a certain semblence of reality is

found in the works of Ibsen and the Ibsenites, the Non-Realists cannot
be denied their point when they argue with Edschmidt that "apparent
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reality is after all not essentially real, that observed reality is
not the essence of the object.
Actually, it seems best to discard most of the popular critical
terms and to search out new ones which relate directly to the major
difference between the two schools.

Since the basis of (he difference

seems to be the objective viewpoint, it would seem that the most apt
term for those dramatists who took their cue from the social dramas of
Ibsen would be writers of the "external or objective drama."

Objec

tivism and Bcternalism correspond closely enough with the terms Nat
uralism and Realism in the broad sense, but they have the advantage
over the latter two terms in that they suggest method without implying
judgment.
With Objectivism as one label, the immediate temptation is to
select Subjectivism as an opposing term.

But this, unfortunately,

forces the two schools into a qualitative-quantitative relationship
which is far from correct.

Moreover, by itself,

Subjectivism lays far

too much stress on the difference between the two schools and far too
little on the development of the one out of the other.

More Important,

Sujectivi8m implies again the old romantic-realistic dichotomy.
Despite all this, Subjectivism does come close to connoting the major

*3carl Enoch William Leonard Dahlstrom, Strindberg's Dramatic
Expressionism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), p. 28.
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area of difference between the two types of dramaturgy, and, therefore,
it seems best to select some term which would Incorporate its meaning
while playing down its unhappy connotations.

The most suitable

generalization seems to be one invented by the playwright Andrievev,
"pan-psychic drama."
As has been stated earlier, the external and pan-psychic dramas
are interrelated rather than parallel but opposing forces.

The roots

of both lie in the total Romantic Revolution, and both are children of
the m o d e m sciences and the general philosophic shift from absolutism
to relativism.

Both can probably be traced back to the Storm and

Stress Movement in Germany and to the somewhat later romantic triumph
which Victor Hugo helped to bring about on the French stage.
Moreover both grew out of a need of the late 19th-century play
wrights to reject the decadence of mid-19th-century theatre.

After

Hugo, the subsequent history of 19th-century drama had not been the
exciting story of a contest between romantic freedom and classical
restraint, but the sad tale of the gradual degeneration of romantic
drama into unstageable closet dramas on the one hand and shallow melo
dramas on the other.

What at the beginning of the century had been a

vigorous if phrenetic movement had been transformed by victory into a
smug and decaying institution.
It was this condition that Ibsen set out to remedy; his manner
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of reform has already been discussed.

It was chiefly structural--that

of introducing an objective viewpoint into the dramatic illusion— and
it was carried into acceptance with the aid of Zola's naturalistic
theories,
efforts.

which appeared concurrently with Ibsen's early realistic
It must be remembered, however, that the drama of externals

was basically romantic.

The emphasis on emotion rather than reason

was very much in evidence.

As Zola said of his dramatization of

Therese Raquin. his aim was to study the wife and her lover in order
"to see nothing but the beast, to throw them into violent drama and
note scrupulously the sensations and acts of these creatures.
Now while many playwrights were following Ibsen and Zola in
noting scrupulously the sensations and acts of man, just as many more
were active in interpreting unscrupulously those same acts and sen
sations.

The intriguing thing about each group was that while they

seemingly differed so greatly in approach and ideals, they were much
more compatible than a casual perusal would indicate.

The fact that

the writers of the pan-psychic drama were, like Hauptmann and Strind
berg, to begin their careers as externalistic playwrights testifies to
the closeness of the two schools.

Also, the interest of the external

ists in private and primitive emotions was the same interest which

l^MacGowan

and Melnltz, oj>. cit., p. 359.
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brought the pan-psychic playwright to a presentation of the total
"soul-complex."

Moreover, both schools laid claim to the support of

19th-century science.

Externalism, as the earlier development, tended

as a whole to follow Naturalism in looking towards the already highly
developed physical sciences,

and the externalists cultivated an

individual-centered, materialistic and pessimistic, philosophy based
upon popular Darwinism.

Pan-psychism, as the slightly younger school,

began with this philosophy as a base, but soon turned to the discov
eries of the new psychology, and, as might be expected, formulated a
modern mysticism based upon the more profound secrets of the private
ego.

In point of fact, the pan-psychic playwrights and the students

of the new psychology might well have been mutually indebted, for as
Lionel Trilling points out, " psychoanalysis is one of the culminations
of the Romanticist literature of the nineteenth c e n t u r y . T o

support

his contention, Trilling quotes Freud's protest when hailed as the
discoverer of the unconscious: " The poets and the philosophers before
me discovered the unconscious....What I discovered was the scientific
method by which the unconscious may be studied.

York:

■^Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (Garden City, New
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), p. 33.
16Ibid., p. 31.
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But whatever its relation to science, and despite its close
kinship with Externalism, the pan-psychic drama has a separate
literary history, the beginnings of which are burled in the "fate
dramas" of young Germany, and early examples of its later symbolic
tendencies may be found in the works of the French playwright de
Musset.

It was not, however, until the late 19th-century that Pan-

psychism began to take its m o d e m form.

Chief among those who may be

called its major forerunners is Richard Wagner, whose theories of the
music drama were elaborated in support of his claim to the writing of
modern Greek tragedies.

But whatever Wagner's stated theories and

aims, his purpose was much more to artistically render "the logic of
human passions" than to recreate classical tragedy.

As Baudelaire

said of Tristan and Isolde, it is Greek tragedy "at the bottom of a
cave, magnificent it is true, but lit by fires which are not those of
Phoebus.in

like manner, Francis Fergusson observes that Tristan

"owes its significance partly to the fact that it is the most perfect
instance of drama as 'the expression of emotion':

the doctrine that

identifies action with passion."18

York:

^Francis Fergusson, The Idea of a Theatre (Garden City, New
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1949), p. 85.
18Ibid., p. 94.
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Whether Trlatan is a "most perfect" anything is doubtful, but .
the opera did serve, along with the other works of Wagner, to foster
the development of the theatre of the private and essentially irration
al ego, the theatre growing out of the "cult of the ego."

Moreover,

Tristan inspired the man who was to give an early and articulate ph i 
losophy to the total modern theatrical movement--Fredrick Nietzsche.
In his Birth of Tragedy, written under the spell of Tristan.
Nietzsche inquires into the nature of art and arrives at the following
decision:

art in essence is the combination of two elements--the

Apollonian and the Dionysian.

The one is the form creating element,

the other the passionate, the Inspiring element.

Of the two, Nietzsche

gives the greater importance to the Dionysian, the divine madness.

It

is vital and basic; the Apollonian is always at its service. To
Nietzsche, the Dionysian is "the eternal and original artistic force,"
the Apollonian is only a means of presenting this force.
If we could conceive of an incarnation of dissonance— and
what else is m a n ? — then, that it might live, this dissonance
would need a glorious illusion to cover its features with
a veil of beauty.

This id the true function of Apollo...

Nietzsche's emphasis on the Dionysian and his concept of man as
an incarnation of dissonance is strongly reminiscent of the "beast" in

l^Fredrick Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche. Clifton P.
Fadiman and others, trans., (New York:

Inc., 1927), p. 1087.

Modern Library, Random House,
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the people of Zola/ and such a similarity testifies to the joint
philosophy shared by both.

Actually, the point of division between

the followers of Zola and the more Nietzschean pan-psychics is found
in the fact that while both saw action in terms of passion, the panpsychic playwrights were to believe with Nietzsche that the truest and
most important human passions sprang from the deep and irrational sub
ject and that this truth could be rendered but poorly by approaching
it through the object.

Thus, we should not look to surface phenom

ena, but behind them.
After Nietzsche, then, the structural problem of the more intro
spective drama was not whether man was to be presented as essentially
Dionysian, nor whether the emphasis should be placed on the relative
position of the individual subject as opposed to the more universal
object, the problem was the selection of a method by which the play
wright could gain access to those areas of human individuation and
dissonance which hide behind the surface phenomena.

As a solution to

this problem in ego-centered relativity, the omniscient melodrama of
the old piece bien faite was obviously useless, but while the strict
objectivity of the new Ibsenlsm seemed equally binding, it proved,
nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, to be a happy development, for it
carried within itself the seeds of expansion and development.
Strangely enough, among the first of the dramatists who experi-
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merited with breaking down and refashioning the objective point of view
was the man most responsible for its initial adoption.

Ibsen, after

laboring so assiduously to create complete dramatic objectivity,
apparently realized the restrictions which externalistic technique
imposed upon a relativistic thinker, and he searched for conventions
which would provide him with more freedom.

Obviously the monologue

and the aside, the two conventions which he held in such high contempt,
would not be among the devices considered.

But in the period when he

did use these conventions— i.e., the period of his early romantic
plays in verse--Ibsen also flirted with a device which had since
become extremely popular in late 19th-century prose and poetry— the
symbol as a communicative agent.

Thus it was that, never quite fully

developed in Brand and Peer Gynt, never often rising above the level
of allegory, symbolism of a much deeper and more complicated nature
was to reappear in Ibsen's 1884 work, The Wild Duck.

Of course,

throughout his middle period the symbol as a dramatic force never quite
disappeared from Ibsen's plays, for it is evident in all his work from
Pillars of Society to Ghosts, but its function remained minor and its
development relativily crude as long as Ibsen was wrestling with the
problem of creating an illusion of reality.

Once some sort of

armistice had been achieved with external reality, however, he turned
to address the difficulty of reopening those areas of psychic activity
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which externality had sealed off.

As Ibsen came face to face with the

problem of gaining access to the inner being,

it is probable that he

was already armed with a growing awareness of the increasing importance
of the symbol in contemporary literature.

Possibly he felt that it was

high time that the dramatist experimented with a device already granted
such a significant place in the other literary arts.

At any rate, in

1884 Ibsen wrote to his publisher:
This new play occupies in a way a place by Itself in my
dramatic production; the method diverges in various
aspects from m y former practice. However,
I will make no
further pronouncements on that score....At
the same time,
I hope that The Wild Duck perhaps may induce some of our
younger playwrights to venture out in a new direction,
and I would consider this d esirable.^
There is no need here to develop in detail the increasingly
symbolic trend of Ibsen's later work, the trend which began with The
Wild Duck and ended only with When We Dead Awaken.

The more important

point is that this trend demonstrated that Ibsen himself had turned
away from pure Externalism, had joined forces with the pan-psychic
playwrights, and had abandoned Ibsenism to the Ibsenites.

Perhaps this

had been his bent from the beginning, perhaps the externalistic plays
were only a step in

the total process, a step which developed into a

long digression, so

long that it took him most of

a creative lifetime

^Op.F.D. Tennant, Ibsen's Dramatic Technique (Cambridge:
& Bowes, 1948), p. 56.

Bowes
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to return to the point*

But no matter whether Ibsen came to his new

method by accident or personality, there is no denying that The Wild
Duck signals the entrance of the most important figure of modern drama
into the school of Pan-psychism.

Tennant justifies this observation

in his remarks on The Wild Duck:
Ibsen here breaks with his problem play-writing and
occupies himself exclusively with human psychology. The
break marks a new departure in his technique of charac
terization, abandoning moral for psychological motivation.21
*

Ibsen did not, however, despair all at once and forever of the
fecundity of the external drama.

After all, the better portion of his

creative life had been spent in perfecting it.

As might be expected,

he attempted at first to work within the restrictions of surfacerealism, while using the symbol as a means of rendering the external
illusion more transluscent.

As Northam indicates, when Ibsen "found

himself" he realized that surface-realism "could be manipulated so
delicately that the illusion of reality remained while the depths of
the personality were explored."
Thereafter, each play was a struggle to reconcile the two
kinds of reality, a struggle that became harder as Ibsen's
insight into human nature grew deeper. Perhaps the

2lIbid., p. 56.
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tension was highest and the reconciliation most tri
umphant in Hedda G a b l e r . 22
As Northam says, Hedda Gabler probably furnishes the best
example of Ibsen's new "psychological method."

Although the super

ficial outlines of Externalism are maintained, the breakdown of
objectivity is everywhere apparent.

The entire progress of the action

can be. traced on two levels--that of the external action and that of
the symbolic action.

Moreover, it seems evident that the major state

ment of the play is much more closely related to the symbolic action.
In the best third-person tradition, Hedda explicitly states certain of
her motives.

To Brack, for instance, she says that she acts the way

she does "because I'm bored I tell you."

To Mrs. Elvsted she explains

that "I want for once in my life to mould a human destiny"; to Lovborg
she confesses that she was interested in him because a young girl,
when it was possible, "should be glad to have a peep, now and then,
into a world which she is forbidden to know anything about."
overtly stated motives are part truth, but mostly excuse.

These

They mask

the more significant motives found only in the symbolism, found in
such things as General Gabler's pistols with their suggestions of
power and masculinity, of destruction and the death wish, of martial

22John Northam, Ibsen's Dramatic Method; A Study of the Prose
Dramas (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1952), p. 219

and sexual romance.

Or again, Hedda's motives can be traced to the

constant application of the cock and satyr images to Brack and Lovborg,
or to Hedda's identification of her child with Lovborg's manuscript and
Mrs. Elvsted's hair with that young lady's power over Lovborg.

The

play is shot through with these and other recurrent symbols which vary
both in meaning and importance according to their relation to a given
situation in the play.

In addition, it is interesting to note that

most of them, like Hedda's vision of Lovborg with "vine leaves in his
hair," testify to the interest which Ibsen shared with Nietzsche in the
Dionysian aspects of human nature.
But even

more interesting than the appearance of symbolism in

Hedda Gabler isthe particular manner

in which it is used.

One would

suppose that the symbol, like the monologue, would be.used to unlock
the psychic processes of more than one character, and, indeed, it did
function in this manner in The Wild D u c k .

But by the time Hedda was

written, Ibsen had long ago fallen into line with the more extreme
doctrines of the new relativism, the new and total emphasis on the
subject.

He was, in

Henry James had

fact, doing much the same thing in Hedda that

done in Portrait of a L a d y .

He was retaining the gen

eral framework of the third-person narrator, but by extremely close
and sympathetic narration, he was placing the "weight" into Hedda's
scale, "into her relation with herself," and he was proportionately
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removing the weight from the scales of her satellites.

Thus, the

really important element of the play, the symbolism, relates primarily
to Hedda in the sense that it either originates with her or refers to
her.

It is this aspect of Ibsen’s use of symbolism which gives such

depth to Hedda, and its use only in terms of her makes the other
characters seem flat and stereotyped.

Brack, Mrs* Elvsted, Lovborg,

and Tesman are purposely allowed to remained unrealized because the
emphasis is not on the total situation, but only on Hedda's relation
to it, and Ibsen's special use of symbolism points to this fact.
Raymond Williams recognizes Ibsen's special approach to Hedda
when he says that the play is not satisfying because it is like "a
powerful dramatization of a novel."23

in an attempt to put his finger

on Ibsen's new and disturbing method, he assigns it to the category of
"savage farce," a special classification which T.S. Eliot has manu
factured for The Jew of Malta and Volpone. Williams seems to have
missed the point.

Hedda is not farce at all, though it has caused

many an audience to laugh at the wrong places because directors and
actors have mistaken it for pure Externalism and have played Hedda's
satellites as fully realized, surface-realism characters.
ing overstatements cannot help but be funny.

^^Williams, oj>. cit.. p. 83 f.

The result

And, of course, when
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these characters become funny, they also become, In their way, sym
pathetic.

Consequently, many an audience leaves the theatre feeling

that Hedda got what she deserved.

This is rather unfortunate, for the

play is not about morals, but about the psychological constitution of
a particular Victorian woman.

If the audience is to understand the

play at all, they must be patient and sympathetic with Hedda alone.
Thus, the play should be presented so that all characters and situa
tions, and above all, all symbols point toward achieving this sympathy
and patience.
What some critics fail to comprehand is thatrlbsen is moving
behind external reality in not one but two ways, first, through
symbols, but more importantly through a change in point of view.
Unfortunately, he is not totally successful in either attempt.

His

failure can probably be traced to his reluctance to drop completely
the objectivity which he had labored so hard to establish.

This am

biguous posture was to become more marked in the plays of his declin?
ing years, but his tendency was always more and more toward symbolism,
more and more toward the pan-psychic drama.
To sum up, Ibsen'8 plays from The Wild Duck onwards move first
in the direction of opening the inner thoughts of all characters, and
then in the direction of concentrating on the psychic flux of a single
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character.

In this final phase, the plays seriously undercut third-

person objectivity and in doing so project the major structural prob
lem of the pan-psychic school, the presentation of a first-person
subjective point of view.

Therefore, we may say that Ibsen serves as

a pivotal figure in modern drama.

On the one hand, he perfected and

popularized a dramatic structure which had as its cornerstone an
objectivity of viewpoint.

But on the other hand, once he realized the

subjective basis of his relativism, his interest passed from a study
of what people actually did to a study of what actually made them do
what they did.

It was to comment on the latter phenomenon that Ibsen

sought for new structural devices.

The ones which he ultimately set

tled upon--symbolism and through symbolism a presentation of a more
personalized point of view— he passed on to the pan-psychic playwrights
for further development.
Nor can we say that the subjective playwrights were ones to
look a gift horse in the mouth.

They took what they received from

Ibsen and went immediately to work.

Ibsen's wish that The Wild Duck

•'may perhaps induce some of our younger playwrights to venture out in
r

a new direction" was, within ten years, more than gratified.

One such

group of younger playwrights were the symbolists, who, though they
claimed direct lineage from Villiers de L'lsle Adam, could not help
but regard

Ibsen as a pioneer and master.

Led by Maeterlinck and
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Claudel, the symbolists were highly influential throughout the nine
ties, and, as their name implies, the most distinguishing feature of
their work was symbolism.

Unfortunately, what began as legitimate

interest in a new technique soon became an overwhelming passion.
Ultimately, the symbolists came to regard the symbol as an end rather
than as a means and began to pursue it
They ended by

toooften for its own sake.

losing sight entirely of the function of the symbol in

Ibsen's work, and their own plays tended to become little better than
"grown-up fairy tales."

Thus, for one group of younger playwrights,

the "new direction" which began so vigorously with The Wild Duck was
to end rather limply with The Blue Bird.
But the symbolists were only one minor group, and Ibsen's
influence did

not stop with them.

His introduction of symbolism into

such plays as

Hedda Gabler secured for the device a respectable if

minor function in the works of latter day externalists like G.B. Shaw,
and made the symbol an important element in the dramas of such eclectic
playwrights as Chekhov and Hauptmann.
fined only to playwrights.

Nor was Ibsen's influence con

However strongly Edel may believe that

O'Neill was influenced by Joyce, William Tindall is equally strong in
his feeling that Joyce found in The Master Builder one of his great
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examples for Finnegan1s Wake.^
But among all the writers of pan-psychic literature who follow
ed Ibsen's example, perhaps the most important of the dramatists was
his younger contemporary August Strindberg.

Strindberg seems to have

finally recognized what Ibsen only vaguely apprehended, that the major
problem of modern pan-psychic drama was the projection of the total
dramatic illusion through some aspect of the first-person subjective
point of view.

He was probably greatly aided in this recognition by

the increasing popularity of Freudian psychology, but his experiments
with mysterious mental processes in such externalist plays as The
Father and Miss Julia certainly demonstrate that he owed no primary
debt to the science of psychoanalysis.

However, the question of what

Strindberg owed to psychology, or even what psychology might have owed
to Strindberg, is beside the point} obviously they were both products
of the total Zeitgeist.

The more germane matter is that since Strind

berg was the first to take up the problem uncompromisingly, any
detailed study of point of view in modern drama must begin with the
Swedish playwright.

Once Strindberg had joined issue with the problem

of dramatizing the subjective perspective, however, it was not long

24william York Tindall, The Literary Symbol (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 133.
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be£ore a considerable group of playwrights from many nations followed
his lead in exploring and exploiting it, and a lengthy period of
structural experimentation began, experimentation which has continued
to the present day.
The remainder of this study will be devoted to a detailed inves
tigation of this experimentation as found in eight examples of aspects
of point of view in modern drama.

Beginning with Strindberg, the

playwrights studied will include Evreinov, Kaiser, Pirandello, O'Neill,
Giraudoux, Miller, and Anouilh.

Their works have been selected for

various reasons, the most important being that each of the works
represents a different aspect of the problem of point of view.

Only

a little less important is the fact that each work is considered a
m o d e m play of some merit, and thus each will serve to keep this study
within the mainstream of modern drama, while at the same time each will
stand as evidence for the contention that the issue of point of view
is perhaps one of the most significant structural questions in modern
dramatic literature. Moreover the eight dramatists represent an inter
national group, and, therefore, prove that interest in the new method
was not limited by geography or culture.

Finally,

the playwrights

fall into a rough chronological pattern, thus serving as examples of
the approximate growth of the problem and of the direction it took as
it evolved within the total contemporary framework.
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There is no doubt that it would have been possible to select
other plays and other playwrights.

German Expressionism, for example,

teems with point-of-view studies, and Kaiser's play could have been
replaced by one of Toller's or any other of a large number of expres
sionists.

The same is true of American drama, which, in such works

as Rice's Adding Machine and Kaufman and Connelly's

Beggar on Horse

back. offered interesting if somewhat clumsy examples of the manipu
lation of subjective point of view.

In the cases mentioned above,

however, the playwrights are either inferior to the dramatists chosen
for study, or else represent a later or less original solution to the
problem.

In short, the eight playwrights to be studied are among the

writers considered as the leading dramatists of our times, and their
works, therefore, seem to stand as the best examples of the possibil
ities and difficulties of point of view as a structural element.
In fine, then, the eight playwrights presented in this study
are the end products of a century and a half of romanticist thinking.
They stand as individual manifestations of the pan-psychic tendencies
of m o d e m drama, tendencies so widespread as to touch even the work of
such part-time and reactionary playwrights as T.S. Eliot and W.B.
Yeats.

The germs of these tendencies are buried somewhere in the

drama of high Romance which dominated the early 19th-century stage,
but their uniquely modern character can first be seen taking shape
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during the last quarter of the 19th-century.

At that time two more or

less distinct currents developed in drama, Externalism and PanPsychism.

Had it not been for Ibsen,

it is difficult to say what the

ultimate relationship of these two forces may have been.

Ibsen's

work, however, forced a schism between the two and set for each its
separate goals.
It must be kept in mind, however, that no matter how diamet
rically opposed the two directions might appear to the casual observer,
they are, in essence, of the closest kinship.

They both share the

common background of subjectively based, irrational relativism, and
the more subjective direction is, in truth, the child of the more
objective.

This relationship is best demonstrated by Ibsen, who is a

key figure in both movements.

First, by rescuing the well-made play

from the decadence of the French theatre and by imposing on it a new
third-person objectivity, he set the pattern for the 20th-century
externalists.

Then, by becoming restive under the restrictions of his

surface-realism method and by attempting to pierce the hard shell of
objectivity through symbolism and a new attitude toward individualized
point of view, he created the goals for the latter day pan-psychic
playwrights.

It only remained for his younger contemporary, August

Strindberg, to make those goals clearer by completely rejecting the
third-person objective point of view.

CHAPTER THREE

THE DREAM AND THE MONODRAMA
STRINDBERG AND EVREINOV STATE THE PROBLEM

I
Strindberg:

The Dream Play

Just before the turn of the century, a particularly interesting
vogue gained popularity among European artists and intellectuals.
At that time it became fashionable— indeed, it became almost manda
tory— to go quite mad.

The names of those artists and thinkers

who were victims of some sort of mental disorder would make a
rather long list and would include such well known figures as
Nietzsche, Van Gogh and Henrik Ibsen.

Always sensitive to the

intellectual currents of his times, August Strindberg, not surpris
ingly, was to be counted among those who most passionately embraced
the new fashion.

Strindberg referred to his own mental collapse,

which followed close upon the heels of that of his friend Fredrick
Nietzsche, as his "inferno" period, a rather lengthy time during
which he harrowed the Swedenborgian hell, practiced alchemy, and
engaged in certain types of black magic.

Somehow, without extensive

medical treatmentj he managed to regain sufficient control to marry
for a third time, establish his own theatre, and resume his writing.
But much had happened to him during the long hiatus, and the work
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which he produced after the "inferno" was often of a strangely
different quality.

While it is true that he continued to write

naturalistic plays up until the very end, his attitude and tech
niques even in these externalistic dramas were different enough to
justify the contention that from 1897 until his death Strindberg's
chief concern was developing the pan-psychic drama.

But this

proposition need not be argued from the externalistic plays, for
its main support comes from Strindberg's experiments in a unique
and surprisingly contemporary dramatic form— the dream play.

These

experiments include the To Damascus series, The Ghost Sonata, and,
of course, The Dream Play itself.
That Strindberg should ultimately settle upon the dream as
a dramatic form seems, in retrospect, something less than unusual.
Considering the man and the times, it seems, in fact, almost
inevitable.

Strindberg, a moody and introspective boy, was the

unwanted child of an extremely large family.

The son of a poverty-

stricken aristocrat and a woman of the lower classes, Strindberg
contained within himself a mlcrocosmic reflection of the larger
struggle between the upper and lower classes which was then being
waged in Europe.

He was to spend much of his adult life attempting

to reconcile this personal conflict.

As if this problem were not

enough, the sensitive boy was soon aware that he was rejected by
both mother and father, and that, after his mother's death, he was
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openly hated by his stepmother.^
Strindberg's problems at home drove the boy to seek solace
In Pietism, a popular Lutheran sect with strong Puritanical and
Calvinistic leanings.

Like the New England Puritans, the Pietists

held as their basic precept the doctrine of election, with its
correspondent emphasis on retraint, prayer, and soul-searching.
The effect such a religion might have on an already introverted
boy can easily be imagined.

Thus, it is safe to say that before

he left home to attend the university, Strindberg's intensely
personal world view had already been established.

What was basic

in the boy was to remain basic in the man, and it is now a truism
to say that Strindberg's work is always highly autobiographical.
To support this contention, it is necessary only to note
that every precept of Strindberg's philosophy can be traced to one
or another of his childhood experiences.

His ambivalent attitude

towards women, for Instance, was probably rooted in his constant
longing for a mother love he never received, and in his later
inability to reconcile this longing with the mature sexual demands
made by his wives.

Or again, the strict teachings of Pietism and

the conflict of loyalties caused by the differing origins of his
mother and father were probably responsible for his continuing

*For those who set store in such things, Strindberg's unhappy
relationship with his mother has caused him to be considered a
classic example of the Oedipus Complex. For a thorough discussion
of this and other matters in Strindberg's life see V. J. McGill,
August Strindberg. The Bedeviled Viking (London: Noel Douglas,
1930).
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iconoclasm, which was consistent only in being always present in
some form*

Moreover, Pietism was in all likelihood the activity

which prepared his soul for his later Swedenborgian ecstasies and
for his ultimate conversion to a Christianity which was a compromise
between the teachings of Swedenborg and those of Roman Catholicism.
All in all, Strindberg's background and personality certainly
equipped him to be a pan-psychic playwright of note, and, if the
times were right, perhaps a truly important Innovator.
happens, the times could not have been more auspicious.

As it so
All

Strindberg had to do was to be alive to their signs, and this
he certainly was.
As Otto Heller notes in his essay on Strindberg, the play
wright was aware of every new intellectual current, and, at one
time or another, supported each of them:
He reversed his judgment with a temerity and swift
ness that greatly offended the feeling and perplexed the
intelligence of his followers for the time being and
justified the question whether Strindberg had any
principles at all. In politics he was by quick turns
Anarchist and Socialist, Radical and Conservative,
Republican and Aristocrat, Communist and Egoist; in
religion, Pietist, Protestant, Deist, Atheist, Occultist
and Roman Catholic.
With such an erratic intellectual pattern, it is not strange
that when Strindberg came to playwrighting, he first tried his hand
at the historical romances then in vogue, and, when the fashion

^Otto Heller, Prophets of Dissent (New York:
Knopf, 1918), p. 78.

Alfred A.
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changed, abandoned these for the new Extemalism.
he became a master.

In the latter mode

But even as Strindberg was producing his

naturalistic masterpieces, Henrik Ibsen, the playwright whom
Strindberg refused to recognize as master, was quietly moving
beyond the frontiers of objectivity.

However much Strindberg

may have believed that Ibsen found Hedda's prototypes in The
Father and Miss Julia. It was ultimately the younger man who was to
be beholden to the older.

Three years before the appearance of

The Father. Ibsen had already presented a new subjectivity In The
Wild Duck, and by the nineties Ibsen had almost broken through the
barrier of objectivity in such plays as Hedda Gabler.

Had it not

been for Strindberg's passionate disagreement with Ibsen over the
"woman problem" it is very possible that Strindberg would have
realized and acknowledged his debt.

After all, the Swedish play

wright could hardly have found fault with the subject-focused
conclusions of Ibsen's relativism, for the homage which Strindberg
paid to Nietzsche and Swedenborg was obviously based on his early
and continuing reverence for Buckle, author of History of Civilization
in England, whose total view was naturalistic determinism, but whose
basic premise was that all truth was relative to the individual,
to his situation and presuppositions.^
Thus, even while Strindberg was damning Ibsen as the "Nor
wegian blue stocking," he was preparing to follow him by becoming
a convert to Buckle's relativism.

^McGill, o£. cit., p. 105.

As if Buckle's beliefs were
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not enough, Strindberg also fell under the Influence of Nietzsche
and carried on a lengthy correspondence with that philosopher.4
Nietzsche's amorality and his stress on the Individual ego must
surely have heightened Strindberg's growing annoyance with the
objectivity of Externallsm, for McGill records that in 1892, in
a famous drinking resort in Berlin, Strindberg made a vehement
attack on Naturalism which, in its violence, surprised and hurt
his friend, the poet Dehmel.^

Why Strindberg did not follow the

lead of Ibsen at this time is an open conjecture.

Happily he did

not, for if he had, it is probable that he would have given his
allegiance to the symbolists, whose work he admired sufficiently
to write Swanwhite in direct imitation of Maeterlinck.

Had

Strindberg committed himself wholeheartedly to the symbolists
at this time, it is likely that he would have been lost to us
but as a writer of fairy tales.
Strindberg's "symbolist period" was to come, however, and when
it did, he was to see what Maeterlinck was blind to, and he was to
take the decisive step into complete subjectivity.

Before he was

equipped to do this, however, one more philosophic Ingredient was
necessary.

The times had already conspired that he should be aware

of the relativism of Buckle, the ego-cult of Nietzsche, and the new

^For more information on the Nietzsche-Strindberg corres
pondence see Herman Scheffauer, "A Correspondence Between Nietzsche
and Strindberg," North American Review. 198 (1913), 197-205.
^McGill, oj>. cit., p. 9.
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techniques of Ibsen as popularized by the symbolists.

He had now

only to descend into his "inferno" and be converted to the mysticism
of Swedenborg.

When he emerged from this final trial, he was

ready to write the drama, not about himself, but of himself.
Thus Strindberg, before the turn of the century, was prepared
to tell the truth.

This truth was the truth in the Buckl6an

sense, the world as seen from Strindberg's point of view.

It

was also the truth in the Nietzschean sense, the truth of the
Individual will, in its Dionysian as well as its Apollonian
form, transcending and reshaping the world.

It was, finally, the

truth in the Swedenborgian sense, the truth of the inner not the
outer existence of man.

To tell this special kind of truth,

Strindberg needed a new structural method.

The objectivity of

Externallsm might, if properly manipulated, very well have met
the demands of Buckle and Nietzsche, but its very nature was the
antithesis of Swedenborgianism.

There was, of course, the symbolism

of Maeterlinck, but a symbol is not total structural solution,
except in the metaphorical sense that all structural solutions
are ultimately symbolic.

Moreover, the symbolist playwrights

had tended more and more towards the fairy tale, thus reducing
their symbolism to the function of anti-realism as opposed to
lnner-reali8m.

Whether realistic or fanciful, their basic structure

still postulated either the objective or omniscient approach.
Thus The Blue Bird may be fantasy, but within the fantastic frame
work, its method of presentation is still that of Externallsm.
Strindberg then could make use of various superficial techniques
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of the symbolists, but he had to search out a fundamentally
different overall approach through which to present his new
trlfold philosophy.
Ihat new method, consciously or not, followed the lead of
Ibsen's experiments with point of view in his post-Hedda Gabler
period, but it took Ibsen's techniques one step farther.

Strindberg

completely discarded any pretense of objectivity and established
instead a first-person subjective point of view.

Now while this

step was prompted by a need to represent the inner reality according
to Swedenborg, its immediate inspiration was, in all likelihood,
the experiences which Strindberg had undergone during his mental
collapse.

Throughout this time hallucinations were frequent

occurrence in the life of the playwright.

He was attacked by

electric currents; he saw white hands lifted in prayer.

The man

with whom he shared a room turned out to be the Doppelg&iger of the
American faith healer, Francis Schlotter.

At another time a

Roman knight appeared to him and offered him the formula for
transforming iron into gold.6

These and other waking dreams

probably suggested to Strindberg the fragility of the relationship
between the subject and the object, between the inner and the
outer reality.

He no doubt realized how much the stability of the

latter depends upon state of will of the former, upon whims of its

^For a full account of this period see Strindberg's auto
biographical work, Inferno. Claude Field, Trans. (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1913).
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ordering consciousness.

Or, inversely, he recognized how quickly

the apparent order of outer reality can be disturbed by the refusal
of the metaconsclous to allow the consciousness to admit that
order's existence.

When a decision had to be made between the two,

Strindberg, true to the dictates of Swedenborg, came to place
his trust in inner reality, even, and especially, when it disagreed
with the outer.

As his experiences had shown him, this disagreement

often took the form of a waking dream; hence, it is little wonder
that when Strindberg cast about for a new structural approach,
he finally came to select the individual dream as an artistic
form.
His first experiments with the new convention were in the
To Damascus trilogy, written between 1897 and 1904.

At first

his technique is inconsistent, for like Ibsen before him Strindberg
was reluctant to relinquish entirely the extemallstic form.

This

reluctance, however, is not apparent in his two most consummate
experiments with his new dream structure— The Ghost Sonata and The
Dream Play.

These two plays, the latter written in 1901-02 and

the former in 1907, still stand as two of the most striking and
original literary works of the early 20th-century.

While both

were written after the publication of Freud's theory of dream
interpretation, there is no evidence to indicate that Strindberg
had ever read Freud.

What he had read were the more important

signs of his time, and, moreover, he had read and acted on them
sometime before the celebrated subjective experiments of Proust
and James Joyce.

Just what Strindberg read in those signs and just
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how he translated what he read Into a dramatic statement can best
be discovered by a detailed analysis of his new method.

Since

The Dream Play is the earliest and the best complete example of the
new technique, it has been selected to serve as a basis for this
analysis.
It must be granted at the outset that The Dream Play is not new
in its dreaminess, for dream works in the Maeterlinck tradition were
then quite popular in Europe.
been popular.
dream play.
fairy tales.

They had, for that matter, always

As Strindberg correctly observed, The Tempest is a
But prior dream plays, like The Tempest, had been
That is, though their atmosphere was fantastical,

their psychology, no matter how naive, conformed to the psychology
of accepted reality.
standardized.

Moreover, even the elements of fantasy were

We expect Ariels and Calibans to appear, even

demand that they do.

The same is true of such elements as enchanted

islands, handsome princes, and lovely princesses.

It is the received

dream world of high romance and conforms to certain universal
principles.

In a play like The Tempest, once we know it for fantasy,

the emphasis is on the dream, and its pleasant divergences from
reality.

The audience has dreamed this same dream many times,

and what they expect to see is not a new dream but a new variation
of the old one.

Both the audience and the playwright agree that

the world depicted is a familiar but alien one whose charm derives
from everyone'8 awareness that it is an Improbable one.
Strindberg's Dream Play differs from this concept in that the
emphasis is on the dreamer, and the world presented is reality, a
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world actually occurring for the dreamer, and the fact that It is a
world possible only for the dreamer does not at all detract from
Its reality.

What the audience Is Invited to do is to share this

world with the dreamer by dreaming along with him, by forgetting,
for the moment all other worlds.

As Strindberg says in the preface

to The Dream Play:
The characters are split, double and multiply, they
evaporate, crystallise, scatter and converge. But a
single consciousness holds sway over them all— that of
the dreamer. For him there are no secrets, no incon
gruities, no scruples, no law. He neither condemns nor
aquits, only relates...^
In other words, what happens in The Tempest may be referred to
the audience*8 sense of external reality, and the divergences between
universal dream and universal reality may be duly noted and enjoyed.
What happens in The Dream Play may be referred only to the dreamer.
The audience is prohibited from considering the points of diver
gence from objective reality because the focus is not on commonly
shared experiences but on the uniqueness of the dreamer's vision.
Briefly, the audience sees Shakespeare's world through their own
eyes; Strindberg's world they see only through the eyes of the
dreamer.

Shakespeare injects fantasy into the universal object;

Strindberg begins with externality and quickly passes into the
variations it produces in the private ego.
...on a slight groundwork of reality, imagination spins
and weaves new patterns made up of memories, experiences,

^Elizabeth Sprigge, Trans., August Strindberg. Six Plays of
Strindberg (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956),
p. 193.
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unfettered fancies, absurdities and improvisations.
Strindberg demands that his audience forget all concepts of
fantasy and reality, of morals and actions, of human relationships
on and off the stage, and observe instead the flux and counterflux
of a single mind as it reacts to an unknown stimulus from the outer
world.

In short, we have in The Dream Play the workings of a mind

observed in no larger sphere of action than the mind itself.

It

is on this basis that one must accept or reject the play.
Moreover, by an unfortunate accident, the mind happens to
be the mind of August Strindberg, a mind not yet fully recovered
from a severe mental illness, a mind fascinated by all manner of
Eastern and Western mysticism, and, consequently, a mind that
could hardly hope to call forth the empathlc response which is the
very sina quo non of an understanding of the dream form.
this, Strindberg has made certain concessions.

Realizing

After the play

was completed, he added the prologue in which Indra's Daughter
descends from heaven in order to experience first hand the life of
man.

By thus casting over the play an aura of Eastern mystery,

Strindberg greatly tempered its distortions.

In addition, the

playwright added a short preface which he had printed in the program
for the first production of The Dream Play.

Along with the other

ideas already cited, the preface stresses the dreaming as opposed
to the waking quality of the play.
minded.

This is sop to the simple-

That the play is nightmarish there is no doubt, but

despite the implication of the preface, there is evidence in the
play itself that the events are part of a waking dream.

More to the

point, the playwright implies that there is no basic difference
between the two, as the following scene between the Poet and Indra's
Daughter indicates.
I seem to have U V e d through this before.
POET.
DAUGHTER. I too.
Perhaps I dreamt it.
POET.
DAUGHTER. Or made a poem of it.
Or made a poem.
POET.
DAUGHTER. You know then what poetry is.
I know what dreaming is.
POET.
I feel that once before, somewhere else, we
DAUGHTER.
said these words.
Then soon you will know what reality is.
POET.
DAUGHTER. Or dreaming.
Or poetry.
POET.
On the basis of this conversation, the play may be considered
a dream, a memory, a bit of external reality, or a poem, or even a
dream within a dream.

The label is unimportant; call it by the more

modern name of stream of consciousness, it still remains that the
playwright is recording the play of mysterious images on the stage
of his consciousness, images that have been called up from some metaconscious level of human existence.

For centuries, the traditional

procedure— broken only here or there by such painters as Hieronymus
van Bosch— had been for the artist to so arrange and translate
these images into the common tongue that a universally stated analogue
to them existed in a painting, poem, or play.

In other words, the

assumption had been that these spectres from the preconsclous were
essentially incoherent, and that in order to make them communicable,
it was necessary to bring to bear on them the ordering logic of the
consciousness.

As Nietzsche puts it, the Dionysian needs the logic

of the Apollonian.

In The Dream Play. Strindberg directly challenges
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this assumption.
Itself.

To him the Dionysian Is meaningful In and of

As he says in the preface to The Dream Play.
In this dream play, as in his former dream play
To Damascus, the Author has sought to reproduce the
disconnected but apparently logical form of a dream.
Thus, before the play begins, Strindberg anounces that he

is studying a new form of logic, the basic logic of the individual out
of which all universal inference ultimately grows.

This rationale

of the individual is best reflected in the "dream work," and therefore
the meaning of the play will be found in Strindberg's comments on and
presentation of the "apparently logical form of a dream."

In other

words, the meaning of Strindberg's dream will be found in the assump
tions upon which it rests and in its own form of coherence, its
own structural patterns.

What then, first of all; are the assumptions

of dream logic?
To begin with, as Strindberg says, "time and space do not
exist."

Just how original this notion was in 1901 is difficult for

us now to realize, for we have had the advantage of seeing an Albert
Einstein scientifically explode our traditional concepts of space
and time.

Indeed, some of us are even now somewhat astounded at the

idea, although every "stream of consciousness" novelist from Proust
onward

hastoyed with and worried the notion to death.

Play Strindberg

In The Dream

pauses to take up the concept in some detail.

OFFICER.
Then how long shall I have to stay here?
SCHOOL MASTER. How long? Here? You believe that time
and space exist? Assuming that time does exist,
you ought to be able to say what time is. What
is time?
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OFFICER.

Time...I can't say, although I know what It Is.
Ergo, I may know what twice two is without being able
to say it. Can you yourself say what time is?
SCHOOL MASTER. Certainly I can.
OFFICER.
Tell us then!
SCHOOL MASTER. Time?...Let me se. While we speak time flies.
Consequently, time is something which flies while I
am speaking.
BOY.
(rising) You're speaking now, sir, and while you're
speaking, I fly. Consequently, I'm time,
(he
flies)
SCHOOL MASTER. That is also quite correct according to the
laws of logic, although it is absurd.
OFFICER.
Then logic is absurd.
SCHOOL MASTER. It really looks like it. But if logic is
absurd the whole world is absurd....
As the scene above suggests, when time and space cease to
exist, so also does popular logic whose casual foundations rest on
spatial-temporal reality.

Having discarded the received time-space

sequence, the Officer and the School Master are justified in playing
Alice in Wonderland with rationality.
OFFICER.

Yes, that's so, one must mature...Twice two—
is two, and this I will demonstrate by analogy, the
highest form of proof. Listen! Once one is one,
therefore twice two is two. For thatwhich
applies to the one must apply to the other.
SCHOOL MASTER. The proof is perfectly in accord with the laws
of logic, but the answer is wrong.
OFFICER.
What is in accord with the laws of logic
cannot be wrong. Let us put it to the test. One
goes into one once, therefore two goes into two
twice.
If time, space, and popular ideals of logic do not exist,
then there is little reason to assume that probability and possibility
exist either.

As Strindberg tells us, "Anything can happen; every

thing is possible and probable."

Thus in one sweep, the entire

structural assumptions of all previous dramatic literature are cast
aside.

And yet, Strindberg promises us that on the basis of this new
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assumptions he will present us with a drama of "apparent logic," a new
logic which will give the key to the whole meaning of the "inner life"
of the ego.
This strange new Strindbergian logic is symbolized in The
Dream Play by the secret hidden behind the door with the clover leaf
design, and one of the major concerns of the play is the unlocking
of that door.

When near the end, the door is finally unlocked, the

secret turns out to be nothing.

This has two meanings.

To the

Dean of Theology, the secret is nothing because out of nothing God
created heaven and earth.

Now this meaning has been generally

passed from critic to critic, and pawned off on readers and audience
as the meaning of the play.

What these critics fall to realize is

that they are the very ones whom Strindberg is satirizing, for they
have failed to take into account that the statement is made by the
Dean of Theology who probably represents the accepted not the
Strindbergian world view.
later,

Actually, Indra's Daughter, a few lines

give? us what must be taken as Strindberg's meaning.

Earlier

she has told the Dean of Theology that what he said was true but
that he has misunderstood.

Now she tells the Poet.

DAUGHTER.
...In the dawn of time, before your sun gave
light, Brahma, the divine primal force let himself
be seduced by Maya, the World Mother, that he
might propagate. This mingling of the divine
element and the earthly was the Fall from heaven.
This world, its life and its inhabitants are
therefore only a mirage, a reflection, a dream
image.
POET.
My dream!
DAUGHTER. A true dream. But, in order to be freed from
the earthly element, the descendants of Brahma
sought renunciation and suffering. And so you
have suffering as the deliverer. But this
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yearning for suffering comes into conflict
with the longing for joy, for love. Now you
understand what love is; supreme Joy in the
greatest suffering, the sweetest is the most
bitter. Do you understand now what woman
is? Woman, through whom sin and death entered
into life.
POET.
I understand. And the outcome?
DAUGHTER. What you yourself know. Conflict between
the pain of joy and the joy of pain, between the
anguish of the penitent and the pleasure of
the sensual.
POET.
And the conflict?
DAUGHTER. The conflict of opposites generates power, as
fire and water generate the force of steam.
Thus there is nothing behind the door because the world is
nothing.

It is but the reflection of the individual dreamer and

its substance changes with each dreamer and each dream.

Or, again,

there is nothing behind the door because it is opened at the end of
the play; had it been opened in the third scene, one could have seen,
in simultaneous montage, the entire remainder of the play.

Hence,

Strindberg's new basic logic is the dreamer's logic, which is, as
Indra's Daughter suggests, the logic of opposites.
formal state, the mind proceeds by contraries.

In its pre-

In proof that this

is the basic comment of the play, let us examine its structural
patterns.
In terms of overall structure, the play may be divided into
two more or less equal halves.
scene at Foulstrand.

The first half culminates in the

The second half begins with the scenes in

Fairhaven and gradually repeats in reverse most of the happenings
of part one. This is not to say that there is a formal repetition,
for that would argue for a rationlistic world.

The order of repetition

is not consistent, and there are individual scenes in both halves that
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have no counterparts.

On the whole, however, the repetition of

contraries is quite obvious.
The play begins and ends with the "growing castle."
first scene it is a prison, a place to escape from.

In the

In the last,

it is a gateway to heaven, a burning bier of deliverance.

In this

same manner, the very short third, fourth, and fifth scenes at the
opera are balanced by the rather long second to last scene of the
play which is also set at the opera.
the balance is more asymmetrical.

For the most part, however,

Thus, the antipenultimate scene

finds its counterpart in the grotto scene, scene eight of part one;
and the graduation scene, a late scene in the first half, is
reflected in the early second half scene at the grammar school.
What episodes are not completely mirrored are at least brought up
in part two.

Thus, though there is no return to the Lawyer's

office; there is a reappearance of the Lawyer and much allusion to
the earlier scene.
In all, the play's special pattern is highly reminisclent of
music, and we may say that Strindberg was among the first of the
early m o d e m dramatists to forsake the role of the architect for
that of the composer.

Thus the first half of the play introduces

the motif of the painful and dreary lot of human existence.

This

theme is built up and varied until it reaches something of a cres
cendo in the scene of domestic strife between the Lawyer and Indra's
Daughter.

There follows an interlude in Foulstrand itself, which

serves to summarize what has happened and to introduce the major
instrument of the second movement, the Poet.

The second movement
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takes up the "Joys" of life in Fairhaven, and this portion of the
play reaches its climax in the lyric ecstacy of the Daughter, who
in her rapture delivers herself of a prophetic vision of ultimate
salvation in God.

Thereafter, Strindberg returns to the backstage

alley of the opera and combines the motifs of both parts into a
larger orchestration which gains steadily in both complexity and
intensity until Indra's Daughter is consumed in the flames of the
growing castle as the bud on the roof brusts into a giant flower.
So much for larger patterns.

Within this framework of

thesis and antithesis are found minor themes and situations which
mirror the overall structure.

Without enumerating them all, we

might indicate one or two that point to the first movement's
constant variations on the theme of desperate hope.

The Officer,

for Instance, waits throughout his life in the vain hope of seeing
the woman of his dreams.

In like manner, the Lawyer, having failed

to receive his degree, marries nevertheless, taking this unwise
step on the basis of a hopeless hope that he will somehow be able
to support a wife and family.

So also does Indra's Daughter— ‘despite

the disillusioning experience of one marital failure— >elope with the
Officer who promises to take her to Fairhaven but who loses his
way and brings them instead to Foulstrand.
In the second movement, these motifs are played in reverse, and
the theme becomes one of hopeless desperation.
hope has been acquired, it cannot be enjoyed.

Once the object of
Edith is invited

to a dance only to find that no one wishes to dance with her.

The

Officer finds that his degree is not enough; he must return to school
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to mature.

The Mediterranean paradise of the Daughter and the Lawyer

is marred by their awareness of the unhappy lot of those who are
less fortunate.
DAUGHTER.
1ST COAL HEAVER.
2ND COAL HEAVER.

This is paradise.
This is hell.
A hundred and twenty in the shade.

Ihus the only thing constant about human life is its contra
dictions. Hope and despair exchange places with one another according
to the shift in perspective, but in some mixture pain and joy are
always present.

Strindberg's belief in the oneness of these two

contraries is perhaps most strongly stated in the scene between the
Officer, his lost love Victoria, and her new husband.
OFFICER.
And Victoria whom I loved, for whom I desired
the greatest happiness on earth, she has her happi
ness now, the greatest happiness she can know,
while I suffer, suffer, suffer.
VICTORIA. Do you think I can be happy, seeing your suffer
ing? How can you believe that? Perhaps it comforts
you to know that I shall be a prisoner here for forty
days and forty nights. Tell me, does that comfort
you?
OFFICER.
Yes and no. I cannot have pleasure while you
have pain.
HE.
And do you think that my happiness can be built
on your agony?
OFFICER. We are all to be pitied— all of us.
Before dispensing with it completely, one final aspect of
Strindbergian dream logic must be considered.

In teems of larger

concepts, dream logic is the logic of contradictions, but what of the
relation of its parts one to the other?
process?

Does this involve a cohesive

The answer to this, of course, depends upon our definition

cohesive.

But if we can assume for cohesive such a synonym as

sequential, we may say that the playwright gives his world of
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contradictions unity by moving from one contrary to another through
the sequential process popularized by Freudian psychoanalysis under
the rather confusing label of the "logic of free association."
Without passing a value judgment on this manner of logic, let us
observe its operation in the play
Scene one finds the Officer complaining of life's injustices.
This, by association, brings up the question of injustices suffered
as a child, and on this note the scene shifts to the Officer's
childhood home.

This is not to say that scene one lays careful

preparation for scene two in the manner in which this might be
done in a well-made play.

What happens in scene two does not

in any manner rest architecturally on scene one.

The only link

between the two is a mention by the Officer of injustice.

This

same sort of association is found between scenes two and three.

As

scene two draws to a close, Indra's Daughter is moved to comment,
"Life is hard.

But love conquers everything.

Come and see."

With

this invitation the scene shifts to the backstage alley of the opera,
and the Officer appears as a faithful suitor waiting for his true
love.

As the play progresses, the linking of one episode to another

through free associations becomes more and more involved.

Thus a

casual mention of some idea or element from an earlier scene is
enough to recall that scene in whole or in part.

The Kyrie of a

children'8 choir, for instance, is used as a transition into the
first Grotto scene, while in the much later second Grotto scene
it reappears as a hymn sung by the sailor's on a doomed ship.

By

the end of the play, the single thin strands of association are so
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thickly webbed that a strong Impression of tangible unity is
achieved, the same effect of unity that is later to be found in
Remembrance of Things Past, for it was the same type of associative
logic, the same special kind of sequential development and cohesion
used in The Dream Play, that was later to form one of the basic
problems of Proust's monumental work.
A second means of gaining unity, a means closely related to
the logic of free association, was that of repetition of key symbols.
In much the same manner that earlier playwrights had gained unity
through central character, Strindberg centered his work about major
symbols.

In all likelihood, Strindberg learned this particular

technique from Maeterlinclq but he took the technique a good many
steps farther into complexity, and the two major symbols of The Dream
Play, the growing castle and the forbidden door, stand as much richer
complexes than do the pale allegories of Maeterlinck.

The castle,

for instance, is first of all a prison, suggesting the solipslstic
nature of the Individual existence.
prison.

It is not, however, an ordinary

Like the bud on its roof and the flowers around it, the

Castle grows away from the earth, and as it grows, it adds new
windows, new views of the earth and the heavens.

Thus Strindberg

manages to make an involved religious and intellectual statement with
his symbol.

He adds to the significance of this statement by having

the Glazier who adds the new windows to the Castle also perform the
task of opening the forbidden door.

The meaning becomes even richer

when we realize that the Glazier is also the earthly father of Indra's
Daughter.

As a final function of the symbol, the Castle serves as a
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funeral bier for Indra's Daughter, and as it b u m s , the bud on its
roof bursts into full bloom, signifying the completion of its
earthly mission.
The significance of the forbidden door has already been
discussed, but a second aspect of it will serve as an example of the
advantages which the dream form offers to one who wishes to obtain
unity of central symbol.

Throughout the play, the door is not only

discussed but makes an almost continual appearance.

First, it is

the door of the Officer's kitchen cabinet, then the door in the
backstage alley, then the door to the Lawyer's legal files.

Such

a repetition of the same property in so many different functions
is only possible within the dream form, which progresses by contra
dictions and which dismisses time and space and probability in favor
of the imaginative liberty of free association.
Over the whole work, in all its diverse structural manifesta
tions, stands the unifying vision of the dreamer, the intensely
personal outlook of Strindberg himself.

There are no characters

in the play; there is only the action of the dreamer.

The forms

which pass as characters are able to "split, double and multiply,
evaporate, crystallize, scatter and converge" because they are not
external characters at all.

They are merely different aspects of the.

same personality, or at best projections of that personality into
external forms.

In short, The Dream Play is a play of introspection,

and what character is present is revealed not developed.
the character revealed is always that of the dreamer.

Moreover,

Thus Indra's

Daughter is the deepest mystical essence of the soul, which is not

uncommonly represented as female.

The Lawyer, the Officer, and the

Poet are each a separate aspect of the Dreamer's more conscious
personality, and each attempts his own sort of communion with the
soul, while at the same time making his own manner of compromise
with the material problems of the flesh.

To each aspect this

communion and this compromise grows out of his nature, his private
viewpoint.

The Lawyer sees his problems through the eyes of a liberal

idealist, the Officer through those of a sentimental romantic.

All

three aspects pull against one another, and all three try to capture
Indra's Daughter, the soul, for himself alone.

It is the Poet who

succeeds best in this struggle because he is the fartherest removed
from externality.

But even he is not totally successful, and he is

condemned forever to compete with the other two for the Daughter's
love.

It is this passionate desire for ultimate mystical communion

with the deepest essence of the soul which keeps the three aspects
from disassociating completely.

Thus, the dreamer's personality,

like all life, is forced to live in continual conflict, a conflict
which gains its unity from the very inseparability of its contra
dictions.

Such an unfortunate condition is truly a basis for the

Daughter's constant refrain:

"Life is cruel.

Men are to be pitied."

To sum up, the dream form was, as Strindberg boasted, a
completely new dramatic mode which he himself invented.

It differed

from previous dream works in that its elements of fantasy were to
be considered as significant^ realizable reality, and in that the
focus was shifted from the world of jointly shared experiences to the
closed and subjective world of the private ego.

The action of the
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dream was the action of the individual interacting within himself,
and, by this involution of action, viewing reality from his own
standards not those of the audience*

These standards included a

rejection of space, time and probability, an acceptance of the
free association of ideas as a cognitive process, an apposition
of contraries as a general framework for thought, and a reliance on
the unity provided by the evolving meanings of major symbols.

As

an ultimate goal, the dream form aimed at presenting the action of a
given soul in reference to itself alone.
It is true, of course, that some sort of stimulus from
external reality was assumed, and, as Martin Lamm informs us, "a
good many of the scenes are day dreams Inspired by what Strindberg
saw from his study window while he was composing the play."** Moreover,
anyone sufficiently familiar with Strindberg's life can see many of
Strindberg's own experiences reflected in The Dream Play.

But these

things are unimportant, for Strindberg was studying the reaction, not
the stimulus.

Despite countless autobiographical references, the

play is not biography in the received sense.
pre-autobiographical.

It is, as it were,

It is a study of the soul spewing forth

those ideas and episodes which will only later be organized
into a logical autobiography.

And thus it is, above all, the first

truly modern projection of the dramatic Illusion through the sub
jective viewpoint of the dramatic character himself.

0

°Lamm, o£. cit. , p. 145.
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In terms of the latter aspect, the dream method has several
advantages.

By dispensing with space, time, and popular logic,

it escapes the restraints of objectivity and eliminates the need
for carefully archltectured intrigue.

It permits the use of symbols

without any regard to the justification of their presence in strange
contexts, and, above all, it provides the dramatist with unlimited
opportunities for romantic irony, which can be achieved so rapidly in
the dream form.

Since the dramatist is bound only by the highly

elastic logic of free association, he may, when he feels the need
to reinforce his scene or theme through Ironic action or statement,
simply introduce a character or situation out of nowhere, make his
point, and then return again to the episode at hand.

Thus, a

pensioner appears just as the Officer is discussing the dreary lot
of life on a pension, and so too the blind man with his speech of
doom just as the pleasure ship sets sail.
Against these advantages stand certain disadvantages.

The

easy access to ironical situations may prove too great a temptation,
and the device may be used so frequently that it becomes emasculated.
Passionate romantic that he was, Strindberg was guilty of this very
error.

Another disadvantage of the dream foxm is the difficulty of

creating the proper atmosphere.

To establish the play's general

somnambulistic quality and still maintain a sense of seriousness,
the playwright must walk a fine line between the grotesque and the
precious .

Moreover, incidental atmospheric distortions must be

clearly differentiated from the more important symbols.

We must, for

instance, be able to decide quickly whether the disappearance of the
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Officer'8 father through a wall has any special meaning or whether
it simply exists as part of the total dream framework.

Problems

of this nature are, of course, tied up with and complicated by the
subject through whom the playwright projects the vision of the dream.
In a play in which all referents are more relative than universal,
there is a strong possibility that some members of the audience
will see meanings in every action no matter how inconsequential,
while others will become so confused that they see nothing but chaos.
To ease this problem, the playwright should attempt to select a
subject whose mind and, consequently, whose dream will bear certain
resemblances to the minds and dreams of his audience.

Strindberg seems

little interested in solving this problem, for the subject'he selected
was himself, a man whose precariously balanced mind made subjective
communication a veritable impossibility.
Not only does the strange mind of August Strindberg cause
communication difficulties, it also gives to his dream the harrow
ing quality of the worst kind of nightmare.

This, of course, was

an accident; nightmarishness is not inherent in the dream structure
as such.

Still the danger is there, and it tended to manifest

itself in the Expressionist Movement, which, in taking its cue from
Strindberg, often attempted to pawn off much meaningless and pre
tentious grotesquery as legitimate theatrical subject matter.
But the greatest disadvantage of the dream method lay in none
of these things.

It lay, instead, in the dream's overall elusiveness,

a quality not easily captured in a meaningful artistic structure.
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Without losing the essential fluidity, and, more Important, the
essential Irrationality of the dream, the playwright must somehow
fix It in a playable dramatic pattern.

To meet this problem,

Strindberg, like so many other moderns, turned to music for his
answer.

Now there is nothing inherently wrong in borrowing Ideas

from another art, but there is a grave potential danger, and Strind
berg seems to have been unable to avoid that danger.

Again, like so

many mode m s , Strindberg seems to have confused music with his own
particular art, and instead of adapting music to dramatic needs, he
adapted drama to the needs of music.

He may, perhaps, be excused

for this, for it was his friend and guide Nietzsche who saw music
as the basis of all arts, but whether Strindberg is excused or
not, the- fact of failure remains.

Metaphors aside, a cathedral is

not a frozen hymn and a play is not a sonata.

When it tries to be,

it is likely to have, as does The Dream Play, a strange, monotonous
quality throughout.

Hence, though each scene has a quality which

is immediate, intense, and, at times, even hysterical, the work as
a whole seems strangely unpointed, even flat.

Together with other

causes, this flatness is the ultimate result of the forsaking of
motivations through character and action in favor of motivations
through rhythm, that is, the basic logic of the play is musical not
dramatic logic.
Whatever his successes or failures, Strindberg had created a
new outlook for the m o d e m playwright, and henceforth the pan-psychic
dramatist was to busy himself with the presentation of some variation
of the individual as opposed to the universal point of view.
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II
Evrelnov:

The Theatre of the Soul

Juat before his death, Strindberg was contemplating a new
dramatic mode*

He planndd to write a "monodrama" in which there

would be only one character on stage*

This actor would carry on

dialogue with various off-stage voices.

Strindberg died before he

could realize his new form, but within four years of the first pro
duction of The Dream Play, a young Russian playwright was actually
discussing and writing a slightly different type of monodrama.
The first theorist and writer of the monodrama was Nicolai
Evrelnov, a brilliant lawyer who at the age of eighteen had read and
been deeply Influenced by Nietzsche*
akin to Strindberg.

In this respect, he was also

Evrelnov was already on his way to a career

in the Ministry of Ways and Communications, when he developed an
interest in the theatre, an interest which was to Increase until it
led Evrelnov into a theatrical career as a playwright, director,
dramatic theorist, and the theatrical scholar and historian of the
first rank.

Always an experimenter, Evrelnov even gained some

repute for his experiments with the nude as a theatrical element.
Such avant-garde concepts led to his first professional position,
that of the regieseur of the Konsnlssarzhevskaya Theatre.
It is significant that Evrelnov's immediate predecessor
at the Kommissarzhevkaya Theatre was Vsevolod Meyerhold, for it was
Meyerhold's theatrical theories and his attacks on the production
methods of the externalists of the Moscow Art Theatre that inspired,
in all likelihood, Evrelnov's unique experiments with the dramatic
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illusion.

In Meyerhold's opinion, the theatre had lost its vigor

because its two cooperating halves, the stage and the audience,
had been completely divorced from one another by the "fourth wall"
of the externalists.

Meyerhold felt that truly great theatre could

come to the West once more only when a successful method was found
to tear down the "fourth wall."

As Freedley and Reeves point out,

what appealed to Meyerhold was the idea of bringing "the spectators
into active participation, making them a vital force in the per-

9
formance."

When Evrelnov replaced Meyerhold as director of the

Kbmmissarzheskaya Theatre, he continued the search for a solution
to the problem of reuniting audience and stage.

His answer to

this problem came in 1908, at which time he presented his theory of
monodrama to the Moscow Literary and Artistic Circle in an article
entitled An Introduction to the Monodrama.
From its inception in this article, Evrelnov's concept of
the monodrama was to undergo many changes and elaborations until
it finally evolved into a theory which embraced all living experiences
and which required, for its final elucidation, a three volume work,
The Theatre of Oneself, published 1915-17.

Even allowing for Russian

tendencies to wordiness and length, the three volumes indicate that
the theory is of considerable scope and magnitude; and, indeed, it is.
In essence, it is based on the proposition that to be human is to be
theatrical.

To Evrelnov, the instict for dramatization is a basic one

®George Freedley and John A. Reeves, A History of the Theatre
(New York: Crown Publishers, 1941), p. 543.
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and must be Included with such drives as sex and self-preservation.
Aa Sayler explains, Evrelnov. felt that "the satisfaction of this
instinct is one of the eudynamlc stages, so far as human happiness
is understood to be one of the needs of the soul."*®
Fundamentally, this theory of the "theatrical instinct" as
advanced by Evreinov is a restatement of the standard apology for
drama as an art form.
something more.

But Evrelnov's theory is this apology and

To him, not only do we have a basic drive to

dramatize, but, more Important, this drive is the one which is
ultimately responsible for the meaning which we attach to our emotions
and thoughts.

According to the final doctrine of the Russian play

wright, "man is touched to the quick only by what he can dramatize. "**
In other words, the only emotions we are capable of realizing fully
and the only thoughts which we can completely understand are those
which we can dramatize for o u r s e l v e s . T h u s , in our own way, each
of us is an actor on the stage of our psyche, just as each of us is
an actor in the larger theatre of life.

Moreover, since each of us

may play several different roles in life, there is reason to suspect
that we may also play several different roles in our own soul*

*®01iver M. Sayler, The Russian Theatre
1922), p. 227.

(New York:

In

Brentano's,

U Ibld.. p. 227.
*^For a more recent discussion touching upon something of the
same matter, se e Kenneth Burke's consideration of the "dramatistic"
function of language in his A Grammar of Motives (New York: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1945).
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Its entirety, Evrelnov's theory of the soul as theatre and the
personality as one or more actors Is an elaboration and extension
of the Individual entity as seen by Strindberg in The Dream Play.
To Evreinov as to Strindberg, the personality may "split, double
and multiply."*^
As previously stated, In terms of the art of the theatre,
Evreinov saw the monodrama as a solution to the Heyerholdian problem
of bridging the gap between the stage and the audience.

As Evreinov

says in his Introduction to the Monodrama:
The task of the monodrama is to carry the spectator to
the very stage so that he will feel he is acting himself....
'I' (the acting character) is a bridge from the auditorium
to the stage.
In terms of specific practice, the monodrama carried the spectator to
the stage by exploiting his basic theatrical instinct.

Once the

true nature of the drive to theatre is recognized, nothing could
be more natural than for the playwright to use the art form which
grows out of. this instinct as a means of studying the instinct
itself.

Thus, the informed playwright will not write plays about

several characters interacting in a common exterior world, he will
write the more fundamentally theatrical plays about one character
acting within himself, performing, so to speak, those very motions by
which he dramatizes his view of the external world.

In brief, the

^Something 0f the same kind of reasoning may lie behind
Eliot's having Prufrock say to himself: "Let us go then you and I."
^Sayler, oj>. cit.. p. 231.
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playwright will write a monodrama.

Evrelnov puts It thus:

The real object of dramatic presentation ought to be
some living experience, and with this, for the purpose
of facilitating receptivity, the living experience of
one soul instead of several. Hence the necessity for
preferring one 'really acting1 protagonist to several
'equally acting,'— in other words, the logic of the
demand for such an hcting character,' in whom as a
focus should be concentrated the whole drama and
therefore the living experience of the other acting
characters....I call monodrama the kind of dramatic
representation which endeavors with the greatest
fullness to communicate to the spectator the soul
state of the acting character, and presents on the
stage the world surrounding him as he conceives it
at any moment in his stage experience.15
In other words, Evreinov wishes to develop a drama which
restricts itself to presenting only the point of view of the central
character.

A drama of this sort, he feels, would be a truer drama

because it would be a more realistic, more basic drama.

Moreover,

it would have the advantage of forcing the spectator to identify
completely with the central character, since a failure to do this
would render the drama incomprehensible to the spectator.
Monodrama forces everyone of the spectators to enter the
situation of the acting character, to live his life, that
is to say, to feel as he does and through illusion to
think as he does.
When the spectator does identify, he will attain "fusion" with the
"main acting character," and, as if happening to find himself on
stage, that is in the very place of the action, he will "lose sight
of the footlights.

They will remain behind him, in other words, they

15Ibid.. p. 232.
16Ibld.. p. 235.
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will destroy themselves."*-7
There£oret for Evreinov, the monodrama is the "most perfect
form of drama" for two reasons: it is the truest expression of the
basic instinct for self-dramatization, and it is the best solution
to "one of the most burning problems of contemporary art, the problem
of chilling and paralyzing the distracting influence of the foot
lights."
To support his new approach to point of view, Evreinov
calls upon justification from the psychologist who knows "it is
elemental that the world surrounding us, thanks to the sense
impressions, inevitably undergoes changes."
The idea that the object has in it inherently that which
in reality it borrows from the impressionable subject is
not some exceptional psychological phenomenon. All our
sense activity is subject to the processes of the pro
jection of purely subjective changes upon the outside
object.*-®
In accordance with this principle, the task of the monodramatist
is to present the "exterior spectacle in terms of the internal
spectacle."

All action and characters should be seen "through the

prism of the soul of the acting character."

Only through this prism,

only through the central character's point of view, should we
"perceive the world surrounding him, the people surrounding him."
Evreinov'8 theory, then, both embraces and extends the
practices of Strindberg.

17Ibid.. p. 243.
X8Ibid.. p. 237.

As The Dream Play testifies, Strindberg

saw the action of the private ego as sufficient dramatic matter in
and of itself, and he felt no need to relate the external spectacle
directly to the internal.

Moreover, Strindberg was interested only in

his own soul, and made no effort to extend his studies to the souls
of others.

Perhaps he was unequipped to do so.

Strindberg's dream was his own.
in both instances.

Whatever the reason,

Evreinov differs from Strindberg

First, he assumes an external spectacle on

which the central character can bring to bear his private viewpoint.
Second, he does not feel that the monodrama demands that the central
character be identified with the playwright himself.

Consequently,

in the play under study, The Theatre of the Soul, the central or
"acting character" is that of a professor.
So much for Evreinov's theory, but what of its practical
results?

The answer to this question can be found by turning to

The Theatre of the Soul.

This interesting little one act play opens

with a prologue, which, like the prologue to The Dream Play, is
obviously intended to prepare the audience for the play's departure
from conventional dramatic modes.

A Professor appears and explains

to the audience that they are going to witness a different kind of
play, but withal, one which is a "genuinely scientific work, in
every respect abreast with the latest developments in psycho
physiology."
"human

The play is to be based on the principle that the

soul is not indivisible, but on the contrary is composed

of several selfs, the natures of which are different."

This is a

principle which the "researches of Wundt, Freud, Theophile Ribot and
others have proved in the most conclusive way."

The Professor then
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goes on to explain that the play will present three of these selves:
M-l, or the rational self; M-2, or the emotional self; and M-3, the
psychical or subconscious self.

This modern trinity will act out

one of the many dally dramas of the soul.

The total action of this

thought-drama will need no more than half a second to be accomplished.
The argument having been presented, the Professor then informs the
audience that it will soon see a theatrical approximation of the
human soul, represented as a huge heart with paper streamers for
nerves and blood vessels and a telephone as a substitute for the
system of synaptic communication.

With this description of the

setting, the Professor concludes his speech and retires.
In a more explicit fashion, the prologue presents much the
same concepts that are found in the preface and prologue to The
Dream Play, with one important difference.

Strindberg, a somewhat

humorless man, presents his ideas of the splitting personality and
the invalidity for the subject of the ordinary space-time continuum
with a Byronic earnestness, while from the start it is apparent
that Evrelnov comes to the matter with a certain amount of play
fulness.

This tongue-in-check attitude of Evreinov'a is continued

throughout the play, which contains more than its share of precious
comedy.

The use of the telephone as a device for communicating

messages to the brain is perhaps the best example of Evreinov's sense
of whimsy, but there are many others.

There is, for instance, M-2's

habit of rubbing the nerves to produce a jangling sound.
Evreinov's sense of humor and Strindberg's lack of same are
responsible for other noticeable differences between the two plays.
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Thus, The Dream Plav becomes a nightmare, whereas The Theatre of the
Soul leans In the direction of the harlequinade, a form into which
Evreinov was to cast several of his best works.

Moreover, as might

be expected, Evreinov'8 comic sense acts as a tempering agent which
prevents the playwright from indulging in excessive distortion.

This

is important, for it aids the dramatist in keeping open all possible
avenues of traditional theatrical comment which do not directly
conflict with the faithful rendering of the point of view of the
central character.

This taking advantage of every opportunity to

relate the point of view of individual character to the more univer
sal outlook of the audience must have been important to Evreinov, for
with his philosophy of complete empathic identification with the
action on stage, he must have wished at all costs to avoid the
confusion growing out of willful distortion

carried to the point of

complete obscurity.
In fact, it would not be far from wrong to say that while the
problem of adjusting the audience to the subjective viewpoint of a
single individual was of minor importance to Strindberg, it was to
Evreinov the prime issue of the monodramatic form.

The fact that

the Russian dramatist felt the need to write several volumes of
theoretical explanation of the monodrama is evidence enough of his
awareness of the communication difficulties inherent in the new form.
In terms of The Theatre of the Soul specifically, Evreinov first
addresses the problem in his very explicit prologue.

Apparently not

satisfied with the adequacy of the prologue, he chose as the external
reality of his play a situation which his audience was not likely to
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misunderstand, that Is, the standard love triangle so popular in the
comedies and melodramas of the period.

Moreover, he was careful not

to disturb the basic Ingredients of that triangle.

There Is the

same good mother, the same father with a weakness for drink, the same
"other woman," wild and undomesticated, a cafe dancer at best, but
very possibily a prostitute.

To keep the formula intact, Evrelnov

even rounds It off with a suicide, a denouement fthlch was almost a
ritual in the more pretentious thesis plays.

Still uncertain about

the audience's ability to follow his new method, Evreinov went to
great pains to clearly delineate each of the various aspects of the
soul.

M-l is a carefully groomed man in a frock coat; M-2 an artist

with untidy hair and full, red lips; M-3 a sombre figure in a black
mask who sits sleeping in the foreground.

As might be suspected, this

extreme concern with clarity robs the play of any possibility of
subtlety and gives to the whole piece the air of a medieval allegory
rather than that of a modern psychological study.

19

It is this

unhappy over explicitness which has caused many critics to agree with
H. W. L. Dana's observation that in The Theatre of the Soul Evreinov
"carried his ideal of the monodrama almost to a reductlo ad absurdum."^

*^Una Ellis-Fermor, ojj. cit.. has remarked on this aspect of the
play, but her observation that this therefore disqualifies it as a
dramatic work is rash and unfounded. If nothing else, the play is
effective in the theatre, and this can hardly be said of some of the
closet dramas, such as Hardy's Dynasts. which that critic holds up as
important contributions to dramatic literature.
^°Clark and Freedley, o£. cit., p. 443.
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Despite Its crudities, The Theatre of the Soul stands as a
tribute to the vision of its author*

Evreinov was as Important an

innovator as Strindberg in that he not only presented his version of
the Strlndbergian dream, but also raised that dream to the level of
the conscious thoughtand emotion.

Among other reasons, he probably

took this step because it afforded him a good means of studying the
ramifications of the presence of multiple points of view within a
single individual, for the play is not a presentation of the central
character's point of view of a possible affair; it is more exactly a
statement about the central character's points of view.

The

rational self contemplates adultery with the dancer and she appears
on stage as a mean and mercenary woman.

When the emotional self

thinks of the dancer, however, she changes into a wild, romantic
beauty.

This same variability is found in the wife, who, in each

case, appears as the opposite of the dancer.

Both the rational self

and the emotional self maintain that the women as they see them are
the women as they really exist.

This quarrel between M-l and M-2

constitutes the matter of the play, and the audience has no way
of telling which is correct.

To this argument the subconscious

self contributes nothing, but when the Professor is finally driven
to suicide, the subconscious self awakes, yawns, picks up his bag
and departs from the stage as if from a train.
Since, as the action of the subconscious demonstrates, the play
is the Strlndbergian dream placed on the level of the organizing con
sciousness, Evreinov is forced to introduce objective reality, since it
is with external reality that the conscious self deals.

In fact,
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the presentation of the various mutations of the object as the subject
exercises on it different methods of observation and organization was
a key feature of Evreinov's method.

But in rendering this relation

ship between the consciousness and external reality, Evreinov had
to assume the presence of the subconscious, just as Strindberg, in
presenting the sub- and semi-conscious, had to assume the existence
of the consciousness and of the reality beyond it.

But while Strind

berg begged the whole question of the importance of the object,
Evreinov in ranging out as far as the object still was careful to
place his ultimate stress on the value of the metaconsclous.

Conse

quently, the subconscious self sits always in the foreground of the
soul.

In placing the subconscious where he does, Evreinov suggests

that the whole tlhlng

is, after all, only M-3's dream.

In his own,

less obtrusive way, M-3, the dreamer, "holds sway over all."

He

awakes only with the suicide, and his single comment on the whole
affair is a weary stretch and a series of yawns.
The Theatre of the Soul is M-3's dream just as life is, in the
final analysis, nothing except the dreams of each of us.

When death

awakens M-3, he provides the final ironic comment on the meaning of
it all, a yawn.

Thus, whether seen through the subject or the object,

life is a farce, and so Evreinov presents it.

It may be that Evreinov

is too clumsy in his presentation of psychological subtleties, or that
he over-sweetens his work with coy humor, but to call his play a
reductio ad absurdum of his method is to both see the point and to
misunderstand it.

Evreinov was a comedian, and he depended heavily

on comic exaggeration to make his point.

The external world is an
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endless comedy of errors, and this is so,says Evrelnov, because it
depends for its coherence upon the individual, who compounds the
farce by being unable to maintain a consistent viewpoint even within
himself.

Played with too much expresslonlstic seriousness, it is

likely that The Theatre of the Soul might become pretentious and
absurd, but played for the serio-comic statement it is obviously
attempting to make, it should be a reasonably effective theatre
piece.
If The Theatre of the Soul is not the reductio ad absurdum of
an ideal, neither is it, as Bakshy sees it, a fatal contradiction
in terms.

According to Bakshy, the shortcoming of the monodrama

lies in the fact that "whilst invoking the spectator's power of
imagination, in which sense it is subjective, it is compelled to
base itself mainly on realistic scenic effects."

21

Such a criticism

leaves one baffled, for it can be leveled against all arts.22

jn

terms of Evreinov's work in particular, what such a view fails to
take into consideration is the subjectiflcation of scenic effects
which Meyerhold had already achieved before the monodrama was postu
lated.

While it is true that it is basic to the art of theatre to

translate all human experience into tangibles, it is not true that

21
*Bakshy, oj>. cit.. p. 79.
22a 11 arts must objectify nontangible realities. Even music
must make its statement in terms of sounds, which are, after all,
objective— i.e., sensible— realities. This problem has been taken up
and discussed in Chapter One, see page 2 f.
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these tangibles must be realistic.

Just as Strindberg when he was

writing Miss Julia could envision a setting that did not have painted
pots and pans on the wall, so Evreinov could write a monodrama that
did not postulate a box set.
The points of Dana and Bakshy are not well taken, but still
the weaknesses which we have already noted in The Theatre of the Soul,
do exist.

These weaknesses, however, are no more excessive in their

own sphere than are the humorless distortions and heavy-handed irony
of The Dream Play.

After a journey through the tortured soul of

Strindberg, the whimsy of Evreinov is rather refreshing.

This is not

to imply a favorable comparison between the two plays, for The Theatre
of the Soul is a much slighter and far less impressive dramaturgic
effort.
When placed side by side both plays appear as overstatements,
a condition which is probably to be expected in any new romantic
form.

Strindberg's work is too diffused, Evreinov's too simplified.

Strindberg could not avoid the nightmare; Evreinov came dangerdusly
close to simple fantasy.

But the weaknesses of the two playwrights

aside, they had, by 1912, presented the new structural problem of the
pan-psychic dramatists.

In doing this, Strindberg proved to be the

better artist, Evreinov the better theorist, but each in his own way
saw that the pan-psychic playwright must abandon intrigue for a
concern with the point of view of the individual if he were to success
fully investigate the human soul.

This change in approach to point

of view also Indicated that it might be necessary to change tradi
tional concepts of time, space, probability and possibility, formal
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logic and objective reality.

All of these things rest ultimately

on the Individual viewpoint and hence should be altered as that view
point changes.

Just how they were altered would be the clue to the

meaning of the Individual and of the play.

Both playwrights, though

not in equal degree, realized that a structural approach based upon
a private subjective viewpoint introduces new problems of communication
with the audience.

Evrelnov's solution to these problems was to

entice the spectator into the center of the action by striking as
many notes of similarity with older dramatic approaches as was
possible without losing total structural integrity.

On the other hand,

Strindberg depended entirely upon the hints offered by a short
program note and a brief prologue, and was Inclined, for the most
part, to let the audience seek its own avenues of understanding.

All

in all, both playwrights were presenting what was up until that time
the most immediate and intense statements of the new relativistic
world view.

Iheir world was a world of unity in conflict, a world

in which there was a continual disagreement between the subject and
the-object and between one and another aspect of the same subject.
It was a universe best summed up in the line uttered by the Officer
in The Dream Play:

"What a strange world of contradictionsJ"

To call the two men dramatic eccentrics or to say as does Eric
Bentley that Evreinov represents "the furthest departure from ortho
doxy" is to assume that the problem of point of view is an undramatic
one.

To a relativist, it is the very essence of drama, and once stated

by Evreinov and Strindberg, the issue of the presentation of firstperson viewpoints becomes one of the major concerns of the giants of
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modern drama.

To understand how quickly and surely both Strindberg

and Evreinov had put their fingers on m o d e m trends In methodology,
we need only note the close resemblance between the nightmarishness
Dream Play and the similar scenes which appeared some twenty
years later in the "night town" section of Ulysses.

If this is not

enough, it might be interesting to some to compare Evreinov'8 theory
of spectator-acting character identification with these lines,

written

some forty years later, about the unique achievement of the m o d e m
psychological novelist:
In the old novels...the omniscient author was nearly
always present and nearly always addressing an audi
ence.. ..Perhaps, for the purposes of fiction, we can put
it another way: in the old novels we are nearly always
seated face to face with the author; it is he who is
looking out the window and telling us the story of what
he sees.
This is the way in which Edel describes the omniscient method.
ing the same figure, he applies it to the m o d e m point-of-view
novel in the following manner:
In the psychological novel the author is nowhere in
sight. Suddently we are seated at the window. Some
where above, behind, below, out beyond the window the
author is busy being a stage manager and an actor,
arranging what we shall see. He tries to give us the
illusion constantly that we are experiencing what is
happening there; and in the process he asks us to
look at all sorts of extraneous things, strange
things, as if we were in one of our own dreams in which
impossible and implausible events occur; magical
transformations*, returns of episodes and people out
of the forgotten past...a veritable mental cinema of
flashing images often confused and incoherent, often
sharply focused, so that, as before, we forget our
selves and have crossed over the window sill and are

Retain
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ourselves out there amid the confusion, living all that
has been arranged for us. From being listeners once
removed from the scene, we have become actual partlcl*
pants.

^Edel, oj>. cit., p. 208 f.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EROSION AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWPOINT
KAISER AND PIRANDELLO SEE THE EGO AS A PHENOMENON
ON THE WAY TO DESTRUCTION

I
Kaiser:

From M o m to Midnight

Strindberg's experiments with the dream form and Evreinov's
and Meyerhold1s relentless attacks on the "fourth wall" were to
provide the precedents for a number of avant-garde theatrical move- ’
ments, chief among which were the Russian and Italian Futurists, the
French Surrealists, and the German Expressionists.

By 1920, that is,

by the time these movements had gained sufficient vigor and personal
ity to be separated and distinctly labeled, the European drama was
in such a state of ferment, borrowing and exchanging of ideas had
become so free and rapid, that it is almost impossible to untangle
the maze of influences and counter-influences which the several move
ments exercised on one another.

Nicoll, for instance, feels that

many of the important attitudes of Expressionism can be traced to the
early Italian Futurists.^

But Futurism, on the other hand, must

surely be related to the Constructivism of Meyerhold, since the two

^Allardyce Nicoll, World Drama From Aeschylus to Anouilh
(London: George G. Harrap & Company, Ltd., 1949), p. 795 f.
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styles so closely resemble each other and since Marinetti, the founder
of Futurism, preached his gospel in St. Petersburg and Moscow long
before he came to Italy,^ Constructivism, in turn, is indebted to the
techniques of the French Symbolists.

Which brings the wheel back

full turn, for Nicoll defines Expressionism as "diametrically
q

opposed...to the subjective Impressionist."

Despite this confusion,

seeking out the origins of the more important modern "ism's" is
a far less difficult task than is the defining of the essential
characteristics of each of the movements.

Moreover, of all the

modern schools, German Expressionism— the one which forms the basis
of our immediate interest in this chapter— is the school which yields
least easily to close definition.
For example, most critics will agree that, contributory
influences aside, the mainstream of German Expressionism flows in a
direct line from Strindberg through Wedekind and Hauptmann to the
young playwrights of the twenties, but few of these critics will agree
on just what the mainstream is.

Tucker, for example, says that Expres

sionism is an art form whose "general characteristics are plain
enough."
It starts by taking its material from real life...but
it aims to distill the very essence of reality and to
present it in terms of the universal. Naturally, then,

^Lander MacCllntock, The Age of Pirandello (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1951), p. 135.
^Nicoll, o£. cit., p. 796.
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it is not concerned with phenomena but with ideas
and springs of conduct.^
Sheldon Cheney, on the other hand, sees in Expressionism a trend
Toward the emotional-crisis play as against the thought
play,, toward intensity of feeling as against likeness
to outward life and truth of detail, toward looseness
of technique as against formulas.^
To Samuel and Ihomas, "the basis of Expressionistic drama is Activistic," that is, it springs from the beliefs of a group of social
reformers known as Activists.
It proclaims an idea, that of the New Man and of a New
Humanity, which is to be no longer subjected to the
limitation of State and nation, of society and tradi
tional laws, and which is to be transformed into a
community of love, goodness and peace."
If these conflicting definitions of Expressionism are somewhat
puzzling, one is always "free to seek comfort in the concise defini
tion given to Carpenter by a German professor, "Expressionism is
intellectual v o m i t i n g . O r one may prefer Mbrdecai Gorelik's
theatre-oriented conception of the movement as an art form which
finds its basis in the desire to do away with the picture frame
stage in favor of the open platform.**

York:

It is possible, of course,

^Marion Tucker, Twenty-five Modern Plays. Rev. Edition (New
Harper Broa, 1948), p. 575.

^Sheldon Cheney, The Art Theatre (New York:
1917), p. 175.

Alfred A, Knop£,

^Richard Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas, Expressionism in German
Life. Literature, and the Theatre (Cambridge: W. Hoffer and Sons, Ltd.,
1939), p. 13 f.
^Carpenter, o£. cit.. p. 196.
**Mordecai Gorelik, New Theatres for Old (Binghamton, New York:
Samuel French, 1947), p. 248.
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to go on endlessly presenting conflicting definitions of Expres
sionism, and it is equally impossible to state flatly

that any one

of these concepts is more correct than the other, for all have their
element of truth.

The best one can do is to seek out a study which

seems to be more thorough and more comprehensive than the others.
Such a study is Dahlstrom's carefully presented work, Strindberg's
Dramatic Expressionism.
In his investigation of the general features of Expressionism,
Dahlstrom lists seven important features of the movement.

First and

foremost, there was a concern with Ausstrahlungen des Ich, or the
radiation, expansion and unfolding of the ego.

Dahlstrom feels that

this concept can be partly "explained by the phrase 'stream of
consciousness' which is current in our English t e r m i n o l o g y . A l o n g
with an interest in the radiation of the ego, the expressionist was
also interested in the unconscious, in artistic intuition, and in
the inner experience of man.

"For the expressionist objective

experience is merely the stimulus for inner experience."10

Expres-

sionistic philosophy also included the concept of Welt als Elnheit:
all things as one.
The expressionist is an idealistic monistJ Soul and
body, material and immaterial, subject and object,
these are the anti-poles for the concept of reality
but are not endowed with separate existence; they are
antithesis from which reality must be wrested.H

^Dahlstrom, oj>. cit.. p. 49.
10Ibid., p. 52.
n Ibid., p. 53.
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In addition to the above Ideas, the expressionist was Interested in the
relationship between the mind and the soul, between Seele and Geist,
"Seele feels the chaos; whereas Gelst thinks the cosmos*

Seele tends

toward dynamic, formless feeling; Geist. on the other hand, is an
ordering element."

12

As might be suspected from the emphasis on

intuition, on the unconscious, and on the inner experience, there is
to be found in Expressionism a great deal more concern with Seele
than with Geist.

In summing up the movement, Dahlstrom notes that

to the list of its major characteristics must also be added a tendency
to imitate musical form, a general sense of the importance and worth
of man, and a certain primitive, Christian religiosity.
Summing up, then, German Expressionism was a striking, if
not very homogeneous, school which can, in general, be included within
the modern pan-psychic movement.

Critics have found it difficult to

give an exact rendering of the tendencies of the movement, probably
because of the diverse influences which shaped it, but also because
critics have been unable to isolate it in historical and artistic
terms.

To some authorities, Expressionism is limited to Germany

in the period from 1910 to 1925; to others Expressionism is a term

13

to be applied to any divergence from Naturalism. J
exact truth lies is unimportant to this study.

Just where the

What is more to the

point here is that as one might suspect any modern movement which

12Ibid, p. 54.
^William Harlan Shaw, German Expressionism: 1915-1920. The
Plays of Georg Kaiser (Unpublished-Ph.D. Dissertation, 1956, Louisi
ana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana), p. 7.
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placed great importance on such matters as inner experience, the
antithesis between inner and outer reality, the role of the uncon
scious and of artistic intuition, and the radiation and unfolding of
the ego, would also be interested in artistically rendering the point
of view of the individual man.

Such is exactly the case, and Expres

sionism includes a great number of works that are, in whole or in
part, point-of-view studies.

Toller's Masse-Mensch. for instance,

contains three "dream scenes" which obviously take place in the
mind of Sonia Irene L.

Probably the most widely known point-of-

view experiment to come out of the Expresslonistic movement was the
famous film, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, a presentation of the
world as seen through the eyes of a lunatic and a work which be
queathed to the commercial cinema many of its standard "horror"
techniques.

In all likelihood, however, the best example of

expresslonistic experimentation with the point of view came from
the pen of Georg Kaiser, the playwright whom most critics consider,
in the phrase of Eric Bentley, "the prince of Expressionism."14
A writer of a large variety of plays in many different modes,
it was in 1916 that Georg Kaiser, as Nicoll puts it, "startled his
contemporaries by the boldness of his Von Morgens bis M lttemacht.
a drama which has since come to be considered as the very archetype
of Expressionism.

In essence the play is a point-of**view study, but

*^Eric Bentley, The Playwright as Thinker (New York:
& Hitchcock, 1946), p. 231.
15Nicoll, o£. cit.. p. 797.
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it is so vory different from those of Strindberg or those of Evrelnov
that it deserves consideration as a special genre.
Kaiser's work,

From Morn to Midnight defies

strange play.

At the present time it

Like so much of

criticism.

It

is a

still occupies a positionof

some respect in the total body of modern drama.

It is not, however,

a great play.

It may well be that it

will be considered a

very bad

play by future

generations.

thing about it seems

certain:

Only one

From Morn to Midnight will never be considered a mediocre play.
Freedley and Reeves have called it a "moving d r a m a " G a s s n e r
has brushed it off as little "more than m a n i c . C h a n d l e r , on
the other hand, sees the play as "one of the best of its kind in
its simplicity and universality*"*®
Probably the main reason for such widely varying evaluations
of the play's quality lies in the fact that From Morn to Midnight,
more than any other single work in his fifty odd play corpus,
presents a more or less complete statement of Kaiser's total world
view, a philosophy which in itself has provoked conflicting critical
conments.

William Drake, for instance, feels that "Georg Kaiser is

exclusively a dramatist of ideas, and a strenuous crusader for these

*®Freedley and Reeves, oj>. cit.. p. 523.
*7John Gassner, Theatre in Our Times (New York:
Publishers, 1954), p. 447.

Crown

t

lft

York:

Frank W. Ghandler, Modern Continental Playwrights (New
Harper & Brothers, 1931), p. 417.
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ideas.

Mordecai Gorelik, on the other hand, sees the key to

Kaiser's plays in "vehemence more than logical thesis."

20

Consider

ing the general tenets of the movement of which Kaiser was the lead
ing playwright, it seems likely that Gorelick's position
defendable than is Drake's.

is more

After all, a school which stresses the

life of the unconscious, the ur-ishness of the Seele over the civiliz
ing influences of the Geist. may certainly be

indicted as being at

the least unintellectual and very probably anti-intellectual.

More

over, the expressionist group as a whole aside, Kaiser's personal
philosophy is hardly one of a man who would write plays of "the most
precise intellectual type."21
The follower of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer,22 Kaiser reflects
the anti-intellectual views of his masters in his own belief that the
fundamental force of all life is "energy."
Energy is the driving force of the world. Without energy
there is nothing. Sentiment, pity, romance are only the
refuge of the weak, who must inevitably go down. The
unfortunate are hinderances. Go out into the world and
see what men really are. They are brutal, self-seeking,
egotistical, heartless, energetic. It is only through
will-power that injustice and stupidity can be done
away with.
All living creatures are endowed with energy in some degree, but "man

19

William A. Drake, Contemporary European Writers (New York:
John Day Co., 1928), p. 96.

2®Gorelik, o£. cit.. p. 248.
2^Clark and Freedley, o£. cit.. p. 102.
22
“ Shaw, o£. cit.. p. 34.
^Gorelik, oj>. cit.. p. 250.
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represents the most intensive form of energy."2^

This fact takes on

added importance when we consider Kaiser's commitment to the ideal
that the individual is created "perfect from the beginning,"
He is, so to speak, a finished product from the very
moment of his birth. The limitations to which he
finally succumbs are not part of his inner nature,
but are Imposed on him from without, as a result
of the distorted forms to which his destiny is
subjected.
The "distorted forms" of which Kaiser speaks, in other words,
those ways in which the individual misuses or misappropriates his
divine energy, are the forms forced on man by a negative and imperfect
social system.

Thus, in Kaiser's view, man is created possessed of

the mystical power of energy, the power which is "the eternal miracle
in man,"2*’ but its possession does him little good.

The Individual

is born not only as a vessel for divine energy, but also as a member
of society, and consequently is doomed to have the potential of his
energy drained from him by the meaness, indifference, or evilness
of his social order.

By being party to society, the individual

contracts the malignant disease of the group:

the disintegration

of his energy, his personality, his innate perfection.

Shaw points

out that this theory "cleanses the Individual of his guilt in his
own destiny and puts the responsibility on the imperfect social

2^Drake, op. cit., p. 94.
2^Moses Frucbter, The Social Dialectic in Georg Kaiser's
Dramatic Works (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1933), p. 7.
2^Drake, oj>. cit., p. 94 f.
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organization which forces him from his perfection."
The tragedy of the man designed by nature to live a
harmonious life lies in the fact that he is thrown
off his course. Since he is unable to find himself
again, he is condemned to slow and relentless dis
integration of his soul, and to living without hope
for personal happiness
Kaiser, thus, saw life as a struggle between the perfect
individual and the imperfect society.

The struggle was an unequal

one "between the world's social system, which is without feelings
for humanity, and the individual with his feeble cries."28

For

most men, this struggle could only result in the total destruction
of their egos.

Indeed, for the great majority of people, the

disintegration of their personality by society is a process of
which they are only vaguely aware.

At infrequent intervals, however,

there appears an individual who has intuitively grasped the nature
and extent of the struggle of which he is the protagonist.
he even acts on his knowledge.

Perhaps

When this occurs, we have an example

of the Kalserian hero, the modern New Man.

Depending on the purity

of his remaining energy, on w h a t still survives of his personality,
the New Man may follow one of three lines:

If he is in a relatively

pure state, he may follow the urges of primitive instinct, of
unadulterated Seele.

If his personality has eroded past the redeem

able point, he may be forced into taking the decadent romantic

^Shaw, o£. cit. . p. 37.
^Ibid., p. 37.
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solution of escape.

If he Is blessed with both a strong Integrity

of ego and the luck to be born into a society ready for change, he
may take the best of the three possible courses--social reform.
But despite the possibilities of success in the latter course, it
also promises the greatest danger if attempted in a society not yet
amenable to reform.

Such a danger is amply demonstrated in

G a t s . 29

Considering the complete Kalserlan system, we may say that
in its practical application it becomes a philosophy of social
reformation.

As such it may even show manifestations of interest in

immediate political and economic problems, such interest as is found
in the Gas trilogy or in Gats.

It may, on the other hand, deal with

such domestic questions as whether a wife is justified in infidelity
if that transgression saves the life of her husband.

Just such a

problem is presented and answered affirmatively in The Woman1s Sacri
fice.

These investigations of what may be considered practical

problems do not spring from any pretention of rationality on the part
of the playwright, but they may be responsible for some critics'
seeing in Kaiser a bent toward "intellectual dramas."

These problems,

that is, are similar enough to the problems presented in such "dramas
of ideas" as Ibsen's social plays to cause some critics to confuse
the essential qualities of the two playwrights.

Actually, Ibsen's

problem plays sprang from a somewhat different impulse.

The social

2^For a complete discussion of Kaiser's concept of the New Man,
see William Harlan Shaw's German Expressionism: 1915-1920. The Plays
of Georg Kaiser, op. cit.
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reform he called for was based on ethics.

Kaiser's social reform

is rooted in a religious impulse, and, though.intellectual on the
surface, is prompted by beliefs which are far more mystical than
intellectual.

For Kaiser, good social order must, in the long run,

emanate from the private individual.

Ultimately, Kaiser felt that

"society is a collective body of individuals, the whole cannot
transcend its units of composition."^

But the individual who would

bring about Kaiser's reform was not, at root, intellectual; he was
the incarnation of sacred energy, a miracle that "has been converted
into the blood out of which he creates, creating even himself.
Hence, beneath Kaiser's intellectual facade lay a basic philosophy
of anti-intellectuallsm, a belief in a perfect society that grew
not out of human reason but out of the primitive, perfect energy of
man.

Kaiser put his faith in pure Seele; Geist was only the imperfect

means of presenting this faith.

Kaiser's views, then, were Nietzschean

and Dionysian, borrowing of the Apollonian only when necessary.
playwright's mysticism and his debt to Nietzsche's own antiintellectualism can be summed up by the final stage direction of
From Morn to Midnight, a direction which can be only imperfectly
realized on the stage.
The CASHIER has fallen back with arms outstretched
against the Cross on the back wall. His husky gasp
is like an ECCE, his heavy sign is like a HOMO* One
second later all the lamps explode with a loud report.

30

Fruchter,

0 £.

cit.. p. 9.

3*Drake, o£. cit.. p. 94.
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To put his mysticism into dramatic form, to display some aspect
of the individual'8 spiritual emaciation at the hands of society, it
was necessary for Kaiser to take the structural approach suggested
by Strindberg and Evrelnov.

In other words, a perfectly workable

definition of Kaiser's concept of the New Man would be a man who
has acquired a viewpoint which differs from that of society in
general, for only the man with a unique point of view would be able
to recognize that his personality was in the process of being destroy
ed by the social system.
With this definition in mind, we may say that Kaiser's sense
of tragedy is concerned with a particular type of insight, the
insight of the New Man who recognizes, often simultaneously with the
acquisition of an individualized view point, that his personality is
inevitably doomed to destruction by the greater force of society.

His

struggle to retain as long as possible the integrity of his own
vision provides the tragic conflict of Kaiser's plays.
catastrophies are possible:

One of two

the New Man may die as the result of

the struggle or he may wearily succumb to a fusion of his private
vision with that of the general, de-spirltualized point of view of
society.
From Morn to Midnight stands as a fine example of Kaiser's
manipulation of point of view to present his modern tragedy.

In the

opening scene we are offered a portrait of a man, the Cashier of a
small bank, who exists as little more than an automaton, a gear in the
social machine.

Into the bank comes a mysterious Italian beauty, and

the Cashier is suddenly prompted by her presence into acquiring an
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individuality, a new and totally different point of view.

That is,

he yields to an impulse, a spark of energy from the Seele, the primi
tive energy of sexual desire.

His instinct, to be sure, is not pure.

It is sufficiently distorted by the erosions which his personality
has already undergone to take at face value the implications of the
bank manager and the executive of the Building Society that the
lady is an adventurer who is willing to gratify any desire for a
large enough price.

But however distorted the Cashier's sex instinct

may be, it is still pure and vital enough to jolt him into becoming
a New Man, a man who sees things differently from his fellows.

With

the acquisition of a private point of view comes also the Cashier's
realization of the malice which society holds toward him.

At once

the Cashier sets off to escape the doom which the social system
has in store for him, that is, the destruction of his Newness.
So corrupted has the Cashier's personality become in the
years before his new vision, that he believes that money can provide
him with a means of escape.

He, therefore, robs the bank and rushes

off in pursuit of the Italian woman.

Upon her rejection of him,

the Cashier sets off on a wild spending spree which takes him to
a bicycle race, to a cabaret and, finally, to a Salvation Army Hall.
There he declares in favor of pure energy, pure Seele. which does not
even need money.

Too late, however, he realizes that he has been

tricked into a confession by society.

Having, in a fit of quasi

religious fervor, given into the demands of society, the Cashier
recognizes the futility of his attempt at escape.

He bows to the

inevitability of the destruction in store for him and commits suicide.
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To capture the Cashier's struggle with society, the struggle
between the personal and the universal point of view, required that
Kaiser revise somewhat the structural methods of Strindberg and
Evreinov.

The former had been interested exclusively in the inner

life of a single individual without reference to externality; the
latter had seen externality only as a reflection of the conflicts
within the individual.

Kaiser, on the contrary, was to see external

reality existing as a sort of no man's land in a war of viewpoints,
the one universal and the other individualized.

Thus, while Strindberg

and Evreinov can remain within a consistent framework, while they
can refer all back to the individual, Kaiser was forced to alternate
his emphasis between the viewpoint of the group and that of the
individual.

Therefore, scenes one and two of From Morn to Midnight

may be called "objective," not perhaps in the sense of pure extemalism, but sufficiently close to traditional objective drama to give
the audience the impression that they were witnessing sane variation
of the "fourth wall" theatre.

The first hint that the point of view

will ultimately shift comes with the stage direction which indicates

.

that while the Cashier helps the Italian woman to reclasp her
bracelet, he "stares at her as if mesmerized."
His spectacles, bright points of light, seem almost to
be swallowed up in the cavity of his wide-open eyes.
The basic objectivity of the first scene is maintained, however,
through scene two, which brings the Cashier to the hotel room of the
Italian woman.

The audience already knows, before the Cashier's

entrance, the disappointment which is in store for him.

Having
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stolen money In order to elope with her, the Cashier Is shocked to
find that the Italian beauty Is wealthy, respectable, and totally
uninterested In him.

With this shock comes his complete awakening

to his new relationship to society.
Now that the New Man is created as a functioning entity, the
playwright, having in the first two scenes presented society's view
point, shifts the focus in scene three to the viewpoint of the
Cashier.

In violation of the most sacred precepts of Exteroalism,

scene three consists of nothing but a very long monologue, disjointed
and often hardly comprehensible, at times not even rising above the
level of a shriek issuing from the murky depths of the soul.

In fact,

it would not be unjust to characterize the Cashier's monologue as the
verbalization of the same sort of images which were objectfied in
Strindberg's Dream Play.

It can hardly be denied that the thought

sequence of the whole speech is much more closely related to the
free association of Strindberg than to the highly structured thought
of a Shakespearian soliloquy.
It is in scene three that the Cashier makes his first overt
declaration of his new individuality.

The monologue begins in this

manner:
How wonderful a toy is every man! The mechanism runs
silently in his joints. Suddenly the faculties are
touched and transformed into gesture. What gave ani
mation to these hands of mine? A moment ago they were
straining to heave the masses that the drifting snow
flakes had strewn. My footprints across the field are
blotted out. With my own hands I have created nothingness.
In other words, with the yielding to an impulse, the Cashier has become
transformed.

He has become a New Man by his act of theft, and his
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former place in society, his old function as part of the social
machine, has been destroyed just as his footprints have disappeared
from the snow.

This theme is repeated once again in his comments as

he throws away his soiled shirt cuffs.
Soiled. There they lie. Missing in the wash. The
mourners will cry through the kitchen: A pair of
cuffs are lost! A catastrophe in the boiler! A
world in chaos!
The Cashier is exultant at his new discovery of individuality.
"Today's experience opens the road," he cries.

"With one leap I'm

at the heart of the universe, the focus of unimagined brightness."
But his joy is soon dampened by the vision of a skeleton in a tree,
the first sign of the doom which awaits his new personality.

How

ever, he refuses at this time to take the omen too seriously.

He

feels that he can still escape.

After all, as he says, "with this

load in my. pocket I'm paying cash— cash down for everything."
Scene four strikes a compromise between the point of view of
the Cashier and that of society.

While it does not have the objective

quality of scenes one and two, scene four is not as completely sub
jective as scene three.

There is, however, even before the Cashier

enters the scene a strong sense that the action of the scene reflects
theCashier's new
in the members

awareness of the total lack of personality

of society.

For example, just before

found

theCashier

enters the following pointless and mechanical dialogue takes place.
WIFE.
MOTHER.
WIFE.
DAUGHTER.
WIFE.
MOTHER.

Today we have mutton chops fordinner.
Have you begun grilling them?
Plenty of time. It's not twelve o'clock yet.
Not nearly twelve, mamma.
No, not nearly twelve.
When he comes, it will be twelve.
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WIFE.
DAUGHTER.
WIFE.

He's not due yet.
When Father comes,
Yes.

It will be twelve

o'clock.

This Is the basic unit of society, the family as the Cashier
now sees It with new eyes.

A short time after his entrance into the

family circle, he comments on Its ability to deaden and erode the
soul.
Comfortable, cozy, contented. Mother-son-grandson under
one roof.
The magic of familiar things— thehousehold
spell. Let it work. Parlour with table and hanging lamp.
Window with geraniums. Piano, music stool. H e a r t h home fires burning. Kitchen, daily bread. Chops for
dinner, fourposter— in-out. The magic of familiar things.
Then, one day— on your back, stiff and white. The table
pushed back against the wall— cake and wine.
In the
middle a slanting, yellow coffin— screw lid, adjustable
stand. A band of crepe hangs around the lamp--the piano
untouched for a year.
This speech is delivered to no one on stage; it is, in fact,
pure radiation of the ego, a segment of the Cashier's stream of
consciousness.

There is, as it were a direct reeling off of the words

as they trace themselves across his brain.

At this moment, all

syntactic and rhetorical relationships are dismissed.

When, however,

the Cashier turns to speak to his wife directly, then these same
ideas are coordinated into something resembling the received speech
pattern.

In other words, the playwright shifts out of the stream of

consciousness into the stream of communication, that is, from a sub
jective to an objective point of view.
Warm and cozy this nest of yours; I won't deny its good
points; but it doesn't stand the final test. No.' The
answer is clear. This is not a halting place, but a sign
post; the road leads further on.
The road leads, in fact, to the bicycle races of scene five,
a scene in which Kaiser again contrasts the point of view of the New
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Han with that of society*

The Cashier offers a large prize to the

winner of the race, and, as the race progresses, the Cashier watches
the crowd, while the race officials, who represent society, watch
only the race*
2ND GENTLEMAN* But you must keep your eye on the track,
and watch the varying course of the race*
CASHIER.
Childish this sport* One rider must win
because the others must lose— >Look up, I sayi
It's there, among the crowd, that the magic
works, Hie wine ferments in this vast barrel
of spectators*
What the Cashier sees in the crowd is his first complete vision of the
tremendous energy inherent in humanity*

It is basic, primitive and

frightening, but above all it is democratic and exhilarating*
2ND GENTLEMAN. The german was leading, but—
CASHIER.
Never mind that, if you please* Up there
you have the staggering fact. Watch the supreme
effort, the last dizzy height of accomplishment*
From stalls to gallery one seething flux, dis
solving the individual, recreating passion*
Differences melt away, veils of nakedness are
stripped; passion rulesJ**No restraint, no
modesty, no motherhood, no childhood— nothing
but passion* That's the real thing* That's
worth the search. That justifies the pricei
But even this energy, distorted as it is, is but fleeting*
Even this "unclean but free" passion is quickly subdued and surpressed
by the entrance of the king*

All heads are bowed, all free instincts

are subjugated b y the sudden appearance of the royal presence; not
even the Cashier's offer of a huge cash prize can buy back the lost
natural state of the crowd.

Disillusioned by this turn of events, and

not willing to give money to a "society of hunchbacks," the Cashier,
seeing what the others do not, violently crushes the race official's
silk hat down upon his shoulders and exists*
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Scene six is s wild bizarre episode which reflects in quality
the growing desperation of the Cashier, who senses the hopelessness
of his battle to retain individuality.

For his new locale the play

wright selects a cabaret at which some sort of costume party is in
progress.

In this manner Kaiser is able to present a world distorted

by the Cashier's point of view while at the same time he retains
access to the more objective viewpoint of society.

The cabaret scene

presents the Cashier's attempts to buy life's primal energy, love.
Into his private dining room he brings four masked women from the
costume ball.

There is about these woman an aura of hidden and

mysterious beauty, but when, in return for a sum of money, two of
the women lift their masks, they turn out to be "monsters."

The

third flees without removing her mask, while the fourth woman is
discovered to have a wooden leg.

The realization that each of these

women is deformed in some way, that each has a physical manifestation
of her spiritual corruption, is too much for the Cashier.

With the

grimest of humor, he seizes the champagne cooler and pours its
contents over the fourth woman's wooden leg, crying out as he does
so, "I'll water it for youi

We'll make the buds sproutJ"

The scene then returns to a more realistic statement; three
gentlemen appear, and the playwright uses them to contrast the calm
but evil viewpoint of society with the desperate frenzy of the
Cashier.

To the three gentlemen, the Cashier is the corrupter of

their girls.

"He entices them away, stuffs them with caviare,

drenches them in champagne, and then insults them."

Having pronounced

their judgment upon the hapless Cashier, the three respectable men
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then quietly steal the money which the Cashier has left as payment for
his bill.

As they leave, they pause a moment to accuse the waiter of

running a conxnon swindler's den.

The scene closes on the wails of the

waiter who cannot afford to lose the money which the Cashier owed
him.
The final scene of the play finds the Cashier in a Salvation
Army Hall.

With him is the Salvation Army Lass who has haunted him

like a conscience throughout the last three scenes of the play.
This scene is projected almost totally through the point of view of
the Cashier, just as the first scene was an almost totally objective
statement.

Briefly, the scene consists largely of a series of con

fessions which slowly wear down the Cashier's resistance to convention
al morality.

Finally, whipped into a frenzy of accepted morality by

what he takes to be the sincere testimony of two professional
cyclists, two prostitutes, two men who have lost their souls in
the contentment of their cozy homes, and, lastly, a thief who has
found peace by going to prison, the Cashier mounts the platform to
confess his own sin and to receive forgiveness.

Irony then follows

irony as he realizes too late that society has managed to weaken his
personal vision just long enough to force him into final destruction.
His stolen money, which the Cashier, taking his cue from the preceeding confessions, felt the group would regard as an object to
be "torn and stamped under foot," is the cause of a riot as each
member of the audience tries to get as much money as he possibly can.
The Cashier then turns to the Salvation Army Lass, who had earlier
stated that she would "stand by him," only to discover that she has
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turned police Informer In order to obtain the reward money*

It Is

then that he recognizes his defeat, his destruction by society*
He sees once again the vision of the skeleton, the sign of his
complete destruction*
This morning, among the snowy boughs, I mocked at you*
Now, in that tangled wire, you are welcomed as an old
friend! I salute you. The road is behind me. The
last steep curves climb upward— -to you* My forces
are spent* I've spared myself nothing! I've made the
path hard where it might have been easy...Why did I
take the road? Where does it lead me now? From first
to last you sit there naked as a bone. From morning
to midnight I run raging in a circle— and now your
beckoning arm shows me the way— -whither?
The Cashier shoots the answer into his breast*

All the lights

explode at once, and the policeman provides society's final judgment
on the struggles of the New Man:

"There must be a short circuit in

the main."
As a projection of the Cashier's point of view, scene seven
is one of the most powerful scenes in all expressionistic literature.
It probably finds its original model in Strindberg's handling of
the final scene in The Dream Play, but where the latter is forced and
clumsy, the final scene in From Morn to Midnight has flow, ease and
a mounting rhythm of intensity.

Following Strindberg's example,

Kaiser repeats in the confessions of the various sinners each of the
previous episodes of the play, just as Strindberg had each of his
characters reappear before the burning castle*

Kaiser, however, shows

superior artistry, for while Strindberg must simply bring his charac
ters in, unannounced and unexcused, and parade them across the stage
after the manner of a role call, Kaiser selects a setting— a Salvation
Army Hall— which will serve as a logical excuse for confessions.
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Moreover, Kaiser makes no attempt to make those giving "testimony"
coincide with earlier characters.

A similarity of experience

serves his purpose sufficiently and does not make unnecessary
demands upon pur credulity.
Because Kaiser holds himself to a single point of view,
scene seven gains greatly in unity of impression.

Throughout the

interior scenes of the play, the dramatist's approach has been
inconsistent.

In scenes three through six there is a constant

shifting from the objective to the subjective point of view.

This,

of course, was in keeping with the playwright's theme of the con
flict between society and the individual.

As such, it had more

than a modicum of justification, but the shifting is confusing,
especially when it occurs several times within a given scene, as
in seenes four and five.

However, as the play progresses, the shift

ing becomes less and less frequent, the tendency being to hold more
and more only to the point of view of the Cashier.

This is not done

because the Cashier is winning his struggle for identity, but, rather,
because he is losing it.

Since the gap between the New Man and

society is rapidly closing, there is less need for a sharp contrast
between the universal and the individual post of observation, and
more need for a concentration on the individual in order to explore
carefully the desperation attendant upon the final stages of. sur
render.

There is, for example, a need in such a scene as that at the

bicycle races to have contrasting points of view.

There must be, in

order to demonstrate the contrast between the emancipation of the New
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Man and the subjugation of society, a group who can see only the
’races, while the New Man sees only the spectators*

Both points of

view, since they are so complementary, can share almost equal
emphasis*

But when the personality of the New Man has eroded

past a certain point, when it has reached that stage at which it
diverges very slightly from that of society in general, that very
little divergence must be emphasized so that it will not escape
unnoticed*

Consequently, since both the gentleman friends of the

masked women and the Cashier see the women as corrupted and corrupt
ing, it is important to emphasize the Cashier's unique view of their
corruption in order that its differences from that of the three
representatives of society can be stressed.

Therefore, the scene in

the cabaret is given over in great part exclusively to the viewpoint
of the Cashier*

In short, the scene demonstrates the increasing

hopelessness of the Cashier's attempt at escape by rendering, in
reference to himself alone, his desperate struggle to maintain a
continually diminishing individuation of viewpoint.
Kaiser's problem in the final scene is somewhat simplified.
Since the purpose of the scene is to dramatize the final defeat
of the personality, he need not seek contrasts between that personal
ity and society*

In fact, he cannot, for contrasts no longer exist.

What was in scene three and four a matter of a difference in kind
becomes in scene seven no more than a slight and continually diminish
ing difference in degree.

In view of this, Kaiser holds, until the

last few speeches, entirely to the viewpoint of the central character*
The quality of the scene is the quality of the Cashier's soul, which
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grows ever niore Intensely desperate as he enters more and more Into
the society which he had left so abruptly.

Gradually, the action of

the scene becomes more formal and rhythmic as the Hew Man loses his
individuality in the oneness of the group.
The increasing
by Kaiser.

At first,

sense of oneness is handled in amasterly way
the

various members

of the audienceappearas

individuals.
VOICE.
Move
WORKMAN.
OFFICER.
OTHERS.
VOICE.
VOICE.

Move up closer. Be careful, Bill] Ha, ha]
up there]
What are
you after?
I've got a question to ask you all.
Speech— -None of your jaw] Music] The band]
Begin]
Stop]

But after the third confession, many members of the audience have been
welded into a more homogenous unit which rises to cry in unison:
"What's my sin?

I want to know my sin]

Tell me my sin]"

By the time

the final confession has been delivered, all the members of the
audience have been built into single universal human machine which
surges up to roar out:

"Nobody's sin]

to hear mine]

My sin]

My sin]

can resist no longer.

That's nobody's sin]

frfy sin]"

I want

By this time, the Cashier

He also rises, shouting as he does so,

"My

sin]"
The growing sense of unity in the audience and the Cashier's
ultimate identification with them is prompted by the confessions of
seven sinners, among whom are cyclists, prostitutes, overly smug
husbands, and, finally, a reformed theif.

Each of these recalls an

incident in the Cashier's day, and each weakens his defenses and
increases the power of society.

The final confession, that of the
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thief, brings the Cashier face to face with his greatest sin against
the mores of the group.

It is too much for him.

He loses his

individuality completely, accepts once more the moral order of the
group, and is led to the platform to make his confession.
Each of the stages in the Cashier's final defeat is marked
not only by an increase of unity in the audience and by a sinner's
confession, but also by a series of duets between the Cashier and
the Salvation Army Lass, who has come to symbolize the Cashier's old
sense of moral duty.
confession.

The duets begin just after the first sinner's

In the first exchange, the Cashier is firm, though his

petulance Indicates that all is not well.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.

Do you hear him?
Let me alone.

After the second confession, the Cashier shows signs of
weakening.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.

Do you see him?
The cycle races.
What are you muttering about?
That's my affair. My affair.
Are you ready?
Hold your tongue.

Again, the confessions of the prostitutes make apparent the weakness
of the Cashier's defenses, but he remains stubborn.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.

Do you hear all?
That's my affair. My affair.
What are you muttering?
The wooden leg.
Are you ready?
Not yet. Not yet.

The end is in sight as the confessions continue.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.

Do you see him?
My daughters. My wife.

Ify mother.
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SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.

What do you keep mumbling In your beard?
My affair. My affair.

One more confession, however, and the Cashier succumbs.
leaps up as one to call out:

"My sin!

My sin!"

The crowd

And the Cashier

rises with them.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.
SALVATION LASS.
CASHIER.

What are your shouting?
The bank. The money.
Are you ready?
Yes, now I'm ready.

Once the Cashier has begun to commit himself to society's
position, the scene begins a rapid shift back toward a more objective
viewpoint.

Taking the attitude expressed by the audience in the

Salvation Army Hall to be sincere, the Cashier confesses his crime
and throws away his stolen money.

The greedy audience riots, but

still refusing to recognize his defeat, the Cashier turns to the
Salvation Army Lass for help.

But she too is a fraud.

Disillusioned,

the Cashier commits suicide.
Kaiser, then, begins his play as an objective statement.

As

the play moves forward, he shifts from third to first-person— ‘some
times objective, sometimes subjec'tive— point of view.

Throughout

there is a growing tendency to hew more and more to the subjective
viewpoint of the Cashier himself.

Accordingly, the final scene is

projected almost entirely through the perception of the central
character.

In terms of the coordination of two points of view,

Kaiser's skill is nowhere better demonstrated than in his ability to
present to us from the opening curtain a view of society which the
Cashier will be able to achieve only in his moments of greatest
insight.

In other words, even though the first two scenes are
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presented objectively, we are seeing in them, in a sense, the world
as it will ultimately appear through the viewpoint of the Cashier,
though at the time neither he nor we in the audience may realize
this fact.

Thus, the insidious malice of society, its power to warp

and distort natural harmony, is displayed to us as early as the
conversation between the fat officer of the Building Society and the
manager of the bank.
The larger framework of From Morn to Midnight, that is, the
form which Kaiser employs to encompass and contain his investigation
of varying viewpoints, has often been referred to as "station drama."
In essence, the form bears a marked resemblance to that of the med
ieval cycle dramas.

A series of short scenes are juxtaposed one

against the other with no regard for sequence, no regard for place,
and little regard for anything but the grossest concept of time.
Like the medieval cycles, the unity of the play is gained through
unity of theme, character and conflict.

Wherever the Cashier finds

himself, and he may find himself anywhere from a snow-covered field
to a cabaret, there is always present his never-ending conflict with
society.

Moreover, at each "station" his position in the struggle

becomes more and more hopeless.

As Kaiser wrings variation after

variation from his central instrument and theme, his "station drama"
draws closer and closer to musical form, never, however, quite
approaching Strindberg's total surrender to purely musical structure.
All in all, Kaiser'8 method of stating his tragic view of the
8low erosion of the individual ego at war with a malevolent society
is not at all ineffective.

There are, of course, certain weaknesses
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in From Morn to Midnight.

The "station drama" framework gives to the

play a quality of looseness and the frequent inconsistencies of view
point lend to the work a general air of confusion*

This confusion,

however, is more than counterbalanced by the almost musical develop
ment of the theme, always present in sharp focus and always gaining
in richness by continual variation.

Kaiser's handling of his theme

gives to the piece a strong sense of rhythmic unity, a: unity that is
increased by the emphasis placed on the major instrument, the ever
present Cashier.

This unity, may, like the unity of Strindberg, be

highly reminiscent of musical form, but it remains as more effective
than the Strlndbergian method primarily because it stops short of
crossing the boundary between music and drama.

Kaiser's logic is

always the logic of character and action, not that of sound and
rhythm alone.

Throughout the play the Cashier is clearly, perhaps

too obviously, motivated by the needs of his own personality, not by
purely formal considerations.
II
Pirandello:

Six Characters in Search of an Author

Just as "the prince of Expressionism" was concerned with the
destruction of the individual ego, so also was his royal counterpart
in Italy, Luigi Pirandello, busily pursuing another aspect of the same
problem.

Like Kaiser, Pirandello's art and philosophy were the end

result of certain avant-garde movements of the times.

In Pirandello's

case these movements were Futurism and the Teatro Grotesco.

While

they were not identical, the basic fact of these two movements was
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the rejection of Exteraalism, which the young Italians felt had
developed into a new academy whose restrictions were just as point
less and just as stifling as the older 19th-century traditions.
What was needed was a new, m o d e m drama, a drama that in the words of
the leading Futurist, F. T. Marinetti, would "return to primitive,
ln8tlctive, almost prehuman sensory impulses.1,33

The new drama

should "abolish tradition, artistic and moral, in favor of more
m o d e m things,"
It proposed, Instead of elaborating the virtues and
accomplishments of humanity in the past, to sing,
henceforth, of contemporary life, speed, noise, the
automobile, the airplane, the smoking factory chimney,
war and destruction.
In practice, Marinetti's drama was to be a drama of few or no
words, a drama of the most theatrical theatre.

His own plays some

times made use only of hands and feet, sometimes of all the gross
and vulgar elements of the circus.

Although the aims of Futurists

like Marinetti were never quite realized on the stage, they did
serve as an inspiration to a second, slightly younger group of
playwrights who ultimately became known as the grotteschi.

Not quite

so violently anti-literary as the Futurists, the grotteschi set out
to study "the secret impulses of the soul,"3^ and any device which
seemed to promise access to the individual soul was taken up and

33MacClintock, oj>. cit.. p. 134.
33Ibid.. p. 134.
34Ibid.. p. 137.
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used by the writers of the Teatro Grotesco.

Moreover, these young men

were not restricted In their playwrighting by any philosophic
devotion to a positive ideal.

Essentially, they were just as

nihilistic as the Futurists.
\

The writers of the grotteschi. convinced as they were that
men are illogical, capricious, that life is meaningless,
tried to find a formula by which they could put this
illogicality, caprice, and lack of meaning on the stage.
They felt that new and different technical means were
necessary and resorted to all kinds of tricks to convey
their ideas. Their plays were no longer comedy, tragedy,
or farce, but 'grottesco,' Hnyth,''fable,' 'colored ad
venture,' 'island night,' 'vision.' They people the
stage with skeletons, with Pierrots, with ghosts, with
'the black men from the sulphur pit,' with puppets;
their plots are often impossible— a man magically gets
his life to live over; a 'time machine' sets us into the
future or the past; Death takes a holiday and visits earth;
a man pretends to die for the pleasure of surviving himself.
By such devices these playwrights tried to dramatize the
new philosophic nihilism of their epoch.35
The grotteschi. like the Futurists, sprang out of a confused
and unhappy Italy.

A nation that had only lately shaken off its

sleepy agricultural economy and had joined the 19th-century movements
toward industrialism and nationalism, Italy had, by the speed at
which it attempted to bring itself abreast of the European industrial
giants, caused much confusion and hardship among its populace.

In

addition, hardly had Italy recovered from its own war of independence
when the new nation was suddenly engaged in an even mightier struggle,
a struggle during which Italy was to be devastated, defeated, and
robbed of much of its newly acquired national dignity.

35Ibld.. p. 138.

Thus, in the
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quarter century between 1915 and 1940t Italian intellectuals, "more
profoundly than in France, England, or America," expressed them
selves in terms of deep pessimism and scepticism*

Italy's unfortunate

condition caused her intellectuals to lose "faith in science, in the
intellect, and, logically enough, in our very humanity itself."3*’

It

was to this pessimism and scepticism that both the grotteschi and
the Futurists attempted to give expression*

Neither group was

totally successful, but they prepared the way for a playwright who
would be eminently so— Luigi Pirandello*
Pirandello's personal life, as well as the life and thought of
the times, admirably equipped the dramatist for his role as Italy's
leading pessimist*

The son of a wealthy owner of Sicilian sulphur

mines, young Luigi was forced into a marriage with a girl whom he had
never seen.

Through this marriage, Stefano Pirandello increased his

business holdings and Luigi acquired a wife with an extremely handsome
dowry*

At first the young couple enjoyed a few years of happiness*

What with his wife's dowry and the more than ample allowance which
his father sent to him, Pirandello prospered well in his new home in
Rome*

Unfortunately, it was not long before both his wife's and his

father's fortunes were wiped out by floods in Sicily*

The young couple

was reduced to poverty, and Pirandello was only too happy to accept a
position as a teacher in a girls high school*

The loss of the family

fortune was too much for Pirandello's wife, and her mind broke*

36Ibid., p. 128

She
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became obsessed with,a belief that her husband was being unfaithful
to her.

Nothing Pirandello could do would convince her to the con

trary.

He went out as little as possible; he turned over his salary

to her,

but nothing would avail.

more frequent and more violent.
she was insane.

Her fits of jealous rage became
There was no longer any doubt that

A doctor was consulted and he advised that the best

hope for cure was to keep her home rather than send her to a sani
tarium.

Thus, Pirandello lived out the better portion of his life

with a mad woman.

He secluded himself from the world and developed

an infinite patience, always hoping for a cure, always waiting for a
recovery which never came.

"It was in this closed torment that was

born, at least in germ, the drama of Luigi Pirandello."
He suffered everything in silence, and through his mind
flashed irrational thoughts while in his heart surged a
feeling of powerless revolt. When he wrote he gave vent
to that tormented inner life by envying madmen who could
shout whatever they wanted, who could reveal their strang
est thoughts and queerest emotions with impunity. He must
have written agonizing pages while his wife pounded at
the door of his studio, accusing him and threatening
him.37
Granting this sort of personal tragedy, it is easy to understand
how a writer of Pirandello's ability would be ready, even eager, to
devote his talent to the Grotesque and Futuristic theatres.
what a service Pirandello rendered these two movements.

And

He took

their generalized and hazy negativism and gave it form, direction
and popularity.

Through Pirandello the Italian theatre and the

37Domenico Vittorini, The Drama of Luigi Pirandello (Phila
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), p. 22.
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resolve this conflict.

Normally, in order to bring the two concepts

of reality and illusion closer together, we assume some sort of mask,
or, as is often the case, the mask is forced upon us from outside.

In

either case, the struggle between reality and illusion becomes a
specific struggle between the face and the mask.

In its simplest

form, this conflict is summed up in the words of Alfredo Canton!, a
writer whom Pirandello greatly admired; "Smiling in appearance,
grieving in reality."4*
Pirandello, however, sees the Interaction between the face and
the mask as oft times far more complicated than is indicated by this
simple aphorism.

In Henry I V . for instance, a young man on the way

to a costume ball is thrown from his horse and strikes his head upon
a stone.

The blow causes him to lose his sanity and actually to

believe that he is Henry IV, the king whose costume he is wearing.
Having once assumed this mask, the man lives out his life as the
ancient king.

He is surrounded by courtiers in proper livery, and

he discusses only the affairs of Henry I V 1s time.

He alone possesses

the secret that his insanity has long ago been cured and that he no
longer believes himself to be a royal personage.

The world, however,

has passed him by, and his mask seems much more comfortable than his
face.

Just as he is showing signs of wearying of his game, he is

forced into a murder, and he realizes that what was once a mask, then
a face, and now a mask again, must in the future continue to be his

41Ibld.. p. 90.
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gloomy pessimism of the modern Italian mind gained world-wide
recognition.
What exactly was the philosophy which Pirandello made so
popular?

To begin with, it grew out of a basic relativism.

As

MacClintock points out, the very title of one of Pirandello's most
famous plays, Right You Arei

(If You Ihink You Are), "reads like

a sentence from William James."3®
was to take a unique turn.

Pirandello's relativism, however,

While Lamm's statement that Pirandello

"himself knew that the notion that truth varies with the eye of the
beholder was as old as philosophy itself,"^ cannot be denied, Lamm
does not go on to indicate that Pirandello was to take that old notion
to its most devastatlngly nihilistic conclusion.

The Italian play

wright had had a lifetime to study the various subjective distortions
which reality, as he knew it, underwent in the deranged mind of his
wife.

It seems little wonder then that his relativism postulated a

constant interplay, a constant confusion between reality and illusion.
In Vittorinl's phrase, Pirandello was concerned with the "drama of
being and seeming. "40

On its most basic level, Pirandello's "drama

of being and seeming" presents a conflict between reality as we wish
it and reality as it is.

Among the more intelligent and complicated

members of the human community, various solutions are attempted to

^MacClintock, oj>. cit., p. 185.
^Lamm, oj>. cit.. p. 242.
40vittorini, og. cit.. p. 89.
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face for the world.
The consequences of Pirandello's view of humanity as the sum of
the conflict between the face and the mask has led the playwright Into
a conclusion which closely resembles that of Kaiser's, that is, the
human ego, caught and confused by a veritable web of faces and masks,
Is doomed to destruction.

The two dramatists, however, disagree

significantly on the process of destruction.

To Kaiser, the ego is

a solid entity which is eroded and reduced to nothingness by society;
to Pirandello the ego is never a very certain phenomenon which begins
by dividing, and subdividing and sub-subdividing until it can no longer
distinguish the whole from the parts, the real from the imaginary.
It thus, through weariness and perplexity, dissolves itself of its
own accord.

Pirandello's is the process which Joseph Wood Krutch

calls the "dissolution of the eg o . " ^
1 have already remarked on the fact that the tendency
which Pirandello carries to a logical or illogical
extreme is not unique to him and that, as a matter
of fact, this tendency to "dissolve the ego" has been
sometimes regarded as one highly characteristic of our
times.^3
Krutch sees the dissolving process as occurring in the following
manner:
The 'I' itself, the thing which perceives appearances
and becomes the victim of illusions, disintegrates—
if, at least, one means by the 'I' any continuous, per
sisting, relatively stable thing. Every 'I' is not
merely all the things which at various times it seems

^Kurtch, oj>. cit.. p. 84.
43Ibid., p. 83.

\
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to be or all the things which at various times it
seems to various people to be* It is all the different
things which at different times it has been* There are
'I's' of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, as well as
what every observer has taken them to be..What, Piran
dello seems to ask, can a 'self' be except what it is
being from moment to moment. 44
To Pirandello, the ego begins to dissolve the moment it
assumes a mask*

Dlls is not to say that all people assume masks.

There are those few "good and simple people" who possess "spon
taneity of live," but these people are but little removed from
plants and animals *45

The more civilized man must assume a mask*

The taking on of a mask usually occurs after the civilized man suc
cumbs to an instinct which makes him act against his moral code*
The element that contributes most in building the gloomy
structure of Pirandello's pessimism is instinct* Man is
compelled to yield to it even when he is perfectly
aware of the dire consequences that it will entail*
Pirandello considers instinct an acid which corrodes
the best that life possesses.46
Once man has succumbed to an instinct, he must recognize it
henceforth as a part of his real ego, his face*

This is ugly, and in

order to hide his ugliness, he assumes a mask of dignity, a mask
which hides his instincts*

Immediately the confusion begins.

him the mask has one meaning, to his friends another.

To

In this

confusion of masks, the face becomes increasingly elusive*

Presently

its outlines begin to soften; eventually, they disappear completely.

44ibid., p. 82 f.
45vittorini, oj>. cit* * p. 90.
^ I b i d * * p. 32.
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"Over-intellectual people" are particularly susceptible to the malady
of the "dissolving ego," for they are the ones who, in enlarging the
boundary and scope of their lives, "fall prey to intellectual compli
cations and to artificiality."
Their inner life is a place that fears light, since
terrible shames are hidden there. Since they are
compelled to go among men and they want to appear
decent and even heroic, they hide themselves behind
a fictitious personality that expresses itself with
exalted gestures and idealistic words.47
Presently the "fictitious personality" becomes confused with
the real.

All universal solids disappear, and we are faced with not

one but many personalities, all equally true, all equally false.
With eager earnestness and passionate conviction he
(Pirandello) points out that we grow up in the belief
that we are one, a definite individual, with a clearcut contour, with definite qualities, with a personal
ity. Life proves that we are not, that in reality this
subjectiveness of man's perceptions create in ua as
many-faceted persons as are Individuals who look at
or know us. Closed in his subjectiveness, roan inter
prets the acts of others according to his own ideas
of human behavior. The result is an inconsnunicability.48
In fine then, Pirandello sees all truth as relative, with "as
many aspects as there are thinking beings,"49 but this very relativity
of truth forces us to assume masks of our own devising, masks that
will bring us closer to the truth as we wish to see it.

Moreover, it

also compels us to take on masks which have been projected by the

47ibid.. p. 91.
48lbld.. p. 30.
49lbid.. p. 34.
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truth as seen by other individuals*

In this process of masking and

remasking, what personality we might have had is first splintered
and then obscured entirely*
ing impasse:

Ultimately, we are faced with the follow

truth is relative to the individual, but the individual

is not likely to exist at all*

Hence truth is but an illusion, and

reality consists of nothing but the continuum of illusions*

Man and

the world he lives in are nothingness.
Pirandello has often been referred to, as has Kaiser, as a
dramatist of ideas, an intellectual playwright*

In view of his

philosophy these labels seem strangely incongruous.

Like other

pan-psychic playwrights, Pirandello's thinking may be involved but
it is essentially irrational.

In fact, it is difficult to disagree

with Vittorini's judgment in this matter.
It is strange that Pirandello should have been called
an abstruse and cerebral author* Ultimately, there is
a strong anti-intellectual trend in his thought*50
As would be expected from his relativism and from his concern
with the face and the mask, Pirandello's primary dramatic problem
was devising some means of presenting and contrasting points of
view.

Actually, aside from his early naturalistic plays, almost

all his plays address themselves to the rendering of one or more
viewpoints of a central "reality."

His many experiments with point

of view include a great variety of approaches*
uses a technique reminiscient of Kaiser*

^®Clark and Freedley,

ojj.

In Henry IV Pirandello

Interestingly enough, the

cit.* p. 366.
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structural pattern Is actually reversed.

We enter the play from

the viewpoint of Henry IV and only gradually do we come to realize
that the play is not an historical romance.

Once the playwright has

made us aware of the existence of other viewpoints, he proceeds to
blend and contrast these points of view until the spectator has some
difficulty in determining which way lies sanity and which madness.
This is exactly Pirandello's point and his reversal of Kaiser's
structure emphasizes the previously discussed philosophic difference
between the two playwrights.

To Kaiser there are always two possible

points of view— that of society and that of the individual.

Which

ever one a given man possesses, he has, at any rate, something
relatively tangible.
no points of view.

To Pirandello there are, in the final analysis,
At best, man can only be aware of his existence

in the ever-changing present.

At worse, he can even lose this

awareness by thinking too deeply on the matter, for even his immedi
ate perception as an illusion compounded of a maze of masks and
faces.

Any close consideration of his existence will cause the whole

complicated edifice of illusions to disintegrate, thus leaving the
individual ego-less.

Pirandello cannot but begin with a given point

of view and end with nothingness.

To reverse this pattern, to use a

structure like Kaiser's, would argue for man's ability to build a
solid point of view, a real face for himself.
Another variation of Pirandello's concern with conflicting
viewpoints which ultimately rest only on illusion is the play Right
You Are!

(If You Think You Are).

In this little comedy the opposing
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points of view of a young clerk and his mother-in-law are presented
to a group of townspeople as to a jury*

The clerk claims that his

mother-in-law is insane, for she believes that his present wife is
her daughter, while in reality her daughter has died and the clerk's
present wife is his second wife.
tale.

Hie mother-in-law tells a different

Hie clerk is insane, for he believes that his wife is his

second wife, whereas she is actually his first wife but recently
returned to him after a long illness.

Son-in-law, mother-in-law,

and wife are finally brought together in an obligatory scene.

When

asked w h o m she truly is, the wife replies:
The truth? Simply this: I am the daughter of Signora
Flora.•.and the second wife of Signor Ponza...and, for
myself, I am nobody....I am she whom you believe me to
be.
Right You Are is a play about points of view, not a rendering of
points of view.

In its general trappings it is, to all extents and

purposes, an Extemalistlc drama.

There is no attempt to directly

present inner thoughts or "soul states," and all information comes
to the audience through objective dialogue and action.

Only at the

very end of the play is any sort of symbolism introduced, and when
the symbol does appear— the veiled figure of the wife— it is direct
and straight-forward.

Throughout the play there is a sense that the

little mystery will be solved, but the unusual twist waiting at the
end is as carefully prepared for as any resolution in Ibsen.

From

the beginning, Laudisi, acting as the author's agent, reiterates
again and again the point of the play:
viewer and his viewpoint.

all truth is relative to the

When the wife appears in her heavy veils,
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the audience should have little trouble in anticipating what she
will eventually say.
Perhaps the most famous of Pirandello's experiments with point
of view is Six Characters in Search of an Author,

It is in this piece

that he first attempts the structural method which was to make him
famous— -the mixture of a play on stage with life beyond the proscenium.
In his play-as-life; life-as-play form, Pirandello was to make his
most perfect statement of his own relativism and to solve to his
satisfaction the problem of presenting points of view.

In all,

Pirandello was to write three plays which made use of what he called
the "theatre in the theatre" structure.

Six Characters appeared in

1921, Each in His Own Way in 1924, Tonight We Improvise in 1930,

Of

the trilogy, Six Characters is the first and certainly the most
striking.
In terms of simple plot, Six Characters has at once one of the
slightest and the most confusing plots in dramatic literature.

A

group of actors who are rehearsing a play are surprised by the
appearance of six unusual people who claim to be dramatic characters
in search of an author to write their story.

They persuade the direc

tor of the company to act as author and they agree to present their
story for him.

The story, in its entirety, never gets told.

There

is, instead, a great deal of discussion of the actual roles of each
of the characters, and in the process of this discussion, the audience
gathers enough Information to piece together a lurid tale of adultery
and incest.

It is obvious, however, that the story of the six
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characters Is not the Important point of the play*

As Pirandello

himself said in the preface to Six Characters. he rejected the six
people not for themselves "but for their drama, which doubtless is
what interests them above all but which did not interest me,"'**

What

does interest Pirandello is the interplay of viewpoints, the inter
play of viewpoints between one imaginary character and another, and
the interplay of viewpoints between the imaginary characters and the
flesh and blood actors.

Thus the story of the six characters serves

only as a factor which draws out and demonstrates various points of
view.

As the play progresses and the facts of the story are dis

cussed and argued, the playwright takes advantage of this opportunity
to compare received reality with a known illusion, the illusion of a
work of dramatic art.

Thus the discussions between character and

character, between director and character, between director and actor,
and between actor and fictitious character bring one always closer
and closer to the ultimate question of the work:

who can truly be

said to have an actual point of view, who has a truer reality— the
fictitious character or the living person?
To present this question and to trace out its many implications,
Pirandello must first establish the existence of the six characters.
This he does in Act One in the most ingenious way.

When

the Director

scoffs at the Father because he claims to be a living character, the
Father turns the Director's own profession into a telling argument.

■^Eric Bentley, Ed., Naked Masks: Five Plays by Luigi
Pirandello (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952), p. 368.
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FATHER. I marvel at your Incredulity, gentlemen. Are
you not accustomed to see the creatures created by
an author spring to life in yourselves and face
each other? Just because there is no 'book' which
contains us, you refuse to believe....
DAUGHTER. Believe me, we are really six most interesting
characters, sir; side-tracked, however.
FATHER.
YesJ That is the wordi In that sense, that is,
that the author who created us alive no longer wished,
or was no longer able, materially to put us into a
work of art. And this was a real crime, sir, because
he who has had the luck to be b o m a character can
even laugh at death. He cannot die. The man, the
writer, the Instrument of the creation will die, but
his creation will not. And to live forever, it does
not need to have extraordinary gifts to be able to
work wonders. Who was Sancho Panza? Who was Don
Abbondie? Yet they live etemally-because— live
germs that they were— they had the fortune to find
a fecundating matrix, a fantasy which would raise
and nourish them: make them live forever.
MANAGER.
That is quite all right. But what do you want
here, all of you?
FATHER.
We want to live.
MANAGER.
For eternity?
FATHER.
No, sir, only for a moment...in you.
Persuading the Director that they do exist and that, through
the medium of the stage it is possible for them "to live," the
characters begin to tell him their story.

Almost at once they have

difficulty presenting a coherent account, since each begins quarrel
ing with the other about the true nature of the facts.

Confusion

mounts, and presently it is apparent that there are as many stories
as there are characters.

Tiro points of view— those of the Step-

Daughter and the Father— are, however, presented more forcefully
than the others.
The Step-Daughter maintains that all the woes of the family are
to be charged to the Father.

His original sin was the sending of his

wife to another man, the father of the Step-Daughter.

This act of

the Father's began a chain of events which ultimately reduced the
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Step-Daughter to prostitution.

It was while she was pursuing this

profession that she very nearly committed incest with the Father.
According to her point of view, the near-incestuous act was the
Inevitable result of the Father's original rejection of the Mother.
In this manner she disclaims all guilt, and she feels that the
Father*s incest is a revenge to which she is justly due.
On the other hand, the Father argues that what happened between
him and the Step-Daughter was an accident.

It grew out of an

unfortunate moral lapse during which he yielded to the Impulses of
his "miserable flesh."

In doing so, he was not to be particularly

blamed, for he was acting no differently from any other man who
"knows what unconfessable things pass within the secrecy of his
own heart."
One gives way to temptation, only to rise from it again,
afterwards, with a great eagerness to re-establish one's
dignity....Everybody's in the same case. Some folks
haven't the courage to say certain things, that's all.
But, argues the Father, this lapse of the flesh had nothing
to do with his relation with the girl or her mother.
he did not know that she was his step-daughter.

To begin with,

Moreover, it was her

father, not he, who did not provide her with better financial support.
As for her mother, he meant "to do good to" her by sending her away.
She was in love with his secretary, and when the young man was sent
away, she drifted "forlornly about the house like an animal without
a master."

Thus, to relieve both him and her, he sent his wife to

her young lover.
When the Daughter takes issue with the Father's view of the
facts, the older man retaliates with these words:
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But don't you see that the whole trouble lies here* In
words, words* Each of us has In him a whole world of
things, each man his own special world, and how can we ever
come to an understanding If I put In the words I utter
the sense and value of things as I see them; while you
who listen to me must Inevitably translate them accord
ing to the conception of things each of you has within
himself. We think we understand each other, but we
never really do*
With this argument, the Father sums up the position of the six
characters.

Ihey exist because an author has conceived them, but

since he has placed them in no story, given them no definite role,
they have no actual life*
another's point of view.

As yet they are but creatures of one
Moreover, none of them is actually

pleased with the role which the others expect him to play*

This

situation is crystallized in the persons of the Father and the
Step-Daughter*

Both feel that they have a certain reality which the

other will not grant them.

In addition both resent the mask, the

external reality, which the one wishes the other to wear*
Father puts it:

As the

"the drama lies all in this— in the conscience that

I have, that each one of us has."
We believe this conscience to be a single thing, but is
is many sided* There is one for this person, and another
for that* Diverse consciences* So we have this illusion
of being one person for all, of having a personality that
is unique in all our acts. But it isn't true* We per
ceive then when, tragically perhaps, in something we do,
we are as it were, suspended, caught up in the air on a
kind of hook. Then we perceive that all of us was not
in the act, and that it would be an atrocious injustice
to judge us by that action alone, as if all our existence
were summed up in one deed* Now do you understand the
perfidy of this girl? She surprised me in a place, where
she ought not to have known me, just as I could not exist
for her; and now she seeks to attach me to a reality such
..as I could never suppose I should have to assume for her
in a shameful and fleeting moment of my life*
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The Step-Daughter will have none of this philosophizing,
whereas the Son contemptuously refers to the whole matter as "Litera
ture]

Literature]"

than the Son.

But the Father understands the situation better

"Literature indeed]

This is life, this is passion]"

Considering the position of the six characters at this moment, the
Father is quite right.

In their present situation, without the

support of a story, a form which stands fixed beyond space and time,
they are no different from the actors and the Director.

The charac

ters are but the baseless fabric of internal and external illusion.
As they now exist, they are, at core, mutable and meaningless.
short, they are living.

In

This fact seems to contradict their earlier

plea for "life," but little reflection is needed to recognize that
Pirandello is making a cruel pun.

For to live as the six characters

wish to live is to exist not as a human being, but as a fixed and
immutable ego.

What they ask is life in the biblical sense, eternal

and unchangeable*

To have life in a story would be to have, as

Pirandello sees it, a "raison d'etre." the very thing which "living"
humans lack.
Every creature of fantasy and art, in order to exist,
must have his drama, that is, a drama in which he may
be a character and for which he is a character. This
drama is the character's raison d'etre, his vital
function, necessary for his existence.52
In short, every character in a drama has life because he has a fixed
point of view and a fixed world within which to exercise that point of
view.

The viewpoint may be simple or complex, but it is, nevertheless,

always rounded and complete.

52Ibld.. p. 368.
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This then is the situation as the first act ends.
characters exist but they do not "live."

The six

Until their story is set

they are no different from any other human being.

In the second act,

the manager allows the Father and the Step-Daughter to act out their
much discussed scene, thereby giving them "life" and ending forever
any discussion of the matter.

It is during the course of Act Two

that the differences between art and human life are presented and
discussed thoroughly. Throughout Act One, the emphasis was on living
as human's live, on life in space and time, on life with its many
points of view, its many faces and masks.

Act Ttoo begins to weave

a pattern of contrast between temporal life and the life of art.
Throughout, the question of reality and illusion is presented through
the art-life paradox.
To begin with, both the Father and the Daughter find that the
actors who have their parts are not giving a true rendering of them
selves.

The Father wishes to see in the actors "our temperaments,

our s o u l s T o

this the Director replies, "your soul, or whatever

you call it takes shape here.
it, voice and gesture."

The actors give the body and form to

In other words, to achieve reality in an

art form, the character must lose his reality as a human, for his
soul is no longer the subjective elusive human spirit.

It is to be

henceforth fixed and objectified, not by means of its own chosing,
but by the factors of the art form.
The Step-Daughter also shares her Step-Father's reservations
about entering the realm of art.
the actress to remove her frock.

She insists on "truth."

She wishes
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MANAGER.
GreatJ
Just what we want, to make a riot in
the theatre.'
DAUGHTER. But it's the truthi
MANAGER. What does that matter? Acting is our business
here. Truth up to a certain point, but no further.
But beyond the physical truth, the Step-Daughter wants above all else
not to allow the Father to turn the play into his own "cerebral
drama."

She wants to be a character in the scene as she sees it, not

a character in the scene as projected through the Father's point of
view.

Passionately she cries out that she wants "to act my part, my

part111 The Director, however, is quick to point out that "there are
other parts than yours."
art.

Her part alone may be life, but it is not

As the Manager says:
I am aware of the fact that everyone has his own
interior life which he wants very much to put forward.
But the difficulty lies in this fact: to set out just
as much as is necessary for the stage, taking the other
characters into consideration, and at the same time
hint at the unrevealed interior life of each. I am
willing to admit, my dear young lady, that from your
point of view it would be a fine idea if each charac
ter could tell the public all his troubles in a nice
monologue or a regular one hour lecture.

With this little speech of the Director's, Pirandello manages to say
three things.
art.

First he points out the differences between life and

Second, he indicates the difficulties attendent upon presenting

points of view in the play form, and, third, he pokes fun at the very
device which he himself has chosen to use.

After all, by allowing

the characters to argue with one another about their different views
of the same story, he has given each an opportunity to tell his
troubles in several nice little monologues.
When the playwright feels that, for the time, enough has been
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said about the art-life paradox, he allows the Father and the StepDaughter to act out their much discussed scene.

The two are thus

given a share of life and the act comes to an end.
Act Ihree is a summary and a demonstration.
same note as the previous act ended.

It begins on the

The Step-Daughter again opens

up the problem of art and life by objecting to the place selected for
the remaining action of the story.
DAUGHTER. I'm not going to talk anymore now. But I must
tell you this: you can't have the whole action take
place in the garden, as you suggest. It isn't
possible.
MANAGER.
Why not?
DAUGHTER. Because he (indicates the SON) is always shut up
in his room. And then there's all the part of that
poor dazed-looking boy there which takes place indoors.
MANAGER. Maybe] On the other hand, you will understand—
we can't change scenes three or four times in one act.
This argument brings up the matter of dramatic illusion, but at the
very mention of the word, the Father becomes irritated.
FATHER.
The illusion] For heaven's sake don't say
illusion. Please don't use that word, which is
particularly painful to us.
MANAGER.
Why, if you please?
FATHER.
I t '8 painful, cruel, really cruel; you ought
to understand that.
MANAGER.
But why. What ought we to say then?
The
illusion, I tell you, sir, which we've got to
create for the audience...
LEADING MAN. With our acting.
MANAGER.
The illusion of reality.
Here Pirandello has at last come to the point of his argument;
all that has gone before has led to the major question of the play:
Who has the truer reality, the living man or the dramatic character
within his drama?
following manner.

The Father proceeds to answer the question in the
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A character, sir, may always ask a man who he Is. Because
a character has really a life of his own, marked with
his special characteristics; for which reason he is always
'somebody,' But a man— I'm not speaking of you now— may
very well be 'nobody',,,If we have no reality beyond
illusion, you must not count over much on your own
reality as you feel it today, since, like that of yester
day, it may prove an illusion to you tomorrow,,,,Our
reality doesn't change; it can't change! It cannot
be other than what it is, because it is already fixed
forever. It's terrible. Ours is an immutable reality
which should make you shudder when you approach us if
you are really conscious of the fact that your reality
is a mere transitory and fleeting illusion, taking this
form today and that tomorrow, according to the conditions
to your will, your sentiments, which in turn are controlled
by an intellect that shows them to you today in one manner
and tomorrow,,.who knows'how?
Thus Pirandello completes his study of points of view, in art
and in reality, and thus he sums up the points made in the first two
acts.

Kie remainder of the third act is perorative demonstration.

Hie characters continue to act out their story.

At a certain point

in the tale, the baby daughter is drowned in a paper mache pond and
the young Step-Son commits suicide with a prop pistol.

The actors

run to him as he falls, some crying that he is really dead, others
that it is only pretense.
cry:

"Pretense?

At this point, the Father looses a "terrible

Reality, sir, reality!"

Director provides the final comment,

As the curtain falls, the

"Prdtense?

Reality?

To hell

with it all!"
And so ends Pirandello's first experiment with the "theatre
in the theatre" structure, a method that is at the same time a very
old and a very new device, for in a manner of speaking, Pirandello is
simply giving a new twist to the ancient technique of a play within a
play.

But Pirandello's twist is undeniably different.

Prior usuage
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of the convention was usually confined to making the inner play serve
as additional emphasis for the outer*

It may be used to review a prev

ious reality, as In Hamlet's play to catch the conscience of the King,
or it may be used to make further comment on an existing reality,
as in the dumb shows which introduce the acts of

C o r b u d u c .53

dello, however, was to use it to confound and reject reality.

Piran
Be

ginning as an illusion in contrast to the reality of the actors, the
play of the six characters finally becomes "truer and more real"
than the actors themselves.

Life is then a mutable illusion;

dramatic illusion is immutable reality.
In yet a second way can Pirandello's new form be considered
both old and new.

Rehearsal comedies were a great favorite with

the playwrights of the Restoration and Shakespeare gives the form a
delightful treatment in the Pyramus and Hiisbe episode of Midsummer
Night's Dream.

But, at the risk of oversimplifying somewhat, we

may say that the humor of previous rehearsal comedies was drawn from
the actors or the playwright.

Pirandello's uniqueness lies in the

humor being drawn principally from the interaction of actors with
imaginary characters who refuse not to exist.

And, while it is true

that the previous rehearsal comedies often invited comparisons between
drama and life, it was usually drama not life that suffered from the
comparison.

53An interesting discussion of the various ends to which the
device of the play within the play can be put is found in Robert J.
Nelson's Play Within a Play (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.)
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Finally, Pirandello's form is both unusual and traditional in
that it is both a point-of-view study and an Extemalistic drama.
Throughout the play the objectivity of the third-person narrative
is rigidly adhered to.

There is nowhere in the play any attempt to

seek out a conventional means of rendering inner or unspoken thought.
What can't be told in external dialogue or action is just not told.
There are, however, two important exceptions to traditional Extemalis
tic technique.

These are the two grotesqueries:

the six characters

actually exist and a seventh, Madame Pace, is made to come to life
simply by creating her proper setting.

But the author is at great

pains in the first act to make the existence of the six fictitious
characters as acceptable as possible to the audience.

This, of

course, is important, since their very living will ultimately become
the point of the play.
But it must be granted that Pirandello was not so careful in
preparing for or explaining away the sudden appearance of Madame
Pace, and he recognized that her appearance represented something of
a lapse in his dramaturgy.

In his preface to Six Characters. he

offers the following apology.
Madame Pace is b o m among the six characters and seems
a miracle, even a trick, realistically portrayed upon
the stage.It is no trick. The birth
is real. The
new character is alive not because she was alive already
but because she is now happily b o m as is required by
the fact of her being a character— she is obliged to be
as she is. There is a break here, a sudden change in
the level of reality of the scene, because a character
can be b o m in this way only in the poet's fancy and
not on the boards of the stage. Without anyone's notic
ing it, I have all of a sudden changed the scene: I
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have gathered It up again into my own fantasy without
removing it from the spectator's eyes* lhat is, I
have shown them, Instead of the stage, my own fantasy
in the act of creating— my own fantasy in the form of this
same stage*54
How much like Strindberg's concept of the dreamerJ

But one wonders

if Pirandello is actually successful in thus briefly rendering a
view of his own creative consciousness?

In a sense, of course,

the whole play is a presentation of the author's creative process,
but only in the most abstractly symbolic sense that all plays are
the objectification of their creator's fancy*
In using the methods of Externalistlc dramaturgy, Pirandello
again does so with a new purpose*
represent reality but to refute it*

His ultimate aim is not to
This he does by cleverly turn

ing the principles of objective drama against objective drama
itself.

By becoming ultrarealistic, that is, by setting the scene

not on the dressed by the undressed stage, by going behind the
dramatic illusion and presenting the actors preparing to create it,
he achieves the best possible contrast between life and the dramatic
art.

In addition, he provides himself with the opportunity to discuss

illusion in the process of being created*

Then too, he also tricks

the audience into accepting the play as the most basic realism, far
removed from fantasy.

Finally, he proceeds to confuse and distort

the whole realistic-illusionistic continuum by introducing into this
very naturalistic situation a group of seven characters who are not
realliat all*

Rius, by using the approach of Externallsm, he gains

-^Bentley, Naked Masks* p* 373*
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not only sharp contrasts, but also, ultimately, considerable ambiguity*
Moreover, he saw to it that his objectivity did not interfere with
his presentation of various points of view by carefully conserving
the facts of his internal play until each of the imaginary charac
ters had had an opportunity to tell the story as it appeared to him*
This purely objective and yet basically subjective structural pattern
gained for Pirandello the best possible statement of his philosophical
paradox*
And here is the universal meaning at first vainly sought in
the six characters**.without wanting to, without knowing
it, in the strife of their bedeviled souls, each of them,
defending himself against the accusations of the others,
expresses as his own living passion and torment the
passion and torment which for so many years have been
the pangs of my spirit: the deceit of mutual under
standing founded on the empty abstraction of the words,
the multiple personality of everyone corresponding to
the possibilities of being to be found in each of us,
and finally the inherent tragic conflict of life (which
is always moving and changing) and form (which fixes it,
immutable). 55
Pirandello's selection of the "theatre in the theatre" form is
a clear demonstration of his superiority as a playwright, for it is,
in fact, the only structural organization which would completely state
his total philosophy*

Such purely Externalistlc plays as Right You

Are can only be plays about point of view*

As Raymond Williams

indicates, Right You A r e ,is, at best, "an entertaining trick comedy."
In it, Pirandello "does not create so much an authentically complex
situation, by which the shallowness of commonplace judgments may be

^ B e n t l e y , Naked Masks, p. 367.
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revealed, as a deliberate (and brilliant) theatrical exception.
Once Pirandello had constructed his "theatre in the theatre" pattern,
however, he had in his possession a tool which enabled him to present
rather than relate differing viewpoints.

Thus, the story in Six

Characters is not a mystery to be solved, as in Right You Are, or a
madness to be cured as in Henry IV. but rather the story remains,
as the Father says, "in us," in the characters.

It is still where it

rightfully belongs, in the points of view of each of the participants.
Consequently, it can be told only through the differing insights of
the characters, and appropriate comparisons and contrasts can be made
as the story unfolds.

In addition, since the story does not yet

exist, the emphasis can be placed not on the factual complications, but
on the subjective variations of those who tell it.

Finally, when

certain portions of the story do exist in a completed form, the
playwright is then free to contrast this immutable form, these
frozen points of view, with the fugitiveness of life and the uncer
tainty of human perception.

In brief, Six Characters is a study in—

not about— points of view.
A final achievement of Pirandello's new form was the solution
which it offered to another major and related problem of pan-psychic
drama, the problem of eliminating the intrusion of the proscenium
arch.

Evreinov had attempted to neutralize the effect of the pros

cenium arch by using point of view as a device for bringing the
spectator to the stage.

Pirandello attacked the problem from the

■Williams, o£. cit.. p. 192.
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rear.

If it were difficult to bring the audience to the stage, why

not bring the stage to the audience?
Six Characters.

Ihis is exactly what he did in

By placing his action on the bare rehearsal stage, he

eliminated all those theatrical trappings which call attention to
the difference between the auditorium and the stage.

Over and above

this initial selection of locale, every attempt is made throughout
the play to make the audience feel that they have merely happened in
at a rehearsal and that at any time they are free to interrupt the
proceedings or to leave if they are bored.

As the opening stage

direction states, the audience enters to see a bare stage so that
"from the beginning they may have the impression of an impromptu
performance."

The curtain is open as the audience walks in, and

the first act ends without a curtain.

It is marked simply by the

major characters' vacation of the stage in order to arrange a
scenario.
by mistake.

The second act ends in a curtain which a stagehand lowers
Thus, the presence of the proscenium is neutralized not

because the audience feels that they are on stage, but because they
have the impression that since this is a rehearsal no formal barrier
has as yet been set up between the stage and the auditorium.
Therefore, the "theatre in the theatre" structure not only
provided the playwright with a means of presenting the various points
of view of his characters and with a method of intermingling art with
life by eliminating the major division between art and life— -the
proscenium arch, but it also permitted him to demonstrate that art by
being the only reality and that life by being only illusion prove
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conclusively that the fate of the human ego Is to discover that It Is
but an ever more entangled web of fantasies destined to ultimate
destruction, whereas the ego of an Imaginary character is a fixed,
eternal thing.

Pirandello proved this postulate to his own satis

faction by contrasting the viewpoints of the six fictitious charac
ters, viewpoints which will remain until the end of time, with the
points of view of the actors, the director, and by implication, the
audience, points of view that are ever-changing, ever creating new
illusions and destroying the old.
Hence, the problem presented by Strindberg and Evrelnov was
taken up by both Pirandello and Kaiser.

To them the rendering of

an Individual's point of view meant not only presenting its imminent
manifestations but also suggesting its probable end.

Both play

wrights felt that a relativism which assumed that the truth resided
in the individual viewpoint must also assume that the very existence
of that viewpoint Implied its destruction.

To Kaiser, the individual

ego was doomed because it was committed to an unequal struggle with
the group ego of an evil society.

To Pirandello, the private ego

carried within itself its own seeds of destruction.

The Pirandel-

lian ego, because it did not agree with the viewpoints of others,
was forced to assume a mask that brought it closer to external
reality and to the viewpoints of others.
points multiplied, so did the masks.

As these external view

Moreover, the original masks

were prone to change and become only illusions of masks as alien view
points changed.

Somewhere in this maze of masks and faces, the
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original face (if there ever was one) becomes lost or suffocated.
Thus, as the masks dissolve, so also does the total personality,
carrying with it to destruction the dead or dying face.
As a container for his point-of-view study, Kaiser made use
of the "station drama," a form which juxtaposes several short scenes
united only by the consistency of theme and central character.

In

each scene he contrasted the viewpoint of society with that of the
individual, moving always towards complete projection of the action
through the eyes of the central character.

Pirandello, on the other

hand, sought to make his statement in the "theatre in the theatre" form,
a structural framework which allowed him to contrast various view
points as flesh and blood actors and imaginary characters passed
freely from the rehearsal stage to the play with the play.

Kaiser's

experiments were later to be tried with some success by Eugene
O'Neill in such plays as The Hairy A p e ; an interesting variation on
a pattern similar to Pirandello's is Andre Gide's The Counterfeiters,
which contains a novel within a novel, within a novel.
The two playwrights invite one final comparison.

Kaiser tended

to make strong use of devices which had fallen into ill repute with
the extemalistic school.

In particular, he made frequent use of the

monologue as a means of rendering inner thought.

Pirandello repre

sents a different trend in the pan-psychic movement.

He attempts,

whenever possible, to correlate his techniques with those of the
Externalists.

When he feels the need, he will not hesitate to use

grotesque elements, such as the six characters themselves, but his
general tendency is to remain with the e x temalistic framework.

CHAPTER FIVE

ATTACKING THE PROBLEM BY THE REINTRODUCTION OF OLDER TECHNIQUES
O'NEIL AND GIRAUDOUX USE OLD MEANS TO A NEW END

I
O'Neill:

Strange Interlude

The new movements in European drama were slow to cross the
Atlantic.

During the time when Ibsen was producing his new symbolic

dramas, when "free theatres" were springing up in London, Paris,
Berlin and Moscow, the emotional scope of America was, in the words of
Richard Skinner, "almost equivalent to that of a highly developed
vegetable."*

Prior to 1915, the American stage could hardly offer

any comparison to that of Europe.

Clearly, the realism of Belasco

and the efforts of such part-time playwrights as Langdon Mitchell and
William Vaughan Moody could not be equated with or judged by the
standards used to evaluate the work of Brahm, Antoine, Stanislavski
and the host of extemalistic and pan-psychic playwrights who were
quickly becoming known as masters in their own lifetime.
however, the tide began to turn.

In 1915,

Nineteen-fifteen was, according to

MacGowan and Melnitz, "that crucial year," for it was at that time that

York:

*Richard Danna Skinner, Eugene O'Neill» A Poet's Quest (New
Longmans, Green and Co., 1935), p. 12.
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the Provincetown Players began to produce the work of Eugene O'Neill."^
Within ten years, the seed first planted in that tiny playhouse had
grown and borne fruit in abundance, and by 1924 O'Neill reigned
supreme as the outstanding playwright of the New York stage and
America's first dramatic genius.
turn to be smug.

Moreover, by 1924 it was America's

Not only did it have a modern drama, but it also

had perhaps the world's greatest practicing dramatist, for by this
time the "trend had shifted" and "coincident with the improvement of
the American product, the European drama began to fade."^
Thus, O'Neill came at the end of a period, and, as might be
expected, he could hardly help but be eclectic.
iences tended to heighten his eclecticism.

Certain of his exper

He came of a theatre

family and had even toured as a bit actor in his father's perennially
successful production of The Count of Monte Cristo.

He had been the

victim of a serious physical breakdown, and while recuperating during
the winter of 1912-13, he "read just about everything I could get my
hands on:

the Greeks, the Elizabethans--practically all the classics—

and of course all the modems.
Strindberg."^

Ibsen and Strindberg, especially

Like many intellectuals of his time, he also read and

^MacGowan and Melnitz, oj>. cit.. p. 427.

bridge:

^Edwin A. Engel, The Haunted Heroes of Eugene O'Neill (Cam
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 301.

York:

^Barrett H. Clark, Eugene O'Neill, The Man and His Plays (New
Robert M. McBride & Company, 1936), p. 35.
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respected Nietzsche.

Clark describes his going to rehearsal one day

with a worn copy of The Birth of Tragedy stuffed into his coat
pocket.*’

O'Neill had also done his share of thinking about the new

psychology and about the theories of Freud and Jung.
toward the latter was one of esteem with reservations.
was "the only one of the lot which interests me."

His attitude
To him Jung

Some of the

psychologist's suggestions were "extraordinarily illuminating" to
O'Neill, but in the final analysis Jung was "no deep student of
psychoanalysis.
Hence, O'Neill was heir to a wide range of theatrical, philo
sophical, and psychological thought and practice, and at one time or
another he was to make use of it all.

His background led him into

an eclecticism which found him by turns a realistic, a symbolic, a
naturalistic and an expressionistic playwright.

His revolt against

the type of romantic drama which had made his father's fortune and
ruined his career as an artist caused O'Neill to turn first to Externalism.

But the man who felt that Strindberg was "the precursor of

modernity in the theatre"? was not long in realizing that his bent
lay in Pan-psychism.

As Skinner points out, O'Neill has always been

the "poet of the individual."

^Ibid., p. 4.
^Engel, oj>• cit., p. 81 f.
?Ibid., p . 83.
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But with O'Neill, the problem of the individual as a soul
in distress or torment has been clearly supreme. It is
the individual's rebellion against the mass, or his abject
surrender to it that counts, rather than the action of
the individual as representing the m a s s . 8
Consequently, by 1920, O'Neill had turned from pure Extemalism
and had completed his first point-of-view study and one of his finest
plays, The Emperor Jones.

The play probably has its roots in Strind

berg's dream form, but its general station drama structure is clearly
comparable to Kaiser's From Horn to Midnight.

The same observation

may be made of The Hairy Ape which was written the following year.
Both plays employ not only the station drama form but also the
Kaiserian device of shifting from the universal to the individual
point of view.

O'Neill was aware of the similarity between his work

and that of the German playwright, but he vigorously denied having
been influenced by Kaiser.

Jones was written, he claimed, "long

before I had ever heard of Expressionism."

The Hairy Ape, "a direct

descendant of Jones," was planned before he had read From Morn to Mid
night. which was a play he "did not think much of."^

Whether O'Neill

was influenced unconsciously by Kaiser, or whether the two playwrights
developed along parallel lines, there is no denying that their struc
tural methods mirror one another.

One of the most important resem

blances was the propensity of both dramatists to use visual elements,
scenery, lighting, properties, as a means of suggesting the central

^Skinner, oj>. cit.. p. 9.
9

Clark, oj>. cit.. p. 125.
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character'8 point of view.

This technique was, of course, strongly

championed by Evreinov and Meyerhold, but O'Neill was to develop it
and rely on it to a degree hardly hoped for by the Russians.
Throughout the period of his pan-psychic experimentation—
that is, from 1920 to 1930— O'Neil continued to try various juxta
positions of the visual and oral elements of the theatre in search
of the best means of depicting the point-of-view of a given individual.
In 1925, for instance, his continued interest in visual statement led
him to reintroduce the mask into the m o d e m theatre.

Just how

important he felt this innovation to be to the writer of point of
view studies can be seen from his statement that the mask was "the
freest possible solution to the m o d e m dramatist's problem as to how—
with the greatest possible dramatic clarity and economy of means— he
can express those profound hidden conflicts of the mind which the
probings of psychology continue to disclose to use."10
O'Neill's use of the mask as a dramatic convention reflected
not only his originality in terms of dramatic invention, but also an
important development in the playwright's underlying philosophy.

As

we have already noted, O'Neill's masters were Nietzsche and Strindberg,
and consequently he was b o m into the new relativism and the new
Dionysianism with certain aspects,of his philosophy ready-made.
Winther has observed:

i

*®Engel, o£. cit.. p. 93.

As
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In O'Neill's plays the 'good' is never a fixed quantity
to which an action can be referred, measured and evaluated.
The 'good' is never the same.
It changes with changing
actions, is relative to each new situation.^
In addition to this relativism, there is in O'Neill a total "yeasaying to life."
There is in him, as in Nietzsche, an almost savage will to
power, a will to live life to its fullest with all its
tragedy and sorrow, a will to face it with insult and
scorn, scorn and insult flung with vengeance and hate
against the brutal tyranny of the past.*2
For a time O'Neill was content to develop and explore the
basic ideas of his masters.

His relativism was just that.

It was

sometime before it occurred to O'Neill to draw any conclusions from
relativism beyond that of presenting life in terms of individual
lives.

To the individual who has been cut off by m o d e m thought and

science from any universal values, from any sense of spirituality in
a universal godhead, O'Neill could offer only the Nictzschean solution
of a new paganism, a new Dionysianism founded on the needs and truth
of the individual being.

However, his sense of naturalistic deter

minism, which is so sharply exemplified in Brutus Jones's inability to
escape the heritage of his race, was sooner or later to force him to
reason his relativism through to some sort of conslusion.
His first conclusion is much the same as Kaiser's:

the all-

important individual ego is doomed to destruction because it is at war

York:

H-Sophus Keith Winther, Eugene O'Neill. A Critical Study (New
Random House, 1934), p. 121.
12Ibid.. p. 81.
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with overpowering forces over which it has no control.
are those of a crass and industrialized society.

These forces

Thus, Yank can

shout and strike at the puppets who walk Fifth Avenue, but in the end
it is they who triumph and Yank is destroyed.

In this unequal struggle,

Kaiser saw hope in the social reformer; O'Neill looked to salvation in
a new paganism.

But "having sojourned to the Dionysian depths in

Desire Under the Elms. O'Neill emerged, never to find his way back
again."13
O'Neill, having lost faith in the Nietzschean ideal, began to
feel that there was no hope at all for the triumph of the individual
because the evil lay more within than without.

The source of the

trouble lay in man's own romantic imagination.

Like the crowds who

flocked to see the impossible dream of his father's production of
Monte Cristo. each man sought some escape from reality in a world of
dreams and ideals.

Hence, man's tragedy was grounded in his need for

his dream and in his refusal to see that there was nothing he could do
to force nature to give his dream reality.

Thus, though Ponce de Leon

goes in quest of love and fame, Marco Polo of power, and Lazarus of
life eternal, all are to be disappointed, not because their dreams are
bad but because they are impossible.

Just as the crowds at Monte

Cristo are not able to buy any more than a few moments of illusion for
the price of a theatre ticket, so each man is doomed to discover that
no matter how lofty his ideal, it is but a theatrical trick, an

l^Engel, o£. cit.. p. 135.
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Illusion.
This discovery comes hard to man, and when the truth does come
it is usually too bitter to face.

After all, his life has been

supported by his dreams just as his dreams have been supported by
his life.

Hence, to hide his disappointments, man manufactures new

illusions which he presents to himself and to the world as a replace
ment for the old.

Such is the way of Dion, the Dreamer of The Great

God Brown, who wears a mask of Pan as a shield against the reality of
the world as conceived by Brown.
greatness and his weakness.

In short, man's dream is both his

The cheapest escapism and the supreme

achievements of humanity grow out of the same romantic ideals, but
no matter what form they take, they ultimately divide man against him
self, make him confuse illusion with reality, and carry him to des
truction.

As Dr. Darrell says in Strange Interlude:

Romantic imaginationI It has ruined more lives than all
the diseases! Other diseases, I should say! It's a form
of insanity.
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that O'Neill's mat
uring thought was drawing him closer to the conclusions of Pirandello:
man is destroyed because he begins by attempting to adjust reality to
his private dream and ends by so compounding dream and reality that
his ego is first split and then destroyed.

Pirandello wrote plays

in which his characters talked about the masks and faces which they
elected or were forced to wear;

O'Neill, with his strong sense of

the theatre-visual, had the characters actually wear masks in The Great
God Brown.

What had been metaphor to Pirandello became icon for O'Neill.

As O'Neill drew abreast of Pirandello philosophically, he also
began to resemble the Italian playwright in other matters besides the
use of masks.

The tendency towards striking a compromise between

realistic and non-rcalistic elements, a tendency which was observable
in Pirandello,-becomes a marked characteristic of the later work of
O'Neill.

In 1926, O'Neill completed the final draft of Lazarus

Laughed, the last of his "pageant dramas."

In the same year he began

work on a far more significant drama, Strange Interlude, a play which
marks the end of a long period of pan-psychic experimentation which
began with the writing of The Emperor Jones.
Strange Interlude is a very Pirandellian work.

In two important ways,
First, like Six

Characters. it is, after a manner, built as a play within a play.

The

two separate plays are the play which takes place on the external
level and that which takes place by virtue of the interaction of the
internal thoughts of each of the characters.

Secondly, like Piran

dello, O'Neill distorts the techniques of Extemalism only so far
as is necessary to make his point.

Hence, the play on the external

level is as realistic as any of the social dramas of Ibsen, and,
interestingly enough, could, with very little adaptation, make a
perfectly coherent and reasonably playable piece in itself.

Thus,

like Pirandello, O'Neill is not adverse to using every possible drama
turgic device of Extemalism.

Such resemblances as the two play

wrights bear to one another is hardly coincidental; they can be
traced to the previously mentioned philosophical similarities.
is not to say that O'Neill's thinking was directly influenced by

This
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Pirandello, for he may well have evolved his conclusions independently.
Whatever the process, the American playwright was ultimately to see
life in much the same terms as the I t a l i a n did.

In an article in

the American Spectator, O'Neill was to say:
One's outer life passes in a solitude haunted by the masks
of others; one's inner life passes in a solitude hounded
by the masks of oneself.
Thus, both playwrights resorted to some variation of the play
within the play in order to present the impossible problem of defin
ing ultimate reality in terms of the private, subjective vision, and
both made use of the techniques of Extemalism as a means of throwing
into sharp relief their presentation of the individual's point of
view.

With such similarity in both ideals and aims, one wonders why

O'Neill did not arrive at a final solution identical to that of
Pirandello?
There are several good reasons.

First James Joyce's Ulysses

had appeared in 1922, the year after Pirandello first formulated his
new method.

The interior monologue, as presented by Joyce, had by

1927 become popularized in the novels of Waldo Frank, Sherwood Ander
son, and Conrad Aiken.

Thus, O'Neil had before him the new technique

of the novel as a guide towards his own use of asides and soliloquies.
The new novel technique, however, must be accorded its influence on
O'Neill with some reservation.

Although George Jean Nathan character

ized Strange Interlude as a "combination of the method of the novel

^^Winther, o£. cit.. p. 276.
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and that of the d r a m a , t h e r e is no reason to assume that O'Neill
was making dramatic hay in the novel's sunshine.

To the contrary,

any assumption that O'Neill was imitating Joyce's technique seems
rash and unfounded in light of the general developments in 'modem
drama and in view of O'Neill's own theatrical background.

As

Engel points out, "O'Neill seems to have combined the technique of
Overtones with that of The Adding Machine."^6

The first was written

in 1913,

the second was Elmer Rice's 1923 success. Both plays are

examples

of the growing American interest in subjective points of

view.

Whether Engel's observation about O'Neill's immediate dramatic

examples

is demonstratably true or not is questionable, but it does

suggest the

important fact that O'Neill's major influences come

much more directly from the theatre than from the novel.
And it was O'Neill's theatrical background which provided a
second cause for his divergence from the methods of Pirandello.
Although O'Neill and Pirandello both began their careers as externalists, they soon began to follow sharply differing dramatic paths.
When pure Extemalism failed to satisfy him, O'Neill was led into
decidedly visual experimentation, a course which Pirandello never
followed.

It was through his interest in the visual theatre that

O'Neill came to have a healthy respect for the so-called "producer's
theatre," a theatre visual as'well as oral.

l^Engel, o£. cit. p. 200.
16Ibid.. p. 203.

Pirandello seems to have
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been an "absolute opponent of the idea."*?

it was the producer's

theatre which probably lured O'Neill Into experimentation with actual
masks, while Pirandello was content with talk.

But strangely enough,

It was also the concepts of MacGowan, the producer, which probably
brought O'Neill to his particular structural solution in Strange
Interlude.

In The Theatre of Tomorrow, published the year before

the appearance of Ulysses. MacGowan had cried out that the "soliloquy
will return again as a natural and proper revelation of the mind of the
character.

Even the aside may redevelop as a deliberate piece of

theatricalism."18
Finally, in addition to the ideas of MacGowan, O.'Neill had his
own early theatrical experiences to guide him, experiences which
were not granted to Pirandello.

After all, O'Neill had grown up in

the shadow of The Count of Monte Cristo. and in young manhood had
even appeared on the stage with that august personage.

Consequently,

he himself had had first hand experience with the effectiveness of the
old aside and soliloquy.

Always a dramatist of the living not the

printed theatre, O'Neill, once he felt that the mask had not made the
completest possible statement, not unnaturally returned in Strange
Interlude to a device which had worked effectively in the past, was
familiar to him, and was being advocated by his close friend and pro
ducer, Kenneth MacGowan.

^Williams, o£. cit.. p. 198.
*®Kenneth MacGowan, The Theatre of Tomorrow (New York:
and Liveright Publishers, 1921), p. 243.
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In addition to their differing theatrical traditions, O'Neill
and Pirandello also were at odds concerning ultimate values.

To

Pirandello, art at least transcended illusion in its immutability;
O'Neill was not even willing to grant this premise.
another mask.

Art was but

Thus Marsden flees from reality in his writing, even

going so far as to "seduce himself in his novels."

But, on the

other hand, while Pirandello glorified art, O'Neill was to see
life's hope in the very thing which is its greatest despair-the romantic ideal.

Hence in Strange Interlude though each character

is destroyed by his idealistic dreams, he is also, through these
same ideals, raised to a certain level of dignity and triumph.

Nina

and Marsden, for instance, have the memory of their afternoons and
the knowledge that they have created happiness for Sam.
then, the romantic ideal both gives and takes away.

Like God,

This is O'Neill's

so-called hopeless-hope, a kind of triumph in defeat that could
best be given a subtle treatment only in some sort of contrast between
the Interior monologue and the external action and dialogue.
In the final analysis, O'Neill is more the Strindbergian than
the Pirandellian.
Pirandello.

More exactly, he is the Strindbergian after

Like his master, O'Neill sees art, life, and dreaming

all as one, and he sees the romantic ideal as the culmination of all,
the focus of the pull of opposites, the dispenser of both good and
evil, which gives to life both its joys and its tragedy.

Unlike Strind

berg, however, O'Neill sees little hope for the individual, who has
no Indra to return to, and who, Pirandello-like, will be t o m apart
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by the pull of anti-poles.

Because, then, of his Strindbergian

divergences from Pirandello, because of his particular theatrical
background, and perhaps because of the trends of the m o d e m novel,
O'Neill brought to the pan-psychic drama two old devices in a new
disguise— the asides and the soliloquies of Strange Interlude.
Strange Interlude, as more than one critic has observed, is
"the play which gives the most complex statement to the destructive
power of the Romantic i d e a l . E a c h of the characters stands as
living proof of the ravages of one or more aspects of romantic
destruction.

Darrell and Marsden are destroyed by their romantic

devotion to Nina and to their careers, Professor Leeds by his un
realistic Puritan ideals, Nina by the Gordon myth.

Their sickness

is the m o d e m sickenss; they are victims of the romantic imagination,
"a form of insanity."

Just as each of the characters give.expression

to O'Neill's theme of the destructiveness of the romantic ideal, so
too does the structure of Strange Interlude.
As pointed out previously, the romantic ideal creates life
in terms of faces and masks; it is responsible for Nina's definition
of life as "a long drawn out lie with a sniffling sigh at the end."
O'Neill's use of the aside and soliloquy to present various points
of view allows his structural patterns to depict for us the processes
by which we turn life into a lie.

First, he contrasts the characters'

interior dialogue with their spoken dialogue to state the most basic
lie of life:

people say one thing and think another.

l^Winther;

ojj.

cit. . p. 32.

Hence, Dr.
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Darrell tells Marsden that at the hospital Nina has been kissing and
spooning with a number of patients, while to himself he thinks:
"Spooning...rather a mild word for her affairs...but strong enough
for this ladylike soul."

Recognition of this sort of contradiction

in life leads Nina to echo the statement of the Father in Six Charac
ters:

"I've suddenly seen the lies in the sounds called words."

Words

to Nina are like the "simple platitudes of truth, those Gospel words
we love the sound of but whose meaning we pass on to spooks to live
by."
On a second, slightly more complicated level, characters may
at rare moments say exactly what they think.

By coordinating the

asides and the soliloquies with the external dialogue, O'Neill
emphasizes this rare occurrence.

When characters say exactly what

they think, they may not be lying themselves but they often upset
the complacent lies of others.

So, when Nina in Act One cries out

bitterly that she should have--married or unmarried— given herself
to Gordon the night before he left for war, her father is appalled.
"Nina."1

he commands sternly, "This is really going too far."

often than

not, however, theshock at seeing another person drop

his mask for a moment remains internal.

To express this, O'Neill

turns again to the aside and the soliloquy.

Take, for example, the

following short scene.
NINA.

More

For playing the silly slut, Charlie. For
giving my cool, clean body to men with hot hands
and greedy eyes which they called love.
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MARSDEN.
(thinking with agony) Then she did!...the little
filth!
(in his flat voice) You mean you--(then
pleadingly) But not— Darrell?
NINA.
Ned? No, how could I? The war hand't maimed
him. There would have been no point in that. But
I did with others— oh, four or five or six or seven
men, Charlie. I forget— and it doesn't matter.
They
were all the same. Count them all as one, and that
one a ghost of nothing. That is, to me. They were
important to themselves, if I remember rightly.
But
I forget.
MARSDEN.
(thinking in agony) B u t why?...the dirty little
trollop...why?
By using the aside in this manner O'Neill is able to study
Marsden's shock and anguish, while at the same time freeing himself
from the problem of making Marsden externalize his thoughts, an action
which would shift the general tide of the scene and greatly change
Marsden'8 relationship with Nina.
O'Neill adds texture to his concept of life as lying by introduing a third and even more complex contradiction into the spoken
word-hidden thought relationship, the contradiction brought about by
a deliberate misunderstanding or confusion growing out of the person
ality of the listener.

Hence, when in Act Two, the distraught

Nina sobbingly tells Marsden, whom she identifies with her late father,
that he has always been "so kind and comforting!
the love-sick writer thinks to himself:

I've wanted you so,"

"wanted?...wanted?...not that

kind of wanted...could she mean?"
To O'Neill, then, these three kinds of deception and confusion,
by themselves and in various simple and intricate combinations, are
responsible for much of life's bitterness and tragedy.

The clashing

of viewpoints, and the labors of the intelligent to adjust their
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truth to the truth of others, while at the same time championing
their own romantic ideals, is the burden and misery of life.
At the root of the difficulty of communicating to one another
is the problem of communicating to oneself.

Not only is life a lie

in terms of our relations with other people, it is also most often
a lie in terms of our relations with ourselves.

Many are the times

when we distort reality because the illusion is comforting and many
are the times when we accept a lie through willful or natural
ignorance.

When, for instance, Professor Leeds says of Nina "in

the present state of her mind the real and the unreal become con
fused," Marsden recognizes this as a common plight.

To himself he

thinks, "as always in all minds...or how could men live?"

O'Neill

offers a fine example of the individual's deliberate confusion of
the real and the unreal in the scene at the end of Act Four in which
Nina seduces Dr. Darrell.

Each creates a lie for himself, and each

uses that lie to convince the other.

To Nina, she is doing what

she is doing for love of Sam, to make him happy.
is acting in the cause of science and friendship.

To Darrell, he
At some level

each knows the other is lying to himself and to his partner, but
they have so managed to confuse reality with ideal that they come to
the end of the scene in the masks of a man and woman humble before
their joint altruism.
crying out:

In their thoughts, however, they are both

"I shall be happyi"

Nina, less realistic than the

scientist Darrell, must carry her lie with her to the end; as the
curtain falls, her last thoughts are:

"I shall make my husband
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happy!"

Without recourse to the devices of the aside and the soliloquy,

O'Neill would have been hard put to present the maze of inner and outer
lies which give both complexity and meaning to this scene.
O'Neill, then, by reintroducing the aside and the soliloquy is
able, first, to compare and contrast the various masks and faces of
reality; second, to reveal inner thought and to study the interaction
of inner and outer thought without disturbing the surface of the story;
and, third, to tell the same story simultaneously from a number of
different points of view.

In fine, coming at the end of a long period

of experimentation, he does not feel the need to seek out brilliant
new technical means.

He is at liberty to draw out what he considers

to be the best of both the extemalistic and the pan-psychic forms.
Consequently, he does not, at least in Strange Interlude, overburden
his play with intricate and vague symbolism as does Ibsen; nor does
he restrict himself to a single point of view as did Evreinov; nor
does he, like Strindberg, cast the whole story as a barely conscious
dream; nor does he, finally, introduce six or seven ghostly characters
to make his point.

He returns instead to a much earlier tradition

and asks the romantic drama of another age to provide him with devices
through which to present his m o d e m concepts.
Asides and soliloquies eliminated, Strange Interlude is struc
turally in the extemalistic tradition.

As has been noted earlier,

it involves only one set of events which occur in an ordinary spatialtemporal sequence, and the play could be presented totally without the
asides and soliloquies.

On its extemalistic level, it may be con
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sidered as a passable, though slightly "soap-box-opera-ish," example
of the Ibsenian version of the well-made play, more exactly, perhaps,
as a combination of Ibsenian and Zolaesque naturalism.

It is, in

brief, the story of the loves of a woman from young womanhood to
old age.
Just how important the asides and the soliloquies are to
Strange Interlude can be seen from the fact that these conventions give
virtually all the meaning to the play.

They are made to carry the

burden of presenting the shattered ideals of each of the participants.
Nina's romantic image of Gordon, for instance, is developed most
completely only in her hidden thoughts, just as Marsden's true feelings
towards Nina are never voiced in her presence.

But in addition to

employing the aside and the soliloquy to add complexity

to the char

acters, O'Neill also uses the devices to great effect in telling four
simultaneous and virtually contradictory stories with the same set of
facts, an accomplishment which makes a telling point in his argument
that life is but a lie.

Perhaps the best example of O'Neill's

"simultaneous method" is found in the chorus of dialogue and solilo
quy which marks the end of Act Six, the climax of the play.

All four

of the major characters are seated together in Nina's living room.
Nina has succeeded in using them all.

She has so orchestrated the

role of each that her life at the moment is full and rich.

Her

delight in this she expresses in the following externalized speech:
Yes, you're here, Charlie— always! And you, Sam--and
Ned! (With a strange gaiety) Sit down, all of you!
Make yourselves at home! You are my three men! This
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is your home with me!
(Then In a strange half-whisper)
Ssssh! I thought I heard the baby. You must all sit
down and be very quiet. You must not wake our baby.
If this were an objective play, the curtain would fall here,
for the external action is complete.

O'Neill, however, now proceeds

to split the one action into four actions.

In a series of interior

monologues, he presents the scene from four different points of view.
The first of these is Darrell's.

He thinks of telling Sam the truth,

but cannot because "to kill happiness is a worse murder than taking
life."

Thus, there is nothing for him to do but "accept her terms."

"And your child is mine!

your wife is mine!...your happiness is

mine.'...may you enjoy my happiness, her husband!"

The action then,

from Darrell's point of view is a story of utter renunciation, the
romantic ideal of sacrifice.
Sam's story is simple, crass and uncomplicated.
Sure good to see Ned again...a real friend if there ever
was one...looks blue about something...oh, that's right,
Charlie said his old man had kicked in...his old man was
rich...that's an idea...I'11 bet he'd put up that capital...
To the subtle Marsden, Nina is "the old queer Nina now...the
Nina I could never fathom."
Her three men!...and we are!...1?...yes, more deeply than
the others since I serve for nothing...a queer kind of
love, maybe...1 am not ordinary!...Our child...what could
she mean by that?...Child of us three?...on the surface
that's insane...but I felt when she said it there was some
thing in it...8he has strange devious currents that become
the one stream of desire...I feel with regard to Nina my
life queerly identified with Sam's and Darrell's...her
child is the child of our three loves for her...I would
like to believe that...I would like to be her husband in
a sense...and the father of her child after my fashion...
I could forgive her anything.
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Marsden's story is more inclusive, his perception of the totality of
the situation is the deepest and the broadest of the three men.
Still, his place in his story differs from his place in Nina's
story.

To her he has long ago become the father of her male

triple god— -husband, lover, father. ' Throughout the first half of
the play,-Marsden does not always wear with good grace the fathermask which Nina has forced on him.

Still it has been better than

nothing, and at this point of the play he seems about to accept it
as reality.

This acceptance will become more marked as the play

moves forward to its conclusion.

Ultimately the mask will replace

the old face entirely, for at the end of the play when Nina calls
him "father...dear Old Charlie," Marsden thinks:
No!

"God damn dear old...

God bless dear old Charlie...who, passed beyond desire, has all

the luck at last."
As each mqtrin his thoughts becomes resigned to his place in
his own story, Nina thinks triumphantly:
My three men!...I feel their desires converge in me!...
to form one complete beautiful male desire which I
absorb...and am whole...they dissolve in me, their life
is my life...I am pregnant with the three!...husband!...
lover!...father!...and the fourth man!...little man!...
little Gordon!...he is mine too!...that makes it perfect!...
Why I should be the proudest woman on earth!...I should be
the happiest woman in the world...Ha-ha...only I better knock
on wood...before God the Father hears my happiness!
How right and how wrong she is!
wrong they all are!

In fact, how right and how

It is just this aspect of O'Neill's use of the

aside and the soliloquy that makes it so very different from the use
to which it was put in premodem drama.

When Hamlet's point of view

is contrasted with that of the King's in the chapel scene, the point
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of the contrast Is to reveal Hamlet's error.

The audience has

possession of a single set of universal facts and standards and can
judge his error accordingly.

His soliloquy and that of the King's

serve only to aid and clarify that judgment.

But O'Neill's argument

is that each viewpoint is as true and as false as the other.

There

is no error because from the viewpoint of each individual there is
none to be made, but there is also much error because each character
assumes a role for himself and the others which they, from their
points of view, can only partially play.

In essence then, O'Neill's

asides and soliloquies do not clarify but actually confuse the facts.
This is his deliberate intention, since without the conventions; the
audience may feel inclined to judge the action universally and impar
tially.

With the addition of the two devices, the audience is forced

to pass five different judgments on Act Six, that is, one judgment for
each viewpoint, and one for the action as a comparison and synthesis
of viewpoints.

By forcing the audience through such a thought

process, O'Neill places them in a position of finding it very dif
ficult to reject his contention that life is a meaningless confusion
of dreams and lies.
Thus the playwright's structure— by allowing him to capture a
simultaneous welter of conflicting viewpoints— both presents and
emphasizes his theme:

life is a web of romantic ideals, a strange

interlude of masks and faces, reality and illusion, happiness and
renunciation, which ends in a weary sigh and from which only death
emerges as victor.

To O'Neill, we are all like the characters in
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Strange Interlude.
as he conceived it.

By the end of the play, each has lost his identity
Only the young have an ideal, since they have

yet to live through the lying struggle.

The others have "passed

beyond desireV and are ready to have their life rounded with a sleep.
Sam, who never had a face, who was a total mask, whose speech and
thoughts always coincided because he always thought the thoughts he
was supposed to think, has died.

Darrell, who would sacrifice nothing

for his career, who thought he could escape the disease of romantic
imagination, has sacrificed all for the happiness of Nina and Sam, and
at the end, even that mask has fallen away.
but work in his biological station.
one's life again.

He wants to do nothing

He will not "meddle" in any

But even this dream is shattered.

station is no longer his because Sam,
robbed him of it by willing

His experimental

in good middle-class

faith, has

it a half million dollars.

Nina has lost husband, lover, son,and happiness.

She remains

nothing but a shell and she wants nothing but to return to the state
of early childhood, to the peace of sitting on her father's knee,
thinking nothing, being "in love with peace."

Charlie Marsden has

a piece of his dream at last, but only a ragged piece.

He is married

to Nina, but not as husband

or lover. Even in marriage he remains

"good old Charlie," even as

a husband he wears the mask of a father.

Charlie feels that he "has won at last," but he has won by losing.
has won by denying the passion he felt for Nina and by replacing the
face with the mask, by denying, in essence, his own personality as
he conceived it.

He
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With the destruction of the egos of each of his major charac
ters , O'Neill presents the -final plight of the m o d e m who is both a
determinist and a relativist.

To hold to a philosophy that sees all

truth as relative to the individual, the believer, like Strindberg,
begins by assuming that the individual soul is in touch with some
sort of divinity which gives meaning to his private insight.

But

when the relativist has come to the deterministic conclusion that
all other gods have been replaced by the "m o d e m sdience God," a
God who has in his blindness and indifference made "life so perverted
and death so unnatural," then he must look about for a newer, happier
God.

Like O'Neill, his first choice for the new God may be the

Nietzschean Dionysus or Mother Earth.

Thus Nina makes her act of

faith to God the Mother.
We should have imagined life as created in the birthpang of God the Mother. Then we would understand why we,
Her children, have Inherited pain, for we would know that
our life's rhythm beats from her great heart, t o m with
the agony of love and birth. And we would feel that
death meant reunion with Her, a passing back into Her
substance, blood of Her blood again, peace of Her peace!
This, however, is but another romantic ideal.

It is not long

before the thinking relativist •realizes that the rhythms of God the
Mother have little to do with the impossible jerks, starts, and fits
of the individual personality-shut up in a labyrinth of internal and
external masks and faces.

Indeed, God the Mother is but' one of the

many illusions which we use to hide from ourselves.

It may be by

some lucky coincidence we can in Her name momentarily arrange all the
masks and faces to suit ourselves, but to do this we must distort, as
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Nina does in Act Six, reality as seen by others.

This distortion we

call happiness. But it bears seeds of despair, for it cannot last for
long.

Others will soon object to the masks which we force upon them.

Like young Gordon who refuses to be the object of maternal love,
others will force us to change both their masks and ours, thereby
causing us unhappiness.
Life, then, to a relativist like O'Neill is like a play, a
poorly constructed one, an interlude.

We come out of the nothingness

of the womb, and although we are romantic enough to feel we have an
important individuality, we are forced by our very concept of our own
individuation to destroy ourselves and others.

The best we can hope

for is to make an early exit and find a little peace backstage.

The

only wisdom we can gain from such a play is that life is a "strange
dark interlude in the electrical display of God the Father," the
blind and pointless God of modern science.
With Strange Interlude the wheel of m o d e m drama has come full
turn.

Isben's shunning of the aside and the soliloquy created m o d e m

Extemalism and made playwrights aware that they were using an object
ive viewpoint.

In an attempt to break through the barrier of

third-person objective presentation, the pan-psychic movement
experimented with various devices designed to present a firstperson subjective point of view.

At the end of the first great

surge of m o d e m drama came Eugene O'Neill who was not afraid to
apply on a grand scale the once abhorred conventions of the aside and
the soliloquy, and to employ them in such a way as to produce the
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effect of a simultaneity of internal and external action--to produce,
in short, a veritable montage of thought, dialogue, action, and dif
fering points of view.
It would be foolish to say that O'Neill's use of these devices
is always sure.

There are far too many Instances where what was said

in the aside could just as easily have been said in the "spoken" dia
logue.

Sometimes this is done purposely, as, for instance, when the

dramatist wishes to demonstrate the simplicity of Sam's personality.
At other times it seems meaningless and much of the lengthiness of
the play can be attributed to the placing in asides and soliloquies
ideas which were inserted uneconomically or which could have just
as easily been carried in the external dialogue and action.

But

despite its weaknesses— most of which, as is usual with O'Neill,
are rhetorical rather than structural--Strange Interlude demonstrates
conclusively that the aside and the soliloquy have not outlived their
usefulness as effective dramatic instruments.

They can prove as

useful to the m o d e m relativistic playwright as they did to those who
wrote in a more absolute tradition.

Moreover, as O'Neill has estab

lished, they can serve as a means of compromise between Extemalism and
Pan-psychicism.

Their value lies, above all, in their ability to give

an impression of simultaneity of thought and dialogue, while at the
same time presenting that thought directly to the audience.
Surely the audience must have appreciated them, for in its
original production Strange Interlude made unique demands upon a m o d e m
audience.

They were asked to spend such a lengthy evening in the
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theatre that It was necessary to take an Intermission £or supper.
They were asked to watch a realistic play which used devices they
had been trained to think of as both unnecessary and unfashionable.
And what with all this, they were asked to listen to a play, with
barely a laugh to cushion the effect, which spent a great deal of
time driving home an unhappy point.

Yet they came in sufficient

numbers to keep Strange Interlude running for over 400 performances.
Thus, the play has passed some important tests.

It may not be great

but it is both acceptable and successful literature.

II
Giraudoux:

The Madwoman of Chaillot

In many ways, O'Neill's renovating of the soliloquy in Strange
Interlude may serve as a signal of the end of an era in modern drama.
Coming as it did at the close of the twenties, Strange Interlude is a
play written just before the world was to enter upon a new and unfor
tunate economic and political period.

With the turn into the thirties,

intellectuals throughout the world, embittered by the great depres
sion, became more and more concerned with solutions to social and
economic problems.

In keeping with the spirit of the times, a new

generation of playwrights arose who were not to be denied their right
to have a say concerning the current economic distress.
the soul were abandoned for problems of the social order.

Problems of
Extemalism

was the mode best suited for the presentation of such difficulties,
and, therefore, the oldest form of m o d e m drama enjoyed a new hey-day.
Experiments in Extemalism ranged from the realism of Waiting for
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Lefty to the Living Newspaper of the Federal Theatre to the Epic Drama
of Bertholt Brecht.
Considering the pressing nature of the social and economic
dislocations, it would not be surprising to find that during the
thirties the pan-psychic drama went into a complete decline.

This,

however, was not the case, but it is true that the fevered experi
mentation of the first fifty years lost much of its impetus.

Striking

examples of totally new structural innovations are much more difficult
to locate, and, in general, the eclecticism already noted in the work
of O'Neill became more pronounced as the world moved through the
depression of the thirties and into the war of the forties.

There

were, of course, a large number of playwrights who exploited the
standard themes and techniques of Pan-psychism.

Priestly, for instance,

investigated the Incongruities of the space-time continuum.

Thornton

Wilder attacked the problem of eliminating the "fourth wall."

The

movies, following the example of such point-of-view studies as
Beggar on Horseback, ruthlessly exploited the dream sequence and the
flashback.

In Ireland, Sean O'Casey combined the techniques of

Maeterlinck with those of German Expressionism to produce his dream
like work, Within the Gates.
Thus, the period from the beginning of the depression to the
end of World War II was characterized not so much by innovation as by
synthesis.

It was a period of consolidation of gains.

Both the

extemalistlc and the pan-psychic dramatists were less Interested in
finding new forms than in constructing the best: possible arrangement

220

of forms already established by the modern masters.

With the outbreak

of World War II, even this sort of experimentation was, for the most
part, temporarily halted.

In the stress of the war, playwrights grew

silent or marked time by writing propaganda plays.

Along with the

rest of mankind they watched in stunned borrow as, for the second
time in the 20th_century, a war demonstrated in harrowing fashion the
inadequacies of a totally materialistic philosophy.

As the war drew

to a close, the world, having been duly impressed and appalled by the
destructive power of science, looked for hope in things spiritual.
On the basis of the past history of the movement, it hardly
seemed likely the pan-psychic playwrights could supply a new hope.
The history of Pan-psychism is one of profound pessimism.

It began in

the nightmare anguish of Strindberg's dream, and, for many of its
practitioners, its ultimate view of life had come to be that of the
tragic dilemma between the face and the mask.

This history of pessi

mism nothwithstanding, Paris had hardly been cleared of German
soldiers before the people of that city were treated to a delight
fully hopeful answer to Pirandello's tragic paradox--Giraudoux's The
Madwoman of Chaillot.

To the citizens of Paris, Giraudoux argued

that having to wear a mask is not so bad, provided one selects the
right mask.
Actually, The Madwoman is a point-of-view study in the tradition
of Evreinov rather than in that of Pirandello, that is, the play is
projected solely through the viewpoint of a single character.

More

over, since Giraudoux produced the major portion of his work in the

s
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eclectic thirties, the play is a synthesis of both old and new
techniques.

But its Intriguing qualities lie not so much in the

fact of synthesis itself as in the things synthesized.

A brief

glance at Giraudoux's dramatic works will indicate that he was
interested in two phenomena— the m o d e m concept of the split or
divided personality and the ancient and enduring power of the myth and
fairy tale.

Sooner or later he was destined to bring these two to

gether in a consummate form.

Thus, in one of his last plays, a play

which he did not live to see produced in 1945, Giraudoux presented
the theatre with a fairy tale within the framework of a single
individual's point of view.
The reasons which led the French playwright to introduce the
fairy tale into pan-psychic point-of-view study can be found partially
in his background and partially in the statement which The Madwoman
attempts to make.

Writing of the forces which shaped Giraudoux's

thought, Laurent LeSage points out that the earliest and most lasting
influence on Giraudoux came from the German romantics, who formed his
major interest in school and who continued to hold his attention when
in 1905 he won a travelling scholarship to Munich to study at first
hand German romantic literature.^

in this respect then, Giraudoux's

dramatic heritage was that of most other pan-psychic dramatists.
Surprisingly enough, he did not undergo that flirtation with Naturalism
which characterized the early careers of such playwrights as Strind-

^^LeSage, op. cit.
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berg, Pirandello, and O'Neill.

From the first he "ignored Flaubert,

Zola, and Maupassant, and instinctively disliked Realism.

Among the

young German writers, Wedekind inspired his greatest admiration."^
Hence, Giraudoux came to the novel and later to the drama with the
ideals of the German romantics and with a deep admiration for their
literary heir, the Expressionist Wedekind.

These German Ideals were

essentially subjective and irrational, and their subjectivism and
irrationality were to be increased by the vogue of Surrealism, the
French counterpart of German Expressionism.
Giraudoux himself cannot be truly called a Surrealist, but he
lived and wrote during the time of their widest influence and could
hardly have remained unaffected by them.

Moreover, as LeSage demon

strates in his essay, "Giraudoux, Surrealism, and the German Romantic
Ideal," both Giraudoux and the Surrealist took their basic inspiration
from the same source--the German romantics.22

Surrealism, however,

was to put much more faith in modern psychology than did Expression
ism.

The Germans had postulated a cult of the ego.

ion of values should lie within the individual ego.

"The sole criter
The exterior

world possesses no real autonomy and must depend on the ego for ani
mation and meaning."23

The French Surrealists, on the other hand,

postulated the cult of the unconscious.

"Identifying peotry with the

2*Laurent LeSage, Jean Giraudoux. His Life and Works (Phila
delphia: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959), p. 23.
22LeSage, "Giraudoux, Surrealism, and the German Romantic Ideal."
23Ibid., p. 5.
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nonrational manifestations of the human spirit, Surrealists, like the
Germans, sought to exploit every psychic state uncensored by

r e a s o n . "24

Another m o d e m trend which manifested itself in France between
the wars was also to have a strong influence on Giraudoux.

This was

the tendency of certain French playwrights, sometimes identified with
Cubism and Surrealism, to return to a theatre dominated by myth, folk
tale, or quasl-historical legend.

This, of course, was an old tradi

tion which had never quite left the m o d e m theatre.

It had flourished

in the writings of the symbolists, and around this form as the form
destined to rescue the stage for poetry had gathered an Important
international group which included Yeats, Eliot, and Lorca.

In

France the use of myth and folk tale in the theatre was probably
strengthened and encouraged by Surrealism's Interest in the unconscious
and in the Jungian concept of myth as the revelation of man's univer
sal unconscious heritage.

Whatever the reason, France produced

between the wars several outstanding advocates of theatre as myth,
the most famous of which was Jean Cocteau, whose outstanding effort was
The Infernal Machine.

It was in this school that Giraudoux, whose

uniqueness resists any close classification, may be said to hold at
least an associate membership.

If Giraudoux is to be called a Surrealist

at all, then it is to this particular surrealistic tradition that he
belongs, for Giraudoux was to work almost exclusively with some form
of myth.

Even that piece of his which is not built upon some existing

24ibjd.. p. 45.
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myth, Intermezzo, can hardly be considered anything but a modern fairy
tale.

Each bf his better known works— Ondine. Tiger at the Gates,

Amphvtrion 38— are the retelling of a familiar legend.

Thus Giraudoux

was beholden to the surrealists for their championing of myth as form,
and he was, together with the surrealists, in philosophic debt to the
early German romantics and to their latter day heirs, the German
expressionists.
Giraudoux's debt to the German's Included both the belief in
the ego as the supreme guide to truth and also the tragic concept
of the ego as an entity locked in hopelbss conflict with itself.

To

Maurice Valency, Giraudoux's recognition of the individual ego's
"profound psychic dualism" was "the conflict that was to entangle his
interest in one way or another during the whole of his life as a
dramatist.This

internal conflict was to take many forms.

In

Siegfried. Giraudoux'8 earliest play, the conflict is between two
cultures— French and German.

A French soldier, the victim of

amnesia, is rescued and rehabilitated by the Germans.

Previously a

brilliant French writer, he now becomes a brilliant German author.
The play itself concerns his inner struggle when his true identity
is made known to him.

In Ondine the internal struggle is between

natural heritage and love.

The water nymph leaves her own world to

marry a mortal, only to find out too late that neither she nor her
lover can overcome with love that part of their natures which makes

OC

JMaurice Valency, Trans., Jean Giraudoux. Four Plays (New York:
Hill and Wang, Mermaid Dramabook Edition, 1958), p. xvi.
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them mortal and immortal respectively.
But Giraudoux's concept of the divided personality was not
exactly that of the German's.

To the

irrationality of Surrealism

and Expressionism, Giraudoux brought the undying rationality of the
classic French mind.

Romantic though he was, Giraudoux could not es-

cape his Gallic heritage.

Thus, Giraudoux's divided ego, as in

Ondine. suffers only when the total personality gives way to that
half which would force it from its natural position in the order of
nature.

If Giraudoux had a philosophic cornerstone it is a concept

of a well ordered world in which each person

retains his innate

uniqueness while at the same time he accepts and lives the role
assigned to him by nature.

Thus, Alcmene prefers to be the wife of

a mortal than the mistress of a god, and "the stiff-necked couples of
Sodome et Gomorrhe sin in refusing to be man and woman living con
tentedly together."2®

As LeSage sums it up, Giraudoux is "urbane"

enough to prefer to "remain on polite terms with the

u n i v e r s e . "27

He therefore "pursues a pretty dream of a world before the Fall," a
world well ordered by nature.
With such a background as he had, Giraudoux could harldy reject
the ego as Pirandello saw it, but he need not accept the Italian's
conclusions as O'Neill did.

Giraudoux's rationality offered him a

different and more optimistic solution to the face-mask conflict, and

2®LeSage, Jean Giraudoux. His Life and Works. p. 161.
27Ibid., p. 157.
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this rationality brought him to offer to a war-weary world a new hope
that grew out of the very phenomenon which led Pirandello into the
blackest pessimism.

Since the world is now suffering from certain

people's urge to move out of their assigned sphere and upset the
order of nature, and since the individual has both the power and the
necessity to wear various masks, why not, asks Giraudoux, make those
masks the single mask of a fairy tale world, a world before the Fall,
in which the unnatural disorder of the world, at least for the indi
vidual, is once more ordered?

Thus The Madwoman of Chaillot is a

Pirandellian dream play, a modern fairy tale.

To the superficial

observer, the play seems to be very much the same as any other
fantasy, and it does purposefully have the air of a popular fairy tale,
but it should not be confused with the traditional romantic fantasy.
It is no nearer to The Tempest, for instance, than is Strindberg's
The Dream Play.

The Madwoman is distinctly modern because while a

work like The Tempest, as has been noted earlier, belongs to everyone
in general and no one in particular, the dream of The Madwoman be
longs to the Madwoman alone.

It is her dream, a world seen through

her eyes, and if we are to understand it at all, we must dream the
dream with her.

We may not remain merely onlookers, comparing and

enjoying the differences between reality and the world of the Countess.
We must, if we are to accept and understand the play as being more than
a pleasant jest, actually join with the Countess as she creates her
world.

In this way, The Madwoman is like The Dream Play.

It differs,

however, from the Strindbergian dream in that it is a conscious
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dream.
mind.

Strindberg is reporting the movements of his unconscious
Giraudoux attaches more importance to the rational.

His

Countess is deliberately creating out of whole cloth a world that is
in contradiction to reality.

Her dream is a conscious creation of

her organizing intelligence and not a vision arising out of her
uninhibited Seele.

She is thinking the cosmos not feeling the chaos.

She is perfectly aware that the point of view she is assuming is
both an internal and external mask, but she is quite happy with the
mask.

In her little spat with Constance, for instance, she admits

there is a'disparity between the world as she sees it and the world
as she wishes to see it.
COUNTESS.
We promise you faithfully that we'll believe
it all over again afterwards, won't we, Gabrielle?
But tell us the truth this once.
CONSTANCE. How dare you question my memories? Suppose
I said your pearls were false!
COUNTESS. They were.
CONSTANCE. I'm not asking what they were. I'm asking what
they are. Are they false or real?
COUNTESS.
Everyone knows that, little by little, as one
wears pearls they become real.
As the Countess points out earlier in the play:
To be alive is to be fortunate, Roderick. Of course, in
the morning, when you first awake, it does not always seem
so very gay. When you take your hair out of the drawer,
and your teeth out of the glass, you're apt to feel a
little out of place in the world.
Especially if you've
just been dreaming that you are a little girl on a pony
looking for strawberries in the woods. But all you need
to feel the call of life once more is a letter in your
mail giving you your schedule for the day— your mending,
your shopping, that letter to your grandmother that you
never seem to get around to. And so, when you've washed
your face in rosewater, and powdered it— not with this
awful rice-powder they sell nowadays, which does nothing
for your skin, but with a cake of pure white starch—
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and put on your pins, your rings, your brooches, braclets,
earrings and pearls— in short, when you are dressed for
your morning coffee— and have had a good look at your
self— not in the glass naturally— it lies— but in the side
of the brass gong that once belonged to Admiral Courbetthen, Roderick, then you're armed, you're strong, you're
ready--you can begin again.
This world of the Madwoman then is the world of the consciously
assumed mask.

It is not a Cabinet of Dr. Caligarl. There may, of

course, be a certain pathos in the unfortunate disparity between
the face and the mask, but there is not necessarily any tragedy.

The

problem is to adjust the disparity so that the differences disappear,
not in the sense that the illusion is shattered but in the sense that
it is strengthened.

The greed and chaos of the world should be con

verted to beauty and order, a beauty and order suchas is found in
the land of myth, in the world as it existed in the legend of Eden.
The dictum which states that all truth is inner truth does not
necessarily demand that the inner truth be a nightmare.
just as easily be a romantic fantasy.

It can

Starting from this assumption,

it was natural that Giraudoux should wed the mode of fantasy with
the point-of-view method to turn the concept of the mask and the face
into an affirmative statement.
The progress of the play then is the progress of the Madwoman's
adjustment of reality to suit her personal mask.
flict arises from this problem.

All dramatic con

At the opening some of the minor

obstacles posed by reality have already been removed.

Whatever her

station in life was, the Madwoman is now a countess, albeit her court
consists of waitresses and rag-pickers.

This matters little, for
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these, at least, have the natural nobility which comes from living
in harmony with the universe.
devoted court.

Moreover, they form a dutiful and

They are happy and obedient because they realize that

the commands of the Countess are not the unusual demands of a maniac,
but the demands of a princess who cherishes a nobel dream of a good
and ordered world.

Their attitude towards the dream of the Countess

is reflected in the little scene between the waiter and the
President.
PRESIDENT. Waiter, ask that woman to move on.
WAITER.
Sorry, sir. This is her cafe.
PRESIDENT. Is she the manager of the cafe?
WAITER.
She's the Madwoman of Chaillot.
PRESIDENT. A madwoman? She's mad?
WAITER.
Who says she's mad?
PRESIDENT. You just said so yourself.
WAITER.
Look, sir. You asked me who she was. And
I told you. What's mad about her? She's the
Madwoman of Chaillot.
While many of the Countess's difficulties with reality are
already solved, certain minor items still remain to be attended to.
Young Pierre, for instance, roust come home with her, for among
other little tasks, he "can take the mirror off the wardrobe door
and deliver me once and for all from the old harpy that lives in the
mirror."

Then there is the matter of the Countess's role in the worlds

created by her friends, the Madwomen of Passy, St. Sulpice and La
Concorde.

She must, for example, put up with Constance's imaginary

dog, and with the not-quite»material people whom Gabrielle invites to
tea.

From time to time she becomes exasperated with the dreams of

her friends^ but she is usually able to recognize that they are
seriously attempting solutions parallel to her own.

Her attitude in
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the face of her problems Is best exemplified by her pronouncement
about Josephine's practice of waiting every day to see President
Wilson.
In anyone else, Josephine, these extravagances might
seem a little childish. But a person of your judgment
doubtless has her reasons for wanting to talk to a man
whom no one would listen to when he was alive.
The difficulties outlined above are, however, insignificant
compared to the Madwoman's two major problems— •the bitter and ines
capable memory of her lost lover, Adolphe Bertaut, and the rude
intrusion into her gay and gentle world of a hateful reality, the
realization that there exist greedy and power-mad men who destroy and
dislocate the order of nature.

The process of solving these two

difficulties forms the major matter of the play.

Adolphe Bertaut is

a problem which she has been facing for years, and, naturally, she
has made some headway.

His physical deformity she has already

turned into a mechanical mishap.

"Adolphe Bertaut has no harelip.

That was a scratch in the negative."

But as yet she has been able to

do nothing about the memory of his never having asked her to marry
him, nor the memory of having seen him, years later, as a dirty and
starving man who stole from under her hand a melon she herself was
about to steal.
Her second major problem, the elimination of the greedy
materialists in the world, is more immediate, since it is thrust upon
her only lately.

One day as she sits in her cafe, she sees and hears

three men who plot to destroy Paris for the oil beneath the city.
these men, the Madwoman's world of natural order based upon the

To
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individual is dangerous.

It is their enemy, civilization.

She

listens as the President describes his concept of her friends.
Good heavens, look at them! Every size, shape, color and
period imaginable. It's utter anarchy! I tell you, sir,
the only safeguard of order and discipline in the modern
world is a standardized worker with interchangeable parts.
The Countess then realizes that there are "people in the world who want
to destroy everything."
They have the fever of destruction. Even when they
pretend they're building, it is only in order to destroy.
When they put up a new building, they quietly knock down
two old ones. They build cities so that they can destroy
the countryside. They destroy space with telephones and
time with airplanes. Humanity is now dedicated to the
universal task of destruction.
To neutralize the ugly reality of such men as the President and
the Prospector, the Countess sends them to their death down an endless
staircase.

There is never any question of her ability to do this

since they, like everything else,

exist only in her mind.

friend Constance has the astuteness to point out:
tell us what you have decided.

"Very well then,

Since you're asking our opinion,

you've doubtless made up your mind."
but should she destroy them?

As her

The question is not can she,

As she herself says:

be merciful, but I must be just."

"I don't have to

In other words, she refuses to

yield to an impulse without rational justification.

She consciously

elects to banish the disquieting element from her dream.

She, at

all times, has control over her fantasy.
Down the endless stairs with the President and the Prospector
go all the other crass and mercenary men and women in the world.

This

is perfectly logical to the Countess; after all, "didn't the Deaf-Mute
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say they were all connected like the works of a machine."

Thus, In

groups, faceless and souless, appear the financiers, the engineers,
the public relations men, and finally, the hard and compassionless
wives of all three groups.
original pair.

All march down the stairs after the

Before their execution, the Countess has seen to it

that they have been duly tried and condemned.

They have lived and

died in her very subjective world, but with their trial she has
demonstrated that it is not the world of a lunatic but a universe of
conscious moral order.
Before sending her enemies to their execution, the Countess
summons enough courage to settle once and for all the question of
Adolphe Bertaut.
logical manner.

This difficulty she deals with in her own very
Since it is obvious that he will never return

to her, she rejects him.

She forces Pierre to play the role of

Adolphe, and in a curious conversation which becomes increasingly
confused by the interplay between past and present tenses of verbs,
the Countess gives Adolphe his dismissal.
PIERRE.
No. I love you.
I shall always love you, Aurelia.
COUNTESS. Yes, I know. That much I've always known.
I
knew it the moment you went away, Adolphe, and I knew
that nothing could ever change it. Georgette in his
arms now— yes. But he loves me. Tonight he's taken
Georgette to hear Denis— yes. But he loves me...I
know it. You never loved her. Do you think I
believed for one moment that absurd story about her
running off with an osteopath? Of course not. Since
you didn't love her, obviously she stayed with you.
And, after that, when she came back, and I heard
about her going off with the surveyor— I knew that
couldn't be true, either. You'll never get rid of
her Adolphe Bertaut— never. Because you don't love
her.
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PIERRE.
I need your pity, Aurelia.
I need your love.
Don't forget me...
COUNTESS. Farewell, Adolphe Bertaut. Farewell. Let go
of my hand and give it back to little Pierre.
Once Adolphe Bertaut has been dealt with decisively and the last
of the corruptors of the Countess's universe have disappeared down
the stairwell, the world takes on a new glow.
has very nearly replaced reality.
clear.

Life is beautiful again.

The Madwoman's mask

"The air is pure.

The sky is

On the street, utter strangers are

shaking hands, they don't know why, and offering each other almond
bars."

The Countess hears music "which seems to thrill from the

uttermost confines of the universe."

The voices of the friends of

animals, of flowers, of people and of friendship speak to her through
the music and thank her for freeing them.
not complete, however.

The Countess's success is

She must undergo one final trial.

The voices

of the Adolphe Bertauts of the world call to her and make a proposal:
From this day on we shall hold fast to what we love. For
your sake, henceforth, we shall be handsome, and our cuffs
forever immaculate and new. Countess, we bring you this
melon and with it our hearts. Will you do us the honor
to be our wife.
This, however, the Countess cannot accept.
much of reality.
crazy.

"Too late!

them away.

This is asking too

She may be the Madwoman of Chaillot, but she's not
Too late!"

she sadly tells the voices and sends

But it is not too late for Irma and Pierre.

It is never

too late for love to save young lovers from the difficult task of
creating a mask to replace reality.

Love will do this for them.

Love--like the dream of love which she has created— will one day
bring the world of crass reality into perfect accord with the world
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as seen through the point of view of the Madwoman of Chaillot.

Love,

if it can triumph, will return the world to the state of Eden.

It

will rid the world of "pimps" and engage it once more in the important
business of having morning coffee and feeding the cats.

Meanwhile,

as we wait for love to save the world, we can do our share by creating
our own world in the image of love.

This is the advice the Countess

gives to Irma and Pierre.
It's three hours since you've met and known and loved each
other. Kiss each other quickly. Look at him, he hesitates.
He trembles. Happiness frightens him...How like a man.' Oh,
Irma, kiss him, kiss him! If two people love each other,
let a single instant wedge itself between them, it grows—
it becomes a month, a year, a century; it becomes too late.
Kiss him, Irma, kiss him while there is time, or in a
moment his hair will be white and there will be another
Madwoman in Paris. Oh, make her kiss him, all of you!
(They kiss) Bravo! Oh, if only you'd had the courage
to do that thirty years ago, how different I would be
today! Dear Deaf-Mute be still— your words dazzle our
eyes! And Irma is too busy to translate for you.
(They
kiss once more) Well, there we are. The world is saved.
And you see how simple it was? Nothing is ever so wrong
in this world that a sensible woman can't set it right in
the course of an afternoon.
The Madwoman then is Giraudoux's answer to Pirandellos pessimism.
He does not deny the conflict between the face and the mask, nor the
conflict between inner and outer reality, but he does not see the
conflict as always resulting in the hopeless destruction of personal
ity.

To have a point of view, to see the world through ego-centered

eyes, is a blessing to Giraudoux, always provided the ego which lies
behind the eyes is motivated by humility and love.

If this be the

case, then if our face does not suit us, or if outer reality is uninvitingly cruel, we have the wonderful ability to exchange that face
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for a more attractive mask or to soften or abolish completely outer
reality.

If enough of us do this, consciously and sanely, motivated

always by

love, then all ugly

faces will disappear and the

world will

become a universe of freedom within natural harmony.
No one will deny that the world of the Madwoman is pure fantasy,
and the Countess herself would be the first to admit it.

But it is

the fantasy of a conscious artist, not the silly joke of a madman.
is sanely conceived and rationally executed.

It

Those who understand the

play only

as a nonsense farce which attacks big business are not only

making an

error, but they are also greatly restricting

Importance of a fine play.

the

theme and

As Laurent LeSage observes:

La Folle de Chaillot is generally described as a philo
sophical comedy about modern mercantilism.
This is quite
accurate if one does not imply that it is just a diatribe
aimed at capitalism. Giraudoux defends more than he
attacks, and his alms are surely not political. The
cause here in question is the very unspecific one of
poetry and idealism, a just measure of which is necessary
to keep materialism and practical astuteness from dis
figuring the earth.28
The world of the Madwoman is her personal fantasy, and as
such it has as much truth as any other inner experience.

It is a s '

true as the nightmare anguish of Strindberg and the torment of the
jungle visions of Brutus Jones; moreover, it is a controlled fantasy,
carefully created and fashioned by the poetic imagination of the
Countess.

Above all, it is one of the first point-of-view statements

which makes an appeal to some form of rationality.

One could hardly

^LeSage, Jean Giraudoux. His Life and Works, p. 80.
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call The Madwoman an intellectual drama, but it does hold forth some
ideal of an ultimate world order rising out of the chaos of subjectiv
ism.
O ’Neill, then, and Giraudoux offer two examples of pan-psychic
playwrights who look to older techniques to make effective their
modern studies in point of view.

The two playwrights select differing

traditional devices because each has a different point to make.
O'Neill found in the ancient conventions of the aside and the solilo
quy two excellent means of presenting a humanity simultaneously shatter
ed by inner conflict and by a web of confusion created by the inability
to express to others its own point of view and a reluctance to compre
hend alien viewpoints.

Giraudoux saw in the presentation of a fairy

tale through the viewpoint of the central character a method by which
he could turn the despair of Pirandello into a statement of pathos
rising into hope.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SOLILOQUY DRAMATIZED
MILLER AND THE EXTERNALISTIC PRETENSE;
ANOUILH AND THE CLASSICAL COMPROMISE

I
Miller:

Death of a Salesman

Not so very long ago, at a time when both Miller and Williams
had only lately appeared in the Broadway firmament, a number of Ameri
can drama critics took great pleasure in pointing out that the New
York stage was the proud possessor of an important dramatic dichotomy
On the one hand, there was Miller perpetuating the tradition of Ibsen
on the other, there was Williams writing after the manner of Chekov.
ThiB dichotomy was so obvious, so neat, so comfortable, really, that
one wonders why, in this age of planned parenthood and planned
economy, the two playwrights did not settle for planned creativeness
and climb quietly into the niches so cleverly prepared for them?

But

then, playwrights have generally been perversely elusive, and thus it
is that the dichotomy still exists, but Miller and Williams have long
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passed it by.

There is no reason, of course, to discard a perfectly

acceptable critical theory simply because there are no dramatists to
whom it may be applied.

After all, the playwrights may yet appear, or

better still, it may be that Miller and Williams, who are still rela
tively young men, might in the years to come backtrack sufficiently to
bring their writing into closer accord with the ideals of certain
critics.

At present, however, the latter devoutly-to-be-wished consum

mation does not seem likely, for it is hard to ignore the fact that
while the popular dichotomy is based solely on the traditions of the
external drama, both Miller and Williams have shown a strong interest
in the pan-psychic problem of presenting first-person subjective per
spectives.

It may well be that, as some maintain, this interest in

point of view is simply "heightened realism," but at the risk of being
too subtle, it seems much safer and more accurate to describe the styles
of the two playwrights as neo-pan-psychic.
To state the matter another way, both men are first and fore
most playwrights of the living theatre.

To be such means, among other

things, to be highly sensitive to the idiom which will make the most direct
and vivid impression on a contemporary audience.

On Broadway after the

war, as on Broadway between the wars, the chief means of exchange
between playwright and audience was the common currency of Externalism, and, therefore, it was in some real or counterfeit aspect
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of this coin that the two playwrights choose to deal.

But, on the

other hand, American audiences had become sufficiently educated by the
subjective experiments of the twenties and thirties, especially those
of the Theatre Guild, that they were not prone to offer vigorous
resistence to departures from Externalism, especially if they felt
that the play had at least one foot in objectivity.

Both Williams and

Miller, consciously or not, were aware of this attitude, and they soon
learned to toss their audiences a bone of realism on which to gnaw,
while they quietly moved the burden of their plays to more subjective
comments.

From behind the stalking horse of Externalism, they fired

their subjective arrows.

Theirs was a new subjective method, hiding

quietly behind the pretense of Objectivism.
Any one of a number of Williams's works, The Glass Menagerie or
Streetcar, for instance, would serve admirably as examples of the
new method, but none of them offer quite so striking a mixture of
subjectivity and objectivity as does Arthur Miller's Death of a
Salesman.

This bold and powerful play, which in 1949 took Broadway

by storm, was the first, and to date perhaps the only, significant work
to come from the young American playwright.

Prior to Death of a Sales

man. Miller had enjoyed some degree of success with All My Sons, a
well-made piece which raised some critics' h o p e s that at last the New
York stage had a true spiritual heir to Ibsen.

When Salesman appeared
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many of these same critics felt that their hopes were more than real
ized, for the play clearly wore many of the trappings of Ibsenism.
These trappings however were somewhat misleading, for much of what
might be called the Ibsenian quality of Death of a Salesman is not so
much the result of Miller's straining after "realistic" prose, as it
is the result of Miller's recognition of his own limitations and of
the subsequent use which he made of those very limitations.

Miller is

neither a poet nor a literary man, and thus his dialogue often smacks
more of the language of the street than of the study.

This, however,

is a more serious handicap to a novelist than to a playwright, and in
terms of Death of a Salesman Miller actually turned his prose style to
his advantage, for in Salesman Miller's posture is deliberately
ambiguous.

He wished to give the play as strong a quality of third-

person objectivity as he could, not because he wished to make a
totally objective statement, but because he wanted to lead his audi
ence gently and unwittingly into accepting a strongly pan-psychic
study.

Consequently, he seems to have made little effort to avoid his

own tendency toward pedestrian prose.

Instead, he used his natural

istic style as a narcotic which pacified those members of his audience
who demanded Externalism in their plays.
Just why Miller, who had proven his mastery of Externalism in
t

All My Sons, could not make his statement through objective techniques
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can be seen from his concept of tragedy.

In an essay written for the

New York Times. Miller states that he believes "that the common man Is
as apt a subject for tragedy In Its highest sense as are kings."
Miller feels that this Is true because he sees tragedy as:
the underlying fear of being displaced, the disaster
inherent In being t o m away from our chosen Image of what
and who we are in this world. Among us today this fear
is as strong, and perhaps stronger, than it ever was.
In fact, it is the common man who knows this fear best.*
Although Miller believes his concept of tragedy to be much the
same as that of classical tragedy, he is somewhat mistaken, for
Miller's sense of tragedy is completely and uncompromisingly modern.
A classic hero is not, like Willy Loman, interested in "claiming his
whole due as a personality."
in Antigone.

Take, for example, the position of Creon

He has no "chosen image of who and what he is."

instead, a received image of who and what a king is.

He has,

He acts in terms

of this image, that is, in terms of the universal not the individual
image of man.

The conflict between Creon and Antigone is, in fact, a

conflict between universal values:

all good kinsmen should act in

accordance with the laws of God and bury their dead; all good kings
have a responsibility to protect the peace of the state by enforcing

*M.W. Steinberg, Aspects of M o d e m Drama (New York:
and Company, I960), p. 229.

Henry Holt

242

the laws which they have fashioned.

Such an unfortunate juxtaposition

of two perfectly acceptable universal concepts Is the very essence of
the tragic situation in a classical work.

In short, classical tragedy

proceeds from the universal to the specific.
Miller's tragic view, on the other hand, rests in a very modern
manner on the individual.

If universal concepts are present at all,

they must be induced from the particular case.

Creon comes to his

throne with an image already prepared for him; Willy must build his
own image.

This, of course, is the necessary condition for modern

man, for he is born into an aclassical world which is not pre-ordered
for him.

What he ultimately becomes is his own choice, because while

there are a number of images to choose from, there is no single
received image for modern democratic man.

He cannot even, as in earl

ier times, settle comfortably into the position of dutiful subject.
Unfortunately, he is both king and servant, yeoman and lord, merchant
and mechanic.

Thus, Miller could not have been more contemporaneous

and less classical in his view of life's tragic implications.
may fall as a king, but kingship remains.

Creon

Willy's failure also

implies the failure of the salesman ideal, since that ideal rests
solely on Willy's concept of who and what a salesman is.
says at Willy's funeral:

As Charley
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Willy was a salesman. And for a salesman there is no rock
bottom to life. He don't put a bolt to a nut, he don't
tell you the law or give you medicine. He's a man way out
there in the blue, riding a smile and a shoeshine. And
when they start not smiling back— that's an earthquake.
And then you get yourself a couple of spots on your hat,
and you're finished.
Nobody dast blame this man. A
salesman is got to dream boy. It comes with the terri
tory.
Briefly, then, the tragedy of such a playwright as Sophocles rests on
classical deduction, Hiller's on modern induction.
It is possible to agree with Miller that "kings or the kingly"
are not required elements of tragedy per se. but it must be recognized
that

asocial view that made

it possible to create the concept of

kings and the kingly is absolutely essential to classical tragedy.
Miller*8 kind of tragedy is only possible after philosophy has come to
accept the belief that even the common man has the ability to manu
facture a world in his own image, such a belief as is demonstrated in
The Madwoman of Chaillot.

Once this view has become thoroughly

accepted, it is possible for a playwright like Miller to draw the
tragic conclusions Inherent in it, conclusions which in other forms
had beendtawnby O'Neill and Pirandello:

man is doomed to tragic

defeat when his subjective image not only comes in conflict with
itself, but also with the world as conceived by others.

To Pirandello

and O'Neill, this tragic defeat comes with a dying fall, with a long
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and despairing sigh.

To Miller, it is stronger, with qualities of

great moral beauty, for man may triumph over his tragedy if he is
willing to die maintaining his ideal image.

"The cotanonest of men may

take on that stature to the extent of his willingness to throw all he
has into the contest, the battle to secure his rightful place in the
world."^
Thus, Miller sets for himself a dual problem in Death of a
Salesman: he must, first, present a popular image of modern common
man, and he must, second, present that man in the process of creating,
maintaining, and dying for his ideal image of himself and his world.
To solve the first aspect of his problem, Miller cast over his play a
certain atmosphere of externality, since this is the quality which had
come to be identified in the public mind with a serious treatment of
the middle and lower classes.

To meet the second aspect of his prob

lem, Miller turned to the convention of first-person point of view,
and presented much of the play solely through the subjective vision of
Willy Loman.

It is some time however before Miller moves from an

objective to a subjective illusion, for the playwright carefully culti
vates the sympathy of the audience by introducing the Initial situ
ation and the whole Loman family as objects before turning to a

2lbid., p. 230.
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presentation of Willy as subject.

Moreover, Miller never entirely

discards externality, but instead, through the play, weaves a pattern
of external and internal statements.
In this way, Miller moves at once on two levels of reality— the
outer reality of the Loman family and the inner reality of Willy's
mind.

Moreover, we must not be misled into thinking that those scenes

which take place in Willy's mind are simply pleasant theatrical
trickery, a rehashing of cinematic flashback techniques.

The whole

structure is much more complicated than that, for often the flashback
of the movies is little more than a tour de force, a device to display
the versatility of the camera and the film editor, whereas Miller's
method is a surprisingly real combination of total human thought, from
the spatial-temporal reality of the object to the totally free asso
ciation of the subject.

So it is that at one and the same time the

play is both built and composed.

Howhere is this better demonstrated

than in the fact that while spatially, i..e., architecturally, the
climax takes place near the midpoint of the play, temporally the
climax happens many, many years prior to the situation and circum
stances in which Willy now finds himself.

As Daniel E, Schnieder

points out, the form of Salesman "is not that of 'flashback'technique,
though it has been described as such":
It is rather the same technique as that of Hamlet: the
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technique of psychic projection, of hallucination, of the
guilty expression of forbidden desires dramatized....Willy
Loman, exhausted salesman, does not go back to the past.
The past, as in hallucination, comes back to him; not
chronologically, as in "flashback," but dynamically with
the inner logic of his erupting volcanic unconscious. In
psychiatry we call this "the return of the repressed,"
when a mind breaks under the invasion of primitive
impulses no longer capable of compromise with reality.^
As Schneider correctly observes, Miller is approaching the
technique of Shakespeare, but not so much in Hamlet as in Macbeth,
in

particular the banquet scene

to

haunt the troubled king.

of Macbeth when Banquo's ghost returns

Or again, it could be said that Miller's

more immediate example is O'Neill's technique in Strange Interlude,
for Miller is making use of a unique kind of soliloquy for much the
same purpose that O'Neill used the soliloquy in Strange Interlude.
The difference is this:
Miller's are dramatized.

where O'Neill's soliloquies are verbalized,
Instead of presenting Willy's thoughts

through the medium of language alone, Miller is exercising the right
of the dramatist to render them basically in terms of action.

In

other words, Willy's soliloquies are more theatrical than literary,
but, above all, they are direct presentations of his stream of con
sciousness.

As Biff says, in them Willy is "spewing out that vomit

from his mind."

3
Daniel E. Schneider, M. D., "Play of Dreams," Theatre Arts.
XXXIII (1949), 18-21.
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While there can be no doubt that Willy is not particularly con
cerned with separating past from present, he is not, as some critics
would have us believe, a pitiable psychotic.

Like many other commen

tators on Salesman. Schneider's choice of the term hallucination is
ill-considered.

Apparently such judgments of Willy are the result of

the playwright’s stark juxtaposition of Willy's Intensely subjective
vision against that of the objective views and actions of the other
characters in the play.

This is the basic weakness of Miller's mix

ture of first and third-person points of view.

It is the penalty the

dramatist must pay for maintaining the pretext of Externalism.

In

other words, if objectivity is to be the point of departure, then any
significant break with externality will, by contrast, tend to suggest
mental derangement.

Moreover, Miller adds to this effect by having

Biff constantly Insist that Willy is insane.

This is probably done

to excuse and soften the rapid transitions from objectivity to sub
jectivity, but Biff's protests often serve only to confirm the unimaginatives* suspicions of Willy's mental collapse.

Miller attempts from

time to time to indicate to the audience that this is not the attitude
which is to be taken, but apparently he is not totally successful.
Fairly early in the play, for instance, he has Linda point out to
Biff:
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No, a lot of people think he's lost his--balance. But
you don't have to be very smart to know what the trouble
is. The man is exhausted...A small man can be just as
exhausted as a great man. He works for a company thirtysix years this March, opens up unheard-of territories to
their trademark, and now in his old age they take his
salary away.
Linda's diagnosis of Willy's condition is correct; her insight
into its causes, as might be expected, is only partially valid.

Willy's

loss of salary is but one of the many cherished ornaments which objec
tive time and reality are now tearing away from his carefully architectured image of who and what a salesman is in this world.

The

mutilation of a quiet residential neighborhood, the broken-down
refrigerator, the dilapidated and still unpaid-for house, and, above
all, the failure of his son Biff, all tend to make Willy aware that
his passionately conceived and passionately pursued dream of success
is no longer an ideal for the present, but an illusion irretrivably
lost in the past.

But the dream once lost in the object, the passion

still remains in the subject, and it is this passion, now as over
powering as it is unrealizable, which Miller sets out to portray.
Thus it is that each episode of the present forces upon Willy's
consciousness the disparities between it and the dreams of the future
which lay hidden in the past.

His son Biff returns home, not as a

conquering hero, but as a young man already defeated by life.

No

matter, Willy will find success for Biff in the events of the past,
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In that happy time when Willy was a successful salesman and Biff a
fine prospect for football stardom.

But even the past refutes Willy's

dream, or Willy refutes it himself, for his basic sense of honesty is
strong enough not to allow him to erase from his consciousness those
episodes which remind him that he was not the success he determined
to be and that there were even times when he gave stockings to chance
women while his wife sat at home and mended her own.
Ultimately, it is this sense of honesty which brings him to
review in the washroom of a restaurant that hidden and unhappy espisode which finally and completely destroyed for Biff, and in conseqence for the world, the image which his father had struggled so long
and hard to build and maintain.

This is the failure on which all

others hinge, for the present woes are but minor compared to that
great sorrow, the loss of his ideal posture in the mind of his first
born son.

The action of the present but serves to point up the

futility of Willy's attempt to recapture Biff for the ideal, and Willy's
tragedy resides in his willingness to die for an end which can never
be realized.

In a sense, however, since the image is and was always

Willy'8 and Willy's alone, his laying down his life in sacrifice to
that image does in some manner serve to fix and accomplish it.

After a

fashion of his own, Willy achieves his triumph.
To point up this highly subjective triumph meant that Miller
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must present as thoroughly as possible Willy's own point of view.
Since the image which Willy fights and dies for in the present had
been developed in the past, it is in the episodes of the past that
Miller presents the viewpoint of Willy alone; it is during these
episodes that Willy's chosen image is rendered and explored.

Against

these episodes, the playwright setB the objectivity of the present.
Miller has so contrived to interweave the two temporal areas that each
event of the present suggests and calls forth a happening of the past,
and hence gives the playwright another excuse for moving on to that
level of reality represented by Willy's point of view.

This inter

weaving of two levels of reality has its moments of unmatched power.
Take, for example, the climax of the play, the scene in the restaurant.
Here we begin on the level of third person objectivity.

Willy has just

lost his job, and Biff has failed, as he has so often before, to find
a job.

Neither, however, can manage to comfort the other.

Consciously,

Willy refuses to recognize Biff's new defeat, but a secret locked
somewhere within his soul refuses to be denied.
possess Willy's total awareness.
an earlier, more important one.

It rises up to

Biff's present failure has called up
Willy can no longer deny his vision,

and he rushes off to the privacy of the washroom where, shut off from
the world, he can allow his most bitter memory an opportunity to replay
itself on stage of his soul.

In a few swift steps Miller moves from
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dialogue to soliloquy, from the objective to the subjective point of
view.

As the intensity of Willy's psychic agony mounts, as we watch

with him his ingnominy at having his young son surprise him with
another woman, we move from fear toward pity.

It is at this point,

just as the scene is about to tumble into full-bloom pathos, that
Miller catches up and holds the tragedy of the moment by abruptly
shifting back to third-person objectivity.

In a nice stroke of

romantic irony, Willy is suddenly once again in the washroom and a
waiter is helping him up from his knees.

The shock obtained from the

shift in viewpoint is enough to place a strong check on our pity and
hold us on that sharp edge of tragic terror.

In such a scene as this

the compromise between inner and outer reality could not have been
more successfully handled.

Here as nowhere else Miller has skill

fully emphasized his treatment of Willy's internal life by sharply
outlining the subjective experience with bold strokes of Externalism.
Miller's particular use of objectivity recalls after a manner the deep,
heavy lines of Rouault, lines which set off and call attention to
those areas of the painting receiving unique or extensive treatment
in color or modeling.
In the final analysis, we cannot help but admire the manner in
which Miller went about solving the dramaturgic problem which he had
set for himself.

He wished to present a modern tragedy, a tragedy of
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the common man.

To his audience, the concept of the common man was

associated with Externalism, but to Miller's mind, the common man's
tragedy lay in his passionate desire to lay down his life for his
chosen image of himself.

To present this image truly and sympathet

ically called for some sort of treatment of a given individual's
point of view.

Therefore, Miller was forced, in the first instance,

to combine both objective and subjective approaches.

Having been

forced into this combination, the playwright turned it to his advan
tage.

The present Miller rendered objectively; the pertinent past

through Willy's point of view.

To relate the two, Miller had each

incident in the present serve as a stimulus which projected images
from the past on the screen of Willy's consciousness.

To portray

these images as they flowed across the salesman's mind, Miller selected
a device so closely akin to the soliloquy that we may call it the
soliloquy dramatized.

By thus blending the soliloquies with the

external action Miller was able to present the tragic conflict between
the world as we fashion it and the world as it fashions us.

As M. W.

Steinberg observes:
The function of the artist, for Miller, is to provide aware
ness that 'society is inside of man and man is inside of society'
and perhaps to help us to understand this relationship.4

4Ibid., p. 146 f.

Willy dies for his ideal image not, as some critics would have
us believe, because he lacked insight into his situation, but because
he refused to accept it as the only possible reality.
is sufficient to his circumstances.

Willy's insight

Part of the function of the solilo

quies in Salesman— as in Hamlet or Macbeth— is to establish this fact.
Although Willy denies to Howard that he had anything to do with Biff's
defeat by life, he soon recalls to himself the very time in the past
when he shattered Biff's ideals.

Actually, the question in Salesman

is not as much a question of insight as it is a question of will.
Willy deliberately selects his own subjective vision, and rejects all
counterproposals by others.

It is the major function of the solilo

quies to present that vision and to demonstrate the nature, scope,
and importance of Willy's choice.

The tragedy is not that Willy died

in vain, pointlessly and never knowing why, but that he had to die
at all.

The tragedy lies in the irreconcilability of the subject and

the object; in Willy's special case between the need of one man for
some small measure of dignity and the Indifference of the social
group, an indifference which forces Willy to lay down his life in
order to keep intact his sense of personal worth.
Death of a Salesman has its share of shortcomings, not the least
of which is the poverty of Miller's prose.

But such critics as T. C.

Worsley display an amazing critical myopia when they argue that the
play's basic weakness lies in its "episodic time-switching and place-
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switching."
A friend of mine said to me recently of this school of
American playwrights: They've discovered the secret of
American audiences, who, when they are in the theatre,
would much rather be in the cinema. These devices belong
to the cinema (and even in the cinema we have begun to
groan when the flashbacks start). The playwright's ace
is concentration of Interest and the Unities are behind
that concentration.*’
This criticism seems to betray an unfamiliarity with the whole
flavor of modern drama.

Even more, it serves to place Shakespeare,

or any user of the aside and the soliloquy, or, again, any violator of
the unities, among the ranks of apprentice playwrights.

What Worsley

fails to recognize is that Miller is not "time-switching" or "placeswitching," but reality-switching.

When a playwright is dealing with

inner reality he is not concerned with time and place at all, since
these concepts have no place on the stage of the human mind.
thing and everyone is always immediately present.

Every

To the objective

viewer, Willy may be in a restaurant washroom, but in Willy's mind he is
in a hotel room with his s o n and a prostitute.
precisely this fact.

Miller's point is

If Willy's mind were capable of perceiving only

the present, there would be no tragedy.

But because Willy, like all

men, is capable of an intense realization of past in present, of sub
jective vision in objective reality, his position reaches the point

^T. C. Worsley, "Poetry Without Words," The New Statesman and
Nation. XXXVIII, No. 961 (August 6, 1949) 146-147.
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where death becomes the only moral choice, the inevitable solution.
Perhaps Miller does confuse a large and unimaginative portion
of his audience.

Perhaps he should not have committed himself to the

pretense of objectivity at all.

But it is difficult to deny that

once having done so, his statement gains greatly in importance by
his willingness to examine the whole internal-external continuum.
Moreover, his solution to the problem of combining the two kinds of
human truth, while it may not be the best possible, is clearly supe
rior to O'Neill's somewhat labored efforts in Strange Interlude.

In

short, who is to say, in terms of dramatic conventions not literary
style, that Hamlet's considering aloud on an empty stage whether it
is "to be or not to be" is any more effective than Willy's conjur
ing up of a long dead brother with w h o m he can debate the same
question.

The most we can say about either of the two soliloquies

as dramatic conventions is that the one reveals a character more
linguistically minded, the other a character more visually minded.

II
Anouilh:

The Waltz of the Toreadors

While Miller was making his peace with the American taste for
Externalism, Jean Anouilh— the man whom Nicoll and Edward Marsh recog
nize as "the most original dramatist of our present generation"^ and

^Nicoll, o£. c i t .. p. 914.
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the modern dramatist "most worthy of study"7--was striking a compromise
of a different nature— a compromise with the French classical tradi
tion.

While it is possible to say that in most countries the modern

movements in arts and letters have meant above all else a rather
complete break with any neo-classic traditions and, at times, an almost
perverted surrender to the most excessive urges of romanticist think
ing, it must be recognized that in all this glut of irrationality
France has stood as the one exception.

It is true, of course, that

France is the birthplace of Surrealism and of the even more extreme
Dadaism, but it is also true that France has fostered m o d e m schools
which are wholly or partially opposed to subjective excess.

It is

no accident, for instance, that while German painters reveled in the
freedom of Expressionism, their French counterparts were developing
the equally romantic but much more intellectualized Cubism.

Briefly,

throughout the last three quarters of a century. France has had its share
of groups which cried out for more and ever more subjective freedom,
but it was never without a number of great artists who set for them
selves the task of turning the strength and liberty of the romantic
spirit to the service of urbane rationality.
group that Anouilh belongs.

It is to the latter

And although he is "a thorough romantic

^Edward Owen Harsh, Jean Anouilh: Poet of Pierrot and Pantaloon
(London: W. H. Allen & Co., Ltd., 1953), p. 34.
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at heart,"® Anouilh has dedicated himself to bringing "lucidity and
sanity to the tortured cry for mankind's conscience-striken loneliness
that came from Strindberg half a century before."9
This trend toward sanity and lucidity is especially apparent
in the French theatre, where it seems that the modern French romantic
is not so much attempting to create a new classicism as to impose
on his subjectivism the restraint and decorum of neo-classic standards.
It is a trend that we have already noted in Giraudoux, and it stems,
according to Francis Fergusson, from the "never-quite-broken French
theatrical tradition," a tradition which made playwrights feel it was
unnecessary "to join the cult:

they reject all the prophetic, re-

vivalistic, or hypnotic attitudes and strategies of Wagner, in the name
of the intelligence, the classic spirit, or the integrity of Art."1®
In this tradition Anouilh writes* and he is its latest and most
extreme exponent.

It may be that "in his romanticism Anouilh shows

particularly close affinity to Jean Giraudoux,"11 but it is equally
true that in his classicism Anouilh "seems to arrive at some conception

8Ibid.. p. 33.
9lbid., p. 34.
iOpergusson, The Idea of a Theatre, p. 207.
iiMarsh, oj>. cit., p. 192.
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of the theatre akin to that of the late Moliere."12

It is these two

traditions which Anouilh attempts to blend in Waltz of the Toreadors.
and he does an amazingly good job of it.
While Anouilh's tendency to compromise with the French classi
cal tradition can be noted as early as his 1932 work, Thieves1 Carnival,
it is most apparent and effective in his later works.

In such a play

as Waltz of the Toreadors. the similarity to Moliere's work is so
strong that it has led Marsh to remark that "the structure of the play
is exactly like a Moliere character c o m e d y . Marsh, however, is
something less than precise,
ities in structure, it

is

for while there are many striking similar
ingeneral quality rather than in exact

dramaturgy that Anouilh resembles Moliere.

In Anouilh's most recent

comedies of character, for instance, there is the same bitter-sweetness
of tone, the same urge

to

gostraight to the essence of a character,

the same "strong sense

of

universalities and

distinguish the loose classicism of Moliere.

abstract valuerf'1^ which

But it is, above all,

in his constant concern with hypocrisy, with society's relentless
corruption of innocence, that Anouilh most resembles Moliere.
These similarities notwithstanding, there are decided and

12Nelson, o£. cit.. p. 155

13Marsh, oj>. cit.. p. 174.
14lbid.,

p. 182.
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important differences between the modern and the Baroque playwright.
Anouilh belongs to what Nelson has called "the age of Pirandello," and
while we must agree with Nelson that Anouilh does not simply "tag
. along...in the wake of P i r a n d e l l o , t h e r e is no denying that
Anouilh is much concerned with Pirandellian problems of illusion and
reality, of Individual mutability, of man as a solipsistic phenomenon.
In these matters, Anouilh is closely akin to French Existentialism.
Concerning this Edward Marsh observes:
Before Sartre had made his specially atheistic brand of
existentialism a household word Anouilh was basing dramas
upon three of its main tenets, all typical of the mood
of our times. There is first the conviction that every
one is alone, that no full or adequate contact can be
made with others, and every attempt to do so leads to
frustration, or to erosion of self. Secondly, one is
no more than the sum of one's past actions as seen
through the eyes of others...Finally (one) is free to
make his own values and need not accept anyone else's.^
These existentialist concepts, especially the latter two, are
not particularly compatible with the supremely rational world of
Moliere, and they fit but poorly within the neo-classic framework.
Nevertheless, Anouilh must have seen equal value in both the Baroque
and modern principles, for in The Waltz of the Toreadors he set for
himself the extremely difficult task of combining the two sets of

l^Nelson, o£. cit., p. 155.
l^Marsh, o£. cit. ,p. 197.
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beliefs.

In terms of structural conventions, this meant that he had

to strike some sort of compromise between the omniscient approach of
Moliere and the modern playwright's first person presentation.

Sur

prisingly enough, Anouilh's solution is highly reminiscent of Miller's
dramatized soliloquy.
Until the last scene of the second act, The Waltz of the Torea
dors romps along in a happy mixture of riotous farce and brilliant high
comedy.

The point of view is omniscient, and asides and monoloques

are almost the rule rather than the exception.

To be sure, General

St. Fe has more than his share of asides and brief soliloquies, but
this is to be expected from the major character.

But in St. Pe's

soliloquies end asides there is a hint of other, decidedly different,
things to come, for from the beginning of the play we are vaguely
aware that St. Pe's inner thoughts are of a different quality from
the other characters.

In his soliloquies, for instance, there is a

stronger sense of introspection; they are true soliloquies, while
the thoughts of the other characters are presented in monologues or
in direct addresses to the audience.

The emphasis on the General's

internal state is increased by our awareness of the mysterious Madame
St. Pe, whose raucous voice and unseen figure lurk behind the bright
gaiety of the first half of the play.
Only once have we caught a glimpse of Madame St. Pe, and then

261

only a limp body, more dead than alive, carried over the General's
shoulder into the midst of a hilarious scene of comically thwarted
suicides.

Her dreary and unpleasant voice, however, is the first

sound we hear as the curtain rises, and it is not long before we
discover that she is constantly on the General's mind.

No matter

what the subject, his thoughts inevitably turn to her.

It is for

her that he has sacrificed his own happiness; for her he has kept
his true love, Ghislaine, waiting seventeen years.

For all his

brave military exploits, for all the slaughter of Arabs in battle,
the General is a coward before his wife.
hurt her.

He cannot bring himself to

This pitiful situation he explains at some length to the

Doctor, summing the whole unfortunate business up in the following
speech.
I t '8 easy to talk. You don't know the old biich--I
mean my soul. When she is face to face with my wife,
she bawls with disgust and fright; but when I make
Emily cry, when she starts to whimper in her wheel
chair— where I know she only sits in order to annoy
me; when I'm at last about to throttle her— don't
laugh, it has crossed my mind--and take my cap off
the hallstand and decamp once and for all; do you know
what she does then, the great goop? (my soul, that is).
She cuts off my legs, she floods me with pity, mean
ignoble pity, and old memories of love from the days
when everything was not dried up and stale between us.
She roots me to the spot. So then I hang my cap back
on the peg again and I take my soul on a little jaunt
to the brothel to see if it won't cheer her up a bit.
But for all the talk about her, Madame St. Pe appears only once,
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in the dead faint previously mentioned.
no one but St. Pe.

Moreover, she talks to

Through it all, therefore, we have the feeling

that whatever she may he in reality, the Madame St.Pe we hear about
exists only in her husband's mind.

This suspicion is confirmed in

the second scene of Act Two.
Act Two, Scene Two calls for the play's only shift in locale.
From the bright, sunny drawing room of the General, we go to the
dreary sickroom of his invalid wife.

This shift in locale also

signals a shift in the total quality of the play.

Up to this point

Anouilh's comedy has sparkled with wit and madcap farce.
humor becomes weird and macabre.

Now the

The General, we find, is married

to a witch, a harpy of great strength who leaps up to dance on her
paralized legs and who constantly shrieks out vulgarities and
obscenities.

Madame St. Pe truly hates her husband, and when asked

why she continues to cling to him, she replies in a most brilliant,
terrifying, and forceful manner with one of the universal truths of
marriage, one of the basic reasons why so many women marry and cling
to a man throughout a loveless lifetime.
To keep you, Leon. To keep you for always because I am
your wife. For I do love you, Leon, on top of everything.
I hate you for all the harm you did to me, but I love you—
not tenderly, you fool, not with seventeen years of waiting
and letter writing, not for the bliss of being in your arms
at night— we never made love together, you poor wretch, you
know it--not for your conversation— you bore m e — not for
your rank either, nor your money--!'ve been offered more—
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I love you because you are mine, my object, my thing, my
hold-all, my garbage bln—
Driven to a frenzy by his wife's vulgarities, the General leaps
upon her and seizes her by the throat.

As he forces her down upon the

bed, he cries out In summation of the whole scene: "Phantasmagoria!"
This Is exactly what the episode has been.

In a sense the

scene has taken place In objective reality, but how much of It Is
verifiable objective occurrence, and how much Is the purely subjective
reaction of the General we will never know.

This much we do know:

we have a view of the General's wife only as he could see her.

The

quality of the scene Is the quality of St. Pe's mind In the presence
of his wife.

Like the subjective portions of Salesman, the scene In

Madame St. Pe's bedroom is a phantasmagoria of the General's own soul,
a presentation of the dramatic illusion through his point of view, in
short, a soliloquy dramatized.

It Is a vivid, dramatically realized

psychic condition, a condition earlier explained to the Doctor as:
"when she is face to face with my wife, she bawls with disgust and
fright...She cuts off my legs...She roots me to the spot."
After the climactic moment at the end of Act Two, the play
returns, for the final act, to the drawing room of the General.

Some

thing of the bright quality found in the first half of the play is
recaptured, but this time in a much more minor key.

The wit is less
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sharp, more wistful.
ludicrous.
wife.

The farce is less vigorous, more melancholy than

Once again, St. Pe realizes that he has failed with his

He cannot even kill her.

By not being able to bring himself to

hurt anyone, he has hurt everyone, most of all himself.

He now

realizes that "there's nothing left but a ludicrous old pantaloon who
never saw a single one of his gestures through to its conclusion."
I have the impression that Lieutenant St. Pe is lying
bloodless on a field of battle, not even wounded in the
fight--some idiot's rifle blew up in.his back a few
minutes before zero hour— but that all the same he's
going to die.
In truth, the play ends in a typically Molieresque manner.
Since the central character has been studied, the plot is quickly
discarded.

A deus ex machina, in the form of a priest, appears and

informs the General that his secretary, and his rival in love, is
' really his long-lost son.

The General withdraws his claim to

Ghislaine, and all depart— the young lovers to their new-found bliss,
the Doctor to his own wretched wife, the priest and St. Pe's daughters
to the church for a thanksgiving prayer.
his shattered image of himself.

The General is alone with

It is all as the Doctor has said:

GENERAL. Dear God, how will it all end?
DOCTOR.
As in real life, or in the theatre, in the days when
plays were plays--a contrived denouement, not too gloomy
on the face of it, and which really doesn't fool a soul,
and then a little later--curtain. I speak for myself as
well as you. Your blood pressure's up to 250 and my gall
bladder is a bag of stones. Make way for the young! May
they commit the self-same follies and die of the self
same diseases.
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Like Moliere, Anouilh even takes the time near the end of the
play to toss a morsel of moral out to those who might feel the need
of it:
GENERAL,
(softly) Lieutenant St. Pe. I want to live. I
want to love. I want to give my heart as well, dear
God!
DOCTOR.
General, nobody wants it anymore. Let it unswell
quietly, that old over-tender sponge. You should have
sown fewer wild oats and had the courage to hurt while
there was still time. Life should be led like a
cavalry charge, General. They ought to have taught
you that at Saumur. Hy poor old friend, shall I tell
you the moral of this story? One must never under
stand one's enemy or one's wife. One must never
understand anyone for that matter, or one will die:
of it.
In an extremely short final scene, Anouilh sounds one of the
bitterest notes of pessimism in all comic literature.
left

alone, contemplates suicide.

The old General,

Suddenly a new maid appears, and

the General's taste for a pretty face rises up to animate hisbroken
spirt.
GENERAL. Pamela. Fancy that now, Pamela. And the
prettiest bosom in the world too. What is all this
nonsense about our having a soul?
Do you believe
in it? He's a fool that doctor.
Put down your
broom, my child. It's a bit late to be sweeping up
now. And there is never enough dust on things. We
must let it settle. You know, you'll find this is
an easy sort of place. I'm an old youngster and I
don't ask much— provided folks are nice to me. You
haven't seen my roses, have you? Come I'll show you
around the garden, and if you're a good girl I'll
give you one. It doesn't bother you, does it,
Pamela, if I put my arm round your waist?
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MAID.
No sir, but what will Madame say?
GENERAL. Madame will say nothing, so long as you don't
tell her. That's a good girl. It's nicer like
this, don't you think? Not that it means anything,
but still, one feels less lonely in the dark.
What Anouilh has done in Toreadors is to present an old romantic
brought to tragic straits by the corrupting power of society.

The

General's most impressive virtue, his compassion for human feelings,
is the very thing which has been his great weakness.

It is the

breech in his defense through which society has poured its polution.
In his despair, the General has turned to lechery, but this has only
added to the disintegration of his youthful dreams.

At the opening

of the play, he still feels that he can recapture his lost youth
and dreams.

In his thoughts he is still Lieutenant St. Pe., "gradu

ated second from Saumur!
thought of!
woman!"

No money, but plenty of courage and well

Ready to give his all for France, for honor, for a

By the end of the play, the General has realized that this

is, as the Doctor says, "but a tender memory."

He understands that

his life is wasted and meaningless, that he has fallen victim to the
same middle-class hypocrisy which he satirizes so brilliantly at the
end of Act Two, Scene One.
and he understands this.

He has settled for less than the ideal,
When his young secretary protests that he

would rather go fast and drown, the General replies:
You are quite right, my boy. It's a sorry business grow
ing old and understanding. Try all the same not to drown
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others, even in a good cause. That's what weighs heavy
on a man, hurting other people. I have got used to
everything, but not to that.
It is difficult to suggest a comparison between Miller and
Anouilh.

The Frenchman is so much the better writer, so much the

superior dramatic architect, his general so much more interesting
and complex than Willy Loman, that one hesitates to place the two
playwrights side by side.

Nevertheless, there is a basic similarity.

Miller's tragic view is much the same as Anouilh's.

Both see the

catastrophe in life as the individual's loss of his chosen image of
himself.

Miller sees death as the only way in which the individual

can keep his ideal uncorrupted.

This is a solution which Anouilh

h a s ’also suggested in Antigone, but in Toreadors Anouilh has arrived
at a different resolution, one which is both pessimistic and urbane.
In the face of defeat, one may submit with as much grace as possible.
Willy*8 answer to life is a wild and desperate taunt, the pointless
taunt of an insignificant beast lost in a concrete waste.

St. Pe's

resignation at least has the virtue of civilized dignity. .With the
intelligence and insight at his disposal, he recognizes that seeing
life as essentially meaningless need not force one into wild and
incoherent actions.

A system of intelligent order, however pointless

at bottom, is certainly preferable to a frenzied irrationality,
equally pointless in the final analysis.
hope of sanity.

The one at least offers the

Thus in the first instance, Miller and Anouilh face identical
problems.

They must find some means of establishing for the audience

the ideal image which their central characters have fashioned for
themselves.

They must also present the dangers, subjective and

objective, which lie in store for those fragile images.

To do this,

Miller depends most heavily on the dramatized soliloquy, Anouilh on
the traditional aside and soliloquy.

But at the climax of the play,

at that point when the General's growing awareness of his loss of his
ideal culminates in a terrifying psychic drama, Anouilh turns to a
device which he himself calls phantasmagoria, in other words, a
soliloquy dramatized.

Anouilh is the better dramatist, and his

interweaving of the traditional and the dramatized soliloquy, of
objective and subjective viewpoints, is much less obvious, much more
in keeping with the total quality of his play.

But this does not

prevent his technique from becoming, at the peak of the play,
identical to Miller's special kind of soliloquy.
Here, however, the similarities between Salesman and Toreadors
cease.

Miller's tradition is that of Ibsen and Strindberg, Anouilh's

that of Moliere.

Thus while Miller seeks to blend modern objectivity

and subjectivity, Anouilh attempts to unite subjectivity with the older
omniscient universality.

He pays homage to the classic spirit which

argues that even if we wish to portray life as meaningless, we need
not present it in an incoherent manner.

Even meaninglessness can be
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presented meaningfully, even irrationality can be viewed sanely.

Thus

Anouilh returns to the orderliness of the Baroque theatre for his
models and methods.

In this manner, the audience obtains not only

the General's viewpoint, but also the points of view of the other
characters, and all of these subjective variations are thrown against
the background of a single universal action in which all participate.
Moreover, the audience not only knows what each character things
and does, but also what the author feels about them all, for in the
person of the Doctor, Anouilh has made use of the traditional
confidant who listens to the General's problems and gives his— and
by implication— the playwright's view of the whole matter.
Anouilh*8 is a romantic world, a modern world in which
innocence and ideals are corrupted by time and society, in which
man is lost in his own spiritual isolation, in which all things, in
the final analysis, are meaningless.

But it is also a world of

civilized order, of sanity and lucidity, of intelligent wit and
rational restraint.

Whether this rationality is forced on the play

by Anouilh's selection of a form akin to that of Moliere's, or whether
Anouilh's own sense of order brought him to impose an old form on a
modern theme, the two do exist together in the same work of art, and
their blending sounds a new note in modern drama.

Once a playwright

has begun to place the check of classical logic on modern subjectivism,
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once has has by that step tacitly admitted that subjective truth
is not a law unto itself, he has taken an important turn away from
the "cult of the ego."
The history of the pan-psychic drama, the history of most
modern drama, has been one of profound pessimism.

There have been

few exceptions to this rule, and Anouilh's work is certainly not
one of them.
Pirandello.

His is perhaps an even deeper pessimism than that of
But it may be that with Anouilh this pessimism has touched

bottom; perhaps his rationality is an omen of different things to come.
The cult of the ego, the emphasis on the world as a reflection of the
subject, has brought us to the point of hopeless and helpless con
fusion.

Among the images, words, and symbols which bob along in

our streams of consciousness, among the maze of internal and external
madks of ourselves and others, we search for some sort of order.
It may be that Anouilh has located the object of our search.

It

may be that he has taken a significant step towards the returning of
the subject to a more sensible relationship to the object, towards
gaining a saner balance between the individual and universal ego.
He may not dispel our pessimism, but he at least clears up a great
deal of our confusion.
Anouilh is still young, and modern drama has not run its course.
It is difficult at this point to see clearly any decidedly new

direction.

Predictions would be foolish.

denying the signs.

Still there are no

Modern drama has become increasingly boneless,

increasingly decadent.

Externalism has long ago lost its vigor

and is at present the plaything of the crassly commercial theatre.
The more important Pan-psychism has tended more and more toward
complete incomprehensibility.

For the better playwrights, the

trend has been towards compromise, such compromises as are found
in Death of a Salesman and The Waltz of the Toreadors.

For the

moment, Western drama in general seems to have hit a plateau, and
there is no denying that France is the only country at present
which is producing a new and exciting drama.
is the leading playwright.

And in France, Anouilh

Who knows, but that his harkening back

to the theatre of Moliere is a signal that some sort of new
classicism is at hand?

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE:

A SUMMARY

Whether we rejoice in it or despair of it, whether we militantly support it or wearily disdain it, it is difficult to deny that
we are the latest participants in a long romantic revolution, a
revolution whose beginnings are buried somewhere in the late 18thcentury, but whose m o d e m manifestations did not appear until the
latter quarter of the 19th-century.

It was at that time that the

growing forces of modernism forced the emergence of a distinctly
different outlook, a new philosophy that began by rejecting many of
those concepts that had sustained Western man's image of himself
from the time of the Delian League to the days of the British Empire,
and a philosophy that was ultimately both a decided break with the
past and, at the same time, an inevitable result of the century of
romanticist thinking which had preceded it.
Long before the birth of modernism, romantic zealots had re
jected the concept of Reason as a guide to human conduct.

With the

fall of the rational ideal, all the tenets-of classicism which looked
to Reason for support were seriously weakened.

As the 19th-century

progressed, the most important of these beliefs, the long-standing
twin concepts of absolutism and universality--the two strongholds of
a view of human actions in terms of moral decisions--became less and
less vital to the romantic mind.
272

Thus it was that Romanticism began
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by successfully replacing Reason with Passion as a clue to human
motives, and, as the 19th-century approached its final quarter,
Passion came increasingly to mean individual as opposed to universal
passion.

It was this latter view that gave the primal impulse to

modern thinking.
A new awareness of the uniqueness of the individual, then,
lies at the root of that burst of Intellectual and artistic activity
which brought the 19th-century to a close on a note of feverish ani
mation.

The new focus on the worth and value of the specific led many

of the early m o d e m s to discard finally and completely the philosophic
bases of Western classicism.

In place of the old absolutism was set

a new relativity which devalued universals and prompted intellectuals
to seek final truths in the very subjectivity of the ego.

Essentially

this meant a new religion of the individual, a new realization of the
world in terms of the subject not the object.

In respect to the arts,

m o d e m relativism forced a stronger appreciation of the role of the
observer, and this in turn prompted many artists to search for new
forms which would stress the importance of the observer over the
thing observed.
In essence, the emphasis on the observer and his special post
of observation meant that the ancient artistic problem of presenting
the inner thoughts and moods of any and all characters was transformed
into the m o d e m problem of rendering the unique viewpoint of a given
individual to the exclusion, for the time being, of all other points
of view.

At first, this.problem was attacked through an attempt to

substitute a new third-person objectivity in place of the older
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omniscient method.

The obvious inadequacy of third-person technique

brought forth fresh experimentation,

new attempts to represent the

object through the subject.
As the century turned, m o d e m preoccupation with an egocentered world began to take on a stronger and stronger atmosphere of
irrationality.

The new science of psychoanalysis eagerly pressed

beyond the limits of human consciousness.

To the psychoanalyst the

key to all action was the sub- and the unconscious, those depts of the
soul which contained forces primitive and overpowering, forces which
often made a shambles of man's moral and intellectual structure.

The

problem of point of view thus became the problem of presenting
acceptable artistic approximations of the sometimes savage and usually
incomprehensible moods of the Seele.

In short, the artist as a m o d e m

relativist began with the assumption that the ego did not exist in the
world, but that the world existed in and for the ego.

When rapidly-

evolving m o d e m thought began to see the ego as an Irrational phen
omenon, the world as such became irrational.
Officer say:

As Strindberg has his

"If logic is absurd then the world is absurd."

indeed, to the m o d e m mind it was]

And,

The problem of point of view,

therefore, became one of seeking conventional means of presenting the
irrationality of the universe through the irrationality of the ego.
The solution to this puzzle was a device variously known as the radi
ation of the ego, the interior monologue, or the stream of conscious
ness.
A particularly talented and interesting group of contemporary
novelists began to offer some striking studies in point of view.

So
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impressive were the experiments of such writers as James, Proust,
Joyce, and Faulkner, so vocal were their critics and admirers, that
it was presently assumed by some that the presentation of the new
relativism through the convention of point of view was the exclusive
achievement of the novelist and that the method was, in fact,
indigenous only to the novel.

This assumption is difficult to

support, for the issue of point of view is a primary issue of most
modern arts.

In duly altered form it is to be found in most of the

spatial as well as the temporal arts.

Without doubt, it is the

central structural problem of a number of important contemporary play
wrights, but though critics of the drama have taken notice of its
presence from time to time, they have attached far too little signifi
cance to it.

Such an oversight is probably prompted in the first

instance by the meek acceptance of the pronouncements of the critics
of fiction, and in the second instance by the wide spread view of
dramatic realism as an end rather than as a stage in the development
of m o d e m subjective forms.

So completely enraptured were actor and

audience alike with the third-person approach of Ibsenian Exteraalism
that they assumed it to be the norm and goal of m o d e m drama, and they
were prone to view any nonobjective presentation of relativism as a
perversion of, rather than a necessary break with, the inadequate
objective approach.

It is this attitude which is probably responsible

for so much confusion in m o d e m dramatic criticism, so much hair
splitting and equivocation, so much quibbling over whether a work is
realistic or naturalistic, expressionistic or surrealistic.

Who can
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really tell the difference between the two former schools or the two
latter schools?

For that matter, who really needs to do so?

Actually, viewed in terms of method--which is, after all, the
key feature of any given period— the development of m o d e m drama
follows two broad directions— Extemalism and Pan-psychism.

Moreover,

in the final analysis, the former is but the necessary and primary
stage of the latter; that is, m o d e m drama originally attempted to
present a new, relative world view by rejecting the omniscience of the
well-made play and by substituting in its stead a third-person objec
tivity.

When the third-person method proved incapable of making sub

jective statements, a number of important playwrights of our era, men
like Strindberg, Pirandello, and O'Neill, turned to an approach to
the dramatic illusion through first-person subjective dramatization.
In this respect, then, the development of m o d e m drama is parallel to
that of the m o d e m novel from the objectivity of Zola to the total
subjectivity of Finnegan'a Wake.
Moreover, the parallelism of the two forms is the thing to be
stressed, for it is a mistake to assume that any experimentation with
point of view in the drama is but a late and naive imitation of the
techniques of the novelists.

In truth, the m o d e m dramatist's inter

ests in the issue of point of view were evidenced quite early.

While

Henry James was casting about for a means to present Isabel more
subjectively, Henrik Ibsen was doing much the same thing with Hedda,
and some ten years before Proust began dredging his stream of con
sciousness, Strindberg had already placed on the stage the grotesque
panorama of his own tortured metaconscious states.

While it is true
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that by 1914 Proust, Joyce and Dorothy Richardson had opened to the
novelist extraordinary new avenues for the study of the human subject,
it is also true that by the same time Strindberg and Evreinov had per
formed a similar service for the drama.

After the first decade of the

20th-century the problem of both the serious modern novelist and the
serious modern dramatist was the problem of rendering introspection,
not intrigue, of presenting the ego chiefly in relation to itself
alone.
It has been the purpose of this study to view the various
aspects of this problem as they manifested themselves in the work of
eight important m o d e m dramatists.

The study, then, is primarily a

study in dramatic form, and the focus has been centered throughout,
where it rightfully belongs, on the works of art themselves.

But it

has also been the aim of this investigation to demonstrate the sig
nificance and suggest the scope of the convention of point of view in
m o d e m dramatic literature.

Accordingly, the playwrights selected for

study were chosen because as dramatists representative of our times,
they serve to place this work in the mainstream of dramatic criticism,
and because as writers truly alive to the spirit of the age, they set
about inventing or perfecting new theatrical solutions to the problem
of point of view.
As early as 1884 Ibsen began, in The Wild Duck, to seek a new,
subjective perspective, but he was never willing to discard his own
objective method.

Therefore, although he strained dramatic symbolism

to the limit in Hedda Gabler, the play remains where it began, locked
behind the plane of the proscenium arch.

It thus fell to the lot of
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the great externalist playwright, August Strindberg, to break through
the restraints of the third-person method.

Strindberg's experiments

with staging his own stream of consciousness were soon followed by the
monodramas of Evreinov, and by 1912 a truly fresh perspective for the
dramatic illusion had been created.

Thereafter, many of the leading

playwrights of German, Italy, France, and the United States took up
the structural problem stated so strikingly by Strindberg and
Evreinov.

What each playwright did with the new dramatic perspective

depended upon his own view, of the individual in relation to the
objective world.
Among the eight playwrights studied herein the solutions have
been various.

To Strindberg, Evreinov, and Giraudoux, inner truth

was viewed as relative almost exclusively to itself alone.

Conse

quently, in The Dream Play. The Theatre of the Soul, and The Madwoman
of Chaillot. the three playwrights made their total statement through
the subjective point of view of a single person.

Kaiser, Miller, and

Anouilh, on the other hand, placed more emphasis on the tragic dis
parity between the subject and the object.

Thus, in their works they

attempted various combinations of subjective and objective points of
view.

O'Neill and Pirandello stand midway between the two trios in

the sense that they came to view life as an enormously complex maze
of interior and exterior conflicts.

To make such a statement the

two dramatists, in Strange Interlude and Six Characters in Search of
an Author, sought out methods of making both an objective and sub
jective statement simultaneously.

279

Whether any one of these playwrights, or any playwright for
that matter, is totally successful in his use of the new method is
doubtful, not because the technique is impossible to the drama, but
because in the final analysis the subjective perspective, in the
drama as in the novel, is committed to a much too single-minded view
of human conduct.

In light of this fact, the same general criticism

can be applied to both the m o d e m literary forms.

There is far too

much pretentious obscurtiy, obscurity which does not grow out of
difficult and involved thought, but out of a belief that the irra
tional impulses of the individual are of significance and interest to
all, and, consequently, should be offered in their most chaotic, most
Dionysian state, directly to the audience or reader.

It is this un

healthy and seemingly inescapable aspect of the rigidly-adhered-to
point of view method which has probably caused a recent trend towards
compromises with more traditional and more communicative dramatic
forms.

Playwrights such as Hiller and Anouilh have attempted a

return to saner and more lucid comments by combining pan-psychic
techniques with those of Extemalism or those of Classicism.
What will be the ultimate place of the subjective perspective
in drama is impossible to say.

As present, it is the latest and most

logical conclusion of a long period of romantic self-contemplation,
and as long as the star of the romanticist is in the ascendency,
there is no reason to believe that the subjective perspective will
ever fall into total disfavor as an important dramatic convention.
Its virtues are many; its weaknesses the weaknesses of the age.

The
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subjective perspective is the problem that lies at the root of m o d e m
drama, the issue which splits contemporary playwrights into two great
schools, the issue which transcends the boundaries of the various
"ism's," the issue which is the most distinctive feature of the
m o d e m theatre, the issue which both shapes and explains our sense of
spiritual isolation.

In short, the dramatization of the subjective

perspective is the central problem of-post-Ibsenian drama.
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